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ABSTRACT
Partial Circuit Replication for Masking and Detecting Soft Errors in SRAM-Based FPGAs
Andrew Mark Keller
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Partial circuit replication is a soft error mitigation technique that uses redundant copies of
a circuit to mask or detect the effects of soft errors. By masking or detecting the effect of soft
errors on SRAM-based FPGAs, implemented circuits can be made more reliable. The technique is
applied selectively, to only a portion of the components within a circuit. Partial application lowers
the cost of implementation. The objective of partial circuit replication is to provide maximal benefit
at limited or minimized cost. The greatest challenge of partial circuit replication is selecting which
components within a circuit to replicate.
This dissertation advances the state of the art in the effective use of partial circuit replication
for masking and detecting soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs. It provides a theoretical foundation
in which the expected benefits and challenges of partial circuit replication can be understood. It
proposes several new selection approaches for identifying the most beneficial areas of a circuit
to replicate. These approaches are applied to two complex FPGA-based computer networking
systems and another FPGA design. The effectiveness of the selection approaches are evaluated
through fault injection and accelerated radiation testing. More benefit than expected is obtained
through partial circuit replication when applied to critical components and sub-regions of the designs. In one example, in an open-source computer networking design, partial circuit replication
masks and detects approximately 70% of failures while replicating only 5% of circuit components,
a benefit-cost ratio of 14.0.

Keywords: triple modular redundancy, duplication with compare, selective, radiation, SEU, mitigation
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Radiation-induced soft errors are a phenomena that can threaten the reliability of a computer or electrical system. Soft errors are non-destructive changes in a signal value or memory
element state that are caused by ionizing radiation [1]. When an ionizing particle strikes an electrical component, it can induce enough energy to change the signals driven by the component. These
changes, while not damaging to the device, may propagate throughout a computer or electronic
system and disrupt its proper functionality. The first study of soft errors was published in 1975
when a series of “anomalies” in the behavior of a satellite were observed. This study concluded
that the passage of high-energy particles through the device could have caused the anomalies [2].
Up until 1978, it was thought that soft errors only pertained to space electronics. A 1978 publication, which coined the term “soft errors”, reported their occurrence in terrestrial electronics
at sea level for the first time [3]. Since these publications, the concern over radiation-induced
soft errors in modern electronic systems has grown [4]. Soft errors are of great concern to spacebased applications (e.g., deep space probes, satellites), high-energy physics applications (e.g., nuclear physics experiments, nuclear reactors), large-scale terrestrial applications (e.g., data centers,
computer networking, telecommunications [5], [6]), and other mission-critical and safety-critical
applications [7].

1.1

Soft Errors in SRAM-Based FPGAs
Space, high-energy physics, and large-scale terrestrial applications can benefit from the use

of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). FPGAs are integrated circuits that are configured by
end users to implement custom logic [8]. They contain an array of generic resources (look-up
tables, flip-flops, memory blocks, connections, etc.) that work together under a specific configuration to implement an intended design. SRAM-based FPGAs use static random access memory
(SRAM) to store device configuration, which makes it possible to reconfigure these devices re-
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motely an unlimited number of times without wearing out the device – a valuable feature. This
type of memory, however, is susceptible to soft errors [9].
Soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs may cause unintended behavior that results in design
failure [10]. The occurrence of a soft error is a fault, or a condition that could cause a design to
fail. An error is a deviation from expected behavior caused by a fault. A failure is an unacceptable
error [11]. A fault may occur that does not lead to an error, and an error may occur that is not
considered to be a failure. A fault that causes an unacceptable change in behavior is a fault that
causes a failure. Soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs may alter circuit configuration or design state,
resulting in unacceptable changes in circuit behavior that are classified as design failures.

1.2

Soft Error Mitigation Techniques
Several soft error mitigation techniques have been developed to promote the use of com-

mercial off the shelf (COTS) SRAM-based FPGAs in applications where ionizing radiation and
high-reliability are concerns [12], [13]. Some techniques are built-in to the device and offered
by device vendors [14], [15]. Other techniques are applied post-manufacturing of the FPGA to a
design as part of its development or implementation. All such techniques are meant to improve the
design’s reliability, or probability of no failure, within a given operating period [16].
Two prominent soft error mitigation techniques are triple modular redundancy (TMR) [17]
and duplication with compare (DWC) [18]. These are post-manufacturing soft error mitigation
techniques that utilize circuit redundancy to address soft errors. TMR uses three circuit copies to
mask the effects of a soft error in any single copy. DWC uses two circuit copies to detect the effects
of a soft error in any single copy. Both TMR and DWC show promising results when applied to
designs implemented on COTS SRAM-based FPGAs. TMR combined with a repair mechanism
has demonstrated a 15-6000× improvement in design reliability in several different studies [13],
[19]–[22]. DWC has demonstrated a detection rate of 99.85% for the occurrence of soft errors that
affect the behavior of a design [18].
TMR and DWC carry significant costs. TMR requires at least three times as many circuit
resources. DWC requires at least two times as many circuit resources. In addition to replicating
circuit components, these techniques require additional resources for overhead. TMR requires the
insertion of voters, and DWC requires the insertion of detectors. The application of these tech2

niques increases the amount of resources used. These techniques also increase power consumption
and can negatively impact timing closure. One study observed a 3-7× increase in power consumption [23], and another study observed a 16-24% increase in critical path timing lengths [17].

1.3

Partial Circuit Replication
Many SRAM-based FPGA designs cannot afford the costs associated with TMR and DWC.

The amount of resources, power, and timing delay available to a design may be limited. If TMR or
DWC require more resources or power than is available or introduce timing delay beyond what is
allowable, then TMR or DWC cannot be used in their full form. In these situations, only a portion
of circuit components may be replicated.
In situations where full TMR or full DWC is not feasible, a selective or partial application of TMR or DWC may be applied instead. A partial application of TMR or DWC involves
the replication of only a subset of utilized circuit components. Components that are replicated
are either triplicated under TMR or duplicated under DWC. Non-replicated components are not
included in TMR or DWC. TMR and DWC provide error masking and detection, respectively, to
the components replicated. In this way, partial TMR or partial DWC provide some of the benefits
of full TMR or full DWC at a lower cost of implementation. This allows and encourages the use
of partial circuit replication in situations where the benefits of TMR or DWC are desired and the
resources for full implementation are not available.

1.3.1

Expected Benefit
Partial circuit replication is expected to provide benefits proportional to the portion of the

circuit replicated. A design with an average failure rate, λavg , of 1.0 failures per unit time should see
a 50% reduction in average failure rate (from 1.0 failures per unit time to 0.5 failures per unit time)
when partial circuit reduction is applied to 50% of all circuit components. This assumes a constant
hazard rate (time invariant), the inclusion of repair for partial TMR, and that each component
contributes equally toward the average failure rate of the design. A cost, ρ, of 30% (i.e., having
30% of circuit components replicated) should reduce the average failure rate by 30% (from 1.0
failures per unit time to 0.7 failures per unit time). The reduction, γ, is defined in Equation 1.1
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0 is the average failure rate after partial circuit replication is applied.
where λavg

γ = 1−

0
λavg
λavg

(1.1)

The benefit-cost ratio, or reduction divided by cost (i.e., γ/ρ), is expected to be 1.0. This ratio can
be less than 1.0 when reduction is proportionally smaller than the cost, or even negative when the
average failure rate is increased by the overhead of TMR or DWC. A benefit-cost ratio greater than
1.0 can be obtained when reduction is proportionally larger than the cost.

1.3.2

Thesis and Contributions
This dissertation proposes that more benefit than expected may be obtained from partial cir-

cuit replication in complex SRAM-based FPGA designs when partial circuit replication is applied
to critical components and sub-regions as identified through attribute-based selection approaches
and targeted fault injection analysis. This claim is supported by the following contributions:
• A reliability model and accompanying metrics that explain the expected benefit of partial
circuit replication,
• Implementations of partial circuit replication on two FPGA-based computer networking designs that demonstrate benefit from partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs,
• An exploration of several attribute-based selection approaches on another FPGA design to
identify general principles that make for a more effective replication selection,
• The identification of critical components and sub-regions through targeted fault injection,
and
• The implementation of partial circuit replication on critical components and sub-regions (as
identified through attributed-based selection and targeted fault injection) in two complex
FPGA-based networking designs in which large benefit-cost ratios are observed.
These contributions build off of related works and advance the state-of-the-art. Several
studies have been conducted that are related to partial circuit replication [18], [24]–[34]. This
4

dissertation explores an aspect of partial circuit replication not yet studied, the effective use of
partial circuit replication in complex FPGA-based design for masking and detecting failures. The
outcomes of this dissertation demonstrate promise in the effective use of partial circuit replication
(large benefit-cost ratio) and provide a stable foundation upon which future work may be established.

1.4

Publications
I have authored or co-authored several publications that either directly or indirectly sup-

port the research conducted in this dissertation. Each publication has been published or has been
accepted for publication. A list of my publications in chronological order with an accompanying
summary for each publication is provided in Appendix A. This dissertation builds upon each of
these individual efforts.

1.5

Organization

This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 addresses soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs. This chapter establishes the failure
mechanisms that partial circuit replication mitigates against.
• Chapter 3 addresses soft error mitigation techniques that have been developed for SRAMbased FPGAs. This chapter establishes TMR, DWC, and other mitigation technique foundations upon which partial circuit replication is built.
• Chapter 4 addresses partial circuit replication. This chapter details expected benefits and
challenges of implementing partial circuit replication on SRAM-based FPGAs.
• Chapter 5 evaluates initial implementations of partial circuit replication on two complex
FPGA-based computer networking designs.
• Chapter 6 evaluates various selection approaches for partial circuit replication on another
FPGA design to identify general principles that make for a more effective selection.
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• Chapter 7 identifies critical components and sub-regions through targeted fault injection and
explores applications of partial circuit replication to these critical components and surrounding logic on two complex FPGA-based computer networking designs.
• Chapter 8 concludes this work.
Several appendices are included as supplementary material.
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CHAPTER 2.

SOFT ERRORS IN SRAM-BASED FPGAS

Soft errors are radiation-induced faults in an electronic device that cause changes to the
value of an electrical signal or the state of a memory element within the affected device [1]. The
changes affected are non-permanent and non-damaging. A change in signal value lasts only a
short period of time, and a change in the state of a memory element lasts only until the state is
overwritten or until the device is power cycled. Soft errors are the most common radiation-induced
effects that occur in SRAM-based FPGAs [35].
This chapter motivates the need for partial circuit replication by detailing the effects of
soft errors on SRAM-based FPGA designs. It describes the relationship between soft errors and
design failures. It discusses the different types of soft errors and the effects they have on circuits
implemented on SRAM-based FPGAs. It presents common metrics for quantifying the risk or
likelihood of radiation-induced design failures.

2.1

Conditions Necessary for Design Failure
Several conditions must be met for a soft error to result in a design failure. A soft error

by itself is merely a fault or a condition that could cause a design to fail. In order for a failure to
occur, the fault must cause an error, or a deviation from expected behavior; and the error must be
unacceptable. If no errors occur or resultant errors are acceptable, conditions have not been met
for a design failure.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the possible outcomes of a soft error occurrence in an SRAM-based
FPGA. When an soft error occurs, the circuit of an implemented design may remain unchanged
(no difference in circuit configuration, design state, or signal values). If a circuit is changed by
the occurrence of the soft error, the observable behavior of the circuit may or may not deviate
from expected behavior. If deviation from expected behavior occurs, the error may or may not be
considered a failure (an unacceptable deviation from expected behavior).
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Soft Error
Occurs

Circuit
Changed

Unexpected
Behavior

Unacceptable
(Failure)

Circuit
Unchanged

Expected
Behavior

Acceptable
(Error)

Figure 2.1: Possible Outcomes of a Soft Error Occurrence

When a soft error occurs, circuits implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA remain unchanged when the soft error affects resources that are not allocated by the implemented circuit.
Circuits implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA make use of only a subset of all available resources. As such, soft errors that affect un-allocated resources are unlikely to affect the implemented circuit. In this way, the occurrence of a soft error may leave a circuit implemented on an
SRAM-based FPGA unchanged.
If an implemented circuit is altered by the occurrence of a soft error, the behavior of the
circuit may not deviate from expected behavior. Alterations to configuration memory, memory
element states, or signal values pertaining to resources allocated by an implemented circuit may
not affect the functional behavior of the circuit. Input stimulus to the circuit may not expose the
changes that have taken place; and errors may be functionally, logically, or temporally masked
before they can be observed on the primary outputs of the circuit [6].
If the behavior of the circuit deviates from expected behavior, the unexpected behavior
(error) may be acceptable. Acceptable errors are those whose behavior falls within tolerable specifications. For example, an error that causes the loss of a network packet or a single image frame in
a video stream may have no effect on the fulfillment of the desired service. Higher level protocols
may be able to compensate for the error, making it a non-issue. As such, soft errors may cause
unexpected behavior that is not a design failure.
If observed deviation from expected behavior is intolerable, a design failure has occurred.
For a soft error to cause a design failure, three conditions must be met. First, the soft error must
affect a resource allocated by an implemented circuit (thereby changing the circuit). Second, the
change to the circuit must alter the observed behavior of the circuit. Third, the deviation from
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expected behavior must fall outside of tolerable limits. As such, a design failure only results from
a soft error when the soft error results in intolerable behavior.
This cascade of events and qualification for failure limits the percentage of soft errors that
is successful in causing a design failure. Figure 2.2 demonstrates this breakdown of all soft error
occurrences into those that result in design failure. Figure 2.2a shows that soft errors may occur in
any device resource: configuration memory (CRAM), user block memories (BRAM), distributed
user memories (LUTRAM), flip-flop registers (FF), and other resources. Figure 2.2b shows that
only a portion of CRAM pertains to the implemented circuit (critical bits) and that only a portion
of all soft errors changes the implemented circuit. Figure 2.2c shows that only a portion of soft
errors that change an implemented circuit results in intolerable behavior (design failure). As such,
the likelihood of a failure event is less likely than that of the occurrence of a soft error.

CRAM
CRAM
CRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM

Tolerable
Tolerable
Tolerable
Never
Never
Never
Critical
Critical
Critical
Activated
Activated
Activated
Failure
Failure
Failure
Bits Bits
SoftBits
errors
Soft errors
Soft
thaterrors
that that
LUTRAM
LUTRAM
LUTRAM
/ Masked
/ Masked
/ Masked
Persistent
Persistent
Persistent
change
change
circuit
change
circuitcircuit
Failure
Failure
Failure
FF Other
FF Other
FF Other

(a) Universe – Any Soft Error

(b) Critical Bits and Soft Errors
that Affect the Design Circuit

(c) Subsets of Soft Errors
that Affect the Design Circuit

Figure 2.2: Breakdown of All Soft Errors to those that Induced Design Failures

In order for a design to fail, the SEU must affect resources allocated by the design, the
affected resources must be activated by stimulus presented to the design (i.e., must contribute to
the outcome of the design), and the affected outcome of the design must fall outside of specified
tolerable behavior. These requirements mitigate the severity of an SEU occurrence because they
specify that only a portion of SEUs (when present during certain periods) will lead to design failure.
Partial circuit replication aims to mask or detect soft errors in critical components and subregions of a circuit implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA, thereby greatly reducing the risk of
radiation-induced design failure. The more qualifiers an error must meet to be considered a failure,
the less likely a failure is to occur. For example, persistent failures (shown in Figure 2.2c) are less
9

likely to occur compared to the occurrence of any failure. Persistent failures are those that remain
in affect over long periods of time without self-resolution [25]. As such, a smaller portion of the
implemented circuit may pertain to the occurrence of a specific failure mode. By applying partial
circuit replication to critical components and sub-regions associated with a specific design failure
mode, it is hypothesized that the likelihood of radiation-induced failure can be greatly reduced.

2.2

Soft Error Types
Radiation effects are primarily caused by the funneling phenomenon [36]. The funneling

phenomenon occurs when an ionizing particle passes through a microelectronic device, creating
funnel-shaped equipotential surfaces that alter the flow of electrical current through the device.
This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 2.3. As an ionizing particle passes through the junction
and depletion layers of the semiconductor device, it creates a current of electrons and a current
of holes that travel in opposite directions. This increases charge density, thereby increasing the
likelihood that a critical charge is collected. This phenomenon can be caused by direct ionization
(collision with an ionizing particle) or by indirect ionization (collision of an uncharged particle
that creates an ionizing particle through an interaction with device materials).

Ionizing Particle

Drain

Gate
Funnel

Depletion Layer

Holes
Current

Source
+ +
- + + - +

Electron
Current

N-type MOSFET
Figure 2.3: Funneling Phenomenon. Figure adapted from Figure 3.3 in [36].

Soft errors are a type of radiation effect that can occur in modern microelectronic devices [4]. They fall under a class of radiation effects known as single-event effects (SEEs). SEEs
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are any observable change in a microelectronic device that is caused by a single energetic atomic
particle passing through the device [1]. Soft errors are SEEs that do not cause permanent damage
to the affected device. Several sub-types of SEEs fall under the category of soft errors. SEEs
that cause permanent damage to a device are known as hard errors. Figure 2.4 displays a brief
taxonomy of SEEs to explain the context of soft errors.

Single-Event Effect (SEE)
Hard Error

Soft Error
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Single-Event Transient (SET)
Single-Event Upset (SEU)
Multiple-Cell Upset (MCU)
Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)

Single-Event
Single-Event
Single-Event
Single-Event

Latch-Up (SEL)
Hard Error (SHE)
Burnout (SEB)
Gate Rupture (SEGR)

Figure 2.4: SEE Taxonomy

Soft errors manifest themselves as single-event transients (SET), single-event upsets (SEU),
multi-cell upsets (MCU), and single-event functional interrupts (SEFIs). SETs are short-lived
changes in the voltage of a signal that last only picoseconds to nanoseconds. These changes can
be latched, allowing them to stay in memory. SEUs are changes to the state of a memory element
such as a flip-flop. They occur when an SET disrupts the positive feedback loop inside a memory
cell. This is depicted in Figure 2.5. When an SET occurs at an information node of a six-transistor
SRAM cell, it can invert the value stored in the cell. MCUs are the occurrence of multiple SEUs
caused by a single particle strike. SEFIs are SEEs that affect a device-wide feature or function [36].
Hard errors are SEEs that cause permanent damage. Hard errors include single-event latchup (SEL), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), and single-event hard
error (SHE). Since hard errors cause permanent damage, devices that are prone to such errors are
generally avoided in applications where the presence of radiation is a concern [35]. SELs are
parasitic structures equivalent to a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) or a PNPN structure that effectively creates a short between power and ground [1]. Device damage may be avoided if the
affected device is powered down before high-current damage occurs. SEBs are SELs that result
in catastrophic failure. An SEGR is an SEE that results in the breakdown of the gate oxide in a
MOSFET device. Subsequently a conductive path is created, which may result in the degrada11
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Figure 2.5: An SET and an SEU. Figure adapted from Figures 3.4 and 3.5 in [36].

tion or complete failure of the device [37]. SHEs are a catch-all classification which includes all
irreversible changes in operation that result from a particle strike.

2.3

Effects on SRAM-Based FPGA Implemented Circuits
The most common radiation-induced fault in SRAM-based FPGAs is an SEU [35]. Current

understanding is that SEUs are far more likely than latched SETs due to the large number of
susceptible SRAM cells that are dedicated to configuration memory. Table 2.1 gives an example
breakdown of SEU susceptible memory in a modern, moderately sized SRAM-based FPGA (a
Stratix V GX A7). Flip-flops that could latch an SET are greatly outnumbered by configuration
memory (CRAM). This makes it difficult to observe latched SETs as SEUs in CRAM are far more
likely to occur. Thus, one of the greatest concerns that SRAM-based FPGAs face, when it comes
to radiation, is the occurrence of SEUs in device configuration memory and active design state
(values stored in flip-flops, block memories, distributed memories, etc.).
SEUs in SRAM-based FPGAs corrupt device CRAM and active design state [35]. CRAM
enables routes, sets look-up table (LUT) equations, and adjusts the behavior of circuit components.
Active design state includes the values in registers (i.e., flip-flops – FF), distributed memories (i.e.,
LUTRAMs), block memories (i.e., BRAMs), and control registers for specialized IP. Values stored
in active design state update during design operation, whereas values in CRAM do not typically
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Table 2.1: Breakdown of SEU Susceptible Memory in a Stratix V GX A7 FPGA

Type
CRAM
BRAM (M20K)
LUTRAM (MLAB)
Flip-Flop

Bits
91,170,156
52,428,800
7,511,040
938,880

Percentage
60%
34%
5%
1%

change once initialized. All of these memory elements are susceptible to SEUs [9]. The corruption
of values stored in CRAM and active design state by SEUs may lead to unexpected behavior.

2.3.1

Effects Based on Location in Device
CRAM bits govern associated configurable resources that get allocated by designs imple-

mented on SRAM-based FPGAs. The general architecture of such a device is presented to explain
the critical role that correct CRAM values play in the proper operation of a design. Figure 2.6
depicts a generalized layout of an island-style FPGA architecture [38]. A design implemented
on one of these devices allocates resources within clusters (e.g., look-up tables, registers) and
other resources (e.g., IO, multi-gigabit transceivers – MGT, digital signal processing units – DSP,
block memories – BRAM, digital clock managers – DCM). Each of these resources is surrounded
by connection resources. Connection resources are used to complete connections between allocated components. All of the connections and component behaviors are governed by a large set
of CRAM bits. These CRAM bits define which resources are allocated by a design and how the
allocated resources are meant to behave.
The corruption of CRAM bits directly affects utilized resources. Figure 2.7 provides two
examples of how CRAM bits are used to configure the behavior of available resources. By extension, possible negative outcomes of CRAM corruption are discussed. The first example given, in
Figure 2.7a, is of a LUT implementation. CRAM bits M0-MF set the output value for a specific
input address held on I0-I3. Corruption of M0-MF would directly cause the output value, O, to
be incorrect for the affected input addresses. The second example given, in Figure 2.7b, is of a
connection multiplexer (MUX) implementation adapted from [39]. CRAM bits M0-M6 activate
pass transistors to allow a specific input, I0-I11, to propagate the output, O. Corruption of these
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Figure 2.6: Layout of an Island-Style FPGA Architecture

CRAM bits could instantly disconnect a connection, or short one or more connections together
unintentionally [40].
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Figure 2.7: Examples of Resource Implementations Governed by CRAM bits

SEUs can occur in the following places in an SRAM-based FPGA:
• CRAM:
– Routing (connections),
– LUT equations,
– LUT behavior (ROM vs RAM),
– Flip-flop reset behavior,
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– Device-wide configuration,
– IO bank behavior, and
– Behavior of other components.
• Flip-flop values,
• Distributed memory values,
• Block memory values,
• Internal DSP pipeline register values, and
• Registers that control the dynamic behavior of hardened IP blocks.
SEUs in these locations can cause changes in the implementation, design state, and behavior of
a circuit. A subset of the available components in a device are configured to work together to
implement a design. When an SEU occurs, resources are reconfigured or internal design state
is altered. These changes may make it so that configured components may no longer function
together as they should.

2.3.2

Critical Bits
Many FPGA vendors provide reports that specify which CRAM bits are allocated by a

design and which are not. Allocated bits are referred to as critical bits [14] or essential bits [15].
An SRAM cell is said to be allocated if it stores a value that somehow affects the implementation
or active state of a design. Any CRAM bits pertaining to resources allocated by an active design is
considered an allocated CRAM bit.
The occurrence of an SEU in an allocated CRAM bit does not guarantee that design failure
will ensue. Some CRAM bits, classified as allocated by vendor tools, may not cause the design to
deviate from expected behavior if upset. These non-sensitive bits may be associated with resources
used by the design, but an upset in these bits does not result in an observable deviation from
expected behavior. For example, all of the CRAM bits pertaining to the logic equation of a LUT
may be labeled as allocated even though half of the labeled bit values may never be propagated
or used by the design. One study found that fewer than 20% of CRAM bits labeled as allocated
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actually resulted in an observable deviation from expected behavior when upset [5]. Sensitive bits,
on the other hand, are CRAM bits that if upset will likely result in an observable deviation from
expected design behavior.
An SEU in an un-allocated (e.g., non-critical, non-essential) CRAM-bit is unlikely to alter
design behavior in any way. Bits that are un-allocated do not contribute toward a design’s likelihood of soft error induced design failure. Thus, upsets in un-allocated bits likely have no impact
on the design.

2.4

Average Failure Rates
Average failure rates are used in this dissertation to evaluate the effectiveness of partial

circuit replication. Average failure rates quantize the risk of radiation-induced failures. Partial
circuit replication aims to minimize the risk of radiation-induced failures by masking or detecting
would-be failures through circuit replication. The ability to quantize said risk assists in evaluating
the effectiveness of partial circuit replication. Effectiveness is determined by comparing the benefit
gained from partial circuit replication against the cost incurred for implementation. More effective
implementations provide a higher benefit at a lower cost. Benefit from partial circuit replication is
measured as a reduction in average failure rate that results from implementing partial circuit replication. The lower an average failure rate becomes after implementing partial circuit replication,
the greater the benefit provided.
Average failure rates reflect the likelihood of radiation-induced design failures. Within a
given radiation environment (space, terrestrial, high-energy physics, etc.) there is a distribution
of high-energy atomic particles respective to their quantity and energy levels. Assuming that the
distribution of particles and energy levels remains unchanged over time, these conditions present
a constant hazard rate [16] for the occurrence soft errors in an electronic device. Similarly, with
design stimulus that has even characteristics (not changing over time), these conditions present a
constant hazard rate for the occurrence of radiation-induced design failures. The reliability of a
design is the likelihood of correct operation for a given period of time [16]. A constant hazard rate
relates to the reliability of a design to an average failure rate (see Appendix D). Thus, an average
failure rate can be used to gauge the likelihood of radiation-induced design failures.
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Average failure rates can be represented in two different ways: as the number of expected
failures over a period of time, and as the average amount of operational time expected to the
occurrence of a failure. Both views represent the same information and are used interchangeably
in this dissertation. These representations quantify the risk of radiation-induced design failure.
An average failure rate, λavg , is simply the number of failure events expected on average
over a given period of time,
λavg =

Failure Events Expected
.
Period of Time

(2.1)

An average failure rate carries the units of failures per unit time. A lower average failure rate corresponds to less risk of radiation-induced design failure; a higher average failure rate corresponds
to more risk of radiation induced design failure. This metric can be scaled to any unit of time,
and it can be scaled to reflect the average failure rate within a given radiation environment (see
Appendix B).
Failure in time (FIT) is an average failure rate with a standardized unit of time. This metric
is commonly seen in the literature. It represents the number of failures expected on average during
one-billion hours of operation [1],
FIT =

Failures Expected
.
Billion Hours

(2.2)

FIT is used in the literature to quantify the likelihood of SEUs occurring in banks of memory
elements as FIT per megabit (i.e., 1×106 ) [9]. It is also used to in the literature to quantify the
likelihood of radiation-induced design failures [6].
Mean time to failure (MTTF) is the average amount of operational time to failure (from
circuit initialization to the occurrence of a failure [41]). Like FIT, MTTF is a metric commonly
used in the literature. MTTF is the inverse of average failure rate,
MTTF =

1
λavg

.

(2.3)

A lower MTTF corresponds to a higher risk of radiation-induced failure; a higher MTTF corresponds to a lower risk of radiation induced failure. There is no standard unit of time for MTTF.
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MTTF and FIT are inversely related as follows:
1
MTTF in hours
=
.
1 × 109 hours
FIT

(2.4)

An MTTF of 114 years is approximately 1000 FIT.
Some examples (included in this dissertation) begin with a small likelihood of radiationinduced design failure before partial circuit replication is implemented, which is okay. Reducing
the average failure rate of a failure mode that is unlikely to begin with is still advantageous. Doing
so significantly reduces the likelihood of failure in a large-scale deployment. The MTTF of a
single instance may be hundreds to thousands of years long, but the deployment of hundredsof-thousands of instances in more harsh radiation environments significantly raises the likelihood
of a failure occurring. Appendix B shows how average failure rates in terrestrial environments
scale, based on quantity and location of deployment. Understanding that small average failure
rates correspond to a significantly high likelihood of failure in scaled environments justifies the
development of partial circuit replication for mitigating the occurrence of severe failure modes
even when the failure mode targeted in a single instance is unlikely.
In this dissertation, average failure rates of radiation-induced failure are estimated through
artificial fault injection and accelerated radiation testing (see Appendix F). Artificial fault injection
purposefully introduces an upsets in CRAM and records the design response. Random fault injection is used to estimate sensitivity or the percentage of CRAM bits that will cause the design to fail
if upset [42]. Accelerated radiation testing estimates the cross section of the design or hypothetical
area that if struck by an atomic particle would result in design failure [36], [43]. These estimates
relate to average failure rates; they are used to determine the benefit provided by partial circuit
replication and to evaluate the effectiveness of a partial circuit replication implementation.
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CHAPTER 3.

SOFT ERROR MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

This chapter provides further background information by discussing several techniques for
reducing the risk of soft error induced design failure in SRAM-based FPGAs. The techniques
discussed are triple modular redundancy (TMR), configuration scrubbing, and duplication with
compare (DWC). TMR, configuration scrubbing, and DWC are well suited for SRAM-based FPGAs. These techniques reduce the risk of soft error induced design failure by lowering the average
failure rate of unmasked or undetected failures. Without the use of these techniques, unmasked or
undetected failures are more likely to occur. These techniques mask, prevent, and detect would-be
failures, thereby reducing the risk of soft error induced design failure.
Techniques that reduce the risk of soft error induced design failures are referred to as soft
error mitigation (SEM) techniques [7], [44], [45]. SEM techniques included repair techniques that
remove soft error faults or restore proper behavior to affected designs. SEM techniques are not
limited to TMR, configuration scrubbing, and DWC. Several other techniques are discussed in
Appendix C.
TMR, configuration scrubbing, and DWC are closely related to partial circuit replication.
Partial circuit replication is the application of TMR or DWC to portions of a circuit. Partial circuit
replication benefits from configuration scrubbing. Understanding TMR, configuration scrubbing,
and DWC aids the advancement of partial circuit replication. The expected benefits of TMR,
configuration scrubbing, and DWC are set forth. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion on
maximizing the benefits gained from these techniques.

3.1

Triple Modular Redundancy
Triple modular redundancy is an SEM technique that masks the effects of soft errors. It

does this by voting on the outputs of three identical circuit copies as shown in Figure 3.1. If the
output of one copy disagrees with that of the other two, its output is ignored and not propagated.
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As long as only one copy is in error, the dominate output will be correct. Using this technique, a
reliable circuit can be made from unreliable components [46].

Circuit Copy 0

Voter

Circuit Copy 1

Voter

Circuit Copy 2

Voter

Figure 3.1: Spacial TMR with Triplicated Voters

Voters propagate the dominate output value among the triplicate signals. So long as two
out of the three copies and the voter itself are functioning properly, the output of the voter will be
correct. If more than one copy provides incorrect output values in the same signal or if the voter has
become corrupt, then the output of the voter be incorrect. Voters used in TMR are often referred to
as majority voters because they propagate the value that is held by the majority of signals coming
into the voter. A majority voter is a bitwise operation, meaning that each bit in an incoming signal
is voted against the same bit in corresponding signal copies independent of the other bits in the
signal.
Voters themselves are often triplicated to avoid a single point of failure [17]. Voters can
be triplicated when used to partition regions of the design that have been triplicated and when
placed within triplicated feedback loops of a design as shown in Figure 3.2. Partitioning allows for
errors to occur across multiple domains without defeating TMR so long as the errors are isolated
within their own partition [47]. Inserting voters into feedback loops allows a corrupt state to selfsynchronize [17].
So long as multiple copies provide correct values at the same time, TMR will succeed in
masking incorrect values. TMR is defeated when multiple copies become corrupted [48]. To defeat
TMR, corrupted copies must provide incorrect values to the same voter at the same time. As soon
as multiple copies provide incorrect values at the same time, TMR will be defeated.
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Figure 3.2: Partitioning and Feedback Voters.

TMR requires outputs from copies to be synchronized in their voter comparisons. This
means that the data presented to a voter must be aligned. For example, three copies of a simple
counter must begin with the same value and operate in lockstep so that voters compare values from
the same position in the counter sequence. If a copy becomes misaligned, corruption in one of the
remaining aligned copies will defeat TMR.
Applying TMR to an SRAM-based FPGA design increases resource utilization, power consumption, and propagational delay. TMR requires three times as many resources plus any resources
needed for voters. A study of fifteen different FPGA designs demonstrated a 3.5× average increase
in logic slice usage with the application of TMR and a feedback voter insertion scheme [17]. TMR
consumes more power. One study demonstrated a 3-7× increase in the consumption of power due
to the application of full TMR [49]. TMR increases propagational delay. The insertion of voters
forces the signals of a design to pass through an additional logic element (the voter) before reaching
its final destination. The same study of fifteen FPGA designs [17] demonstrated a 16-24% increase
in the critical path delay due the application of TMR. The benefit of TMR (namely masking design
failures) comes at the cost of resources, power, and propagational delay.

3.1.1

Repair
When a copy becomes corrupted, TMR defeat becomes more likely. With a copy corrupted,

the corruption of a subsequent copy will defeat TMR; only a single additional copy needs to be
corrupted after a first copy is corrupted to defeat TMR. Normally, there is a period of time between
the corruption of a copy and TMR defeat. With a copy already corrupted, no period of time exists
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between the corruption of a subsequent copy and TMR defeat; a TMR system with a corrupted
copy is placed in greater jeopardy of TMR defeat.
Repair restores a TMR system to a fully functional state. In a fully functional state, all three
copies are operating correctly in tandem, and the system is prepared to withstand the corruption of
a single copy. In a masked functional state, the system is masking incorrect values from a corrupted
copy. Repair moves the TMR system from a masked functional state back to a fully functional state
by removing corruption and re-synchronizing copies.
In SRAM-based FPGAs, corruption is removed by writing correct values to configuration
memory and by restoring correct values to memory elements. Correct configuration is restored
through configuration scrubbing [50] (see Section 3.2), and correct values in memory elements
are restored through re-synchronization. Corrupt values can also be removed as state is naturally
cleared through periodic resets or feed-forward logic.
Re-synchronization occurs in many ways. It can occur through explicit re-synchronization
tasks such as the implementation of memory scrubbing among triplicated block memories [20]
or the procedural copying a program state from one soft core processor to another [51]. Resynchronization can also occur through voter insertion within feedback loops [17]. Inserting voters
within feedback loops allows the circuit to self-synchronize such that a corrupted counter, for
example, can take on the value of its neighboring copies as soon as its supporting circuitry is
restored to its proper configuration and an update is issued to the counters.
A multifaceted repair approach (e.g., configuration scrubbing with self-synchronization
voters) allows corrupted copies within a TMR system to fully recover such that a subsequent corruption can occur without defeating TMR [20]. This effectively increases the reliability of a TMR
system by making it less likely that multiple copies have overlapping periods of corruption.

3.1.2

Reliability Improvement
TMR offers remarkable reliability benefits. These benefits are observed through reliability

modeling and applications of TMR found in the literature. This section discusses the benefits of
TMR, presents examples from the literature, and sets forth benefit expectations.
Figure 3.3 displays the reliability curves of three different systems: a simplex system without redundancy, a TMR system, and a TMR system with repair. More details on these curves and
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their derivations are found in Appendix D. The curves correspond to the probability of correct
functionality over time normalized to the failure rate of a single copy, λ . A constant hazard rate
is assumed [16]. MTTF is obtained from these curves as their integral from time equals zero to
infinity.
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Figure 3.3: Reliability Comparison of Three Systems: Simple, TMR, and TMR with Repair

A benefit of TMR is improved reliability over short operational periods. For example, a
TMR system without repair is able to maintain five-nines (i.e., 0.99999) reliability much longer
than a simplex system (by a factor of 183:1). For time values greater than zero and less than
ln (2) /λ , the reliability of a TMR system without repair is greater than that of simplex system.
The MTTF of a TMR system without repair is worse than that of a simplex system. The MTTF
of a simplex system is 1/λ whereas the MTTF of a TMR system without repair is 5/(6λ ) or
five-sixths that of a simplex system. The MTTF of a TMR system can become better than that of
simplex system by adding repair.
Combining TMR with repair greatly improves system reliability and MTTF. Compared to
a simplex system or a TMR system without repair, higher reliability is maintained by TMR with
repair over significantly longer operational periods. MTTF is significantly improved as well. The
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MTTF for a TMR system with repair is,
MTTFTMR with Repair =

5
µ
+ 2,
6λ 6λ

(3.1)

where λ is the failure rate of a single copy and µ is the repair rate. For µ  λ , the MTTF is
greatly improved compared to that of a simplex system. In an ideal scenario, there is no limit to
the improvement in MTTF that can be obtained from TMR with repair [52],
lim MTTFTMR with Repair = ∞.

(3.2)

µ→∞

It is important to note that repair in an SRAM-based FPGA is not limited to configuration scrubbing; repair can be anything that allows all TMR copies to return to their proper behavior and
re-synchronize.
In the literature, several examples are given of TMR in SRAM-based FPGAs. In [22], TMR
is applied to a soft-core processor, demonstrating a near 6000× improvement in MTTF. In [27],
TMR is applied to a recursive demodulator system for digital communications, demonstrating a
1,500× MTTF improvement. In [53], a 80-50,000× improvement in MTTF is observed from
TMR applied to an FPGA design. In [13], a 10-50× improvement in MTTF is observed. When
TMR is used in conjunction with configuration and memory scrubbing, TMR becomes more beneficial [20]. In [20], a 13× improvement in MTTF over TMR is observed with the addition of
configuration and block memory scrubbing. From these examples it is shown that TMR carries
promise of significantly improved MTTF.
Near infinite improvement in MTTF from the use of TMR has not yet been obtained. Obtaining infinite improvement is barred by several factors. First is the possibility of accumulating
faults in different copies causing TMR defeat. Second is the poor approximation of repair behavior as a constant repair rate [41]; an infinite repair rate is unrealistic. Third is a lack of isolation
between the copies, which allows a single fault or a common cause to corrupt multiple copies or
system-wide dependency, leading to design failure. Common-cause failure and single-point failure
in TMR on SRAM-based FPGA is the focus of several studies: [21], [48], [52]–[55].
In a TMR system, the maximum obtainable MTTF improvement is limited by the repair
rate and the presence of any single-point failure or common-cause failure factors. Figure 3.4
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presents a modified Markov chain of TMR with repair and common-cause or single-point failure
(see Appendix D). The failure rate of a TMR copy is λt , and the rate of common-cause or singlepoint failure is λi . The common-cause or single-point failure rate is given the subscript i because
µ
S0

3λt

S1

2λt

S2

λi
λi
Figure 3.4: Modified Markov Chain of TMR with Repair

these factors cause TMR to be incomplete, lacking isolation between modules. The MTTF of the
system is,
MTTFIncomplete TMR with Repair =

5λt + µ + λi
6λt + 5λt λi + µλi + λi 2
2

.

(3.3)

The limit of MTTF as the repair rate, µ, approaches infinity is,
lim MTTFIncomplete TMR with Repair =

µ→∞

1
.
λi

(3.4)

Thus, the maximum MTTF obtainable with TMR is limited by the repair rate and any commoncause or single-point failure rate present.

3.2

Configuration Scrubbing
Configuration scrubbing is an SEM technique commonly used in SRAM-based FPGAs.

Configuration scrubbing identifies SEUs in configuration memory and overwrites corrupted values with correct values [50]. By correcting corrupted values, configuration scrubbing lowers the
likelihood of design failure and increase the likelihood of functional restoration.
Configuration scrubbing addresses a significant soft error vulnerability in SRAM-based
FPGAs. Configuration memory represents a large portion of device memory that is susceptible to
SEUs. Table 2.1, presented previously, shows an example where configuration memory makes up
60% of all SEU susceptible memory in a Stratix V GX A7 FPGA. Excluding user block memories
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(BRAM), CRAM makes up more than 90% of the remaining memory that is susceptible to SEUs.
Distributed memory held in writable look-up tables (LUTRAM) and registers (flip-flops) make up
a much smaller portion of susceptible memory. By employing configuration scrubbing, a large
portion of SEU susceptible memory is benefited.
Configuration scrubbing is slow compared to the operational speed of an FPGA design.
Configuration scrubbing of an entire device may complete on the order of 100 ms, whereas an
FPGA design may operate at 100 MHz or 10 ns per clock cycle (nominal). In this scenario, an
SEU is present on average for 50 ms or 5 million clock cycles before it is scrubbed.
When an SEU is present in configuration memory, it has a direct effect on underlying
resources. There is no grace period or buffer. Configuration memory connects directly to the
physical resources it governs. As soon as an SEU occurs, the effect of the SEU takes place. The
overall effect of an SEU on a design depends on the use of affected resources and the propagation
of signals throughout the design. Given that an SEU may be present for millions or even billions of
clock cycles before being scrubbed, there is ample opportunity for the SEU to adversely affect the
design. The circuit of the design may be incorrect for a time even though configuration scrubbing
is employed.
Configuration scrubbing lowers the likelihood of design failure by decreasing the concurrence of SEUs and stimulus. In order for an error or failure to occur, an SEU must be present
with stimulus to activate affected resources. If the affected resources are not active (i.e., they will
not affect the outcome of the design through signal propagation or otherwise), then the SEU will
have no affect on the outcome of the design. The longer that an SEU is present, the more likely its
presence is to coincide with the introduction of stimulus that activates affected resources, resulting
in an error or failure. Resources that are used by a device are not likely to be active all at the same
time. By continuously and quickly scrubbing SEUs as they occur, the likelihood of concurrence
between SEU and activating stimulus decreases.

3.3

Duplication with Compare
Duplication with compare (DWC) is an SEM technique that can be used to detect the occur-

rence of soft-error induced failure. DWC detects failures by comparing the output of two identical
circuit copies. If the outputs of the circuit copies ever disagree, an error is reported and addressed
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by the system. Figure 3.5 shows a simple implementation of DWC on a bit of logic and a register.
The comparison between the duplicates acts as an error detector. A detector needs to be placed
anywhere where a signal transitions from being duplicated to being non-duplicated. This could be
at the primary outputs of the design, or it could be internal to the design. Signal outputs from the
detectors are captured into subsequent registers for processing the detection of an error.

Primary
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Secondary
Copy

Output
Input

Logic
A0

Register
A0

A0

Capture
A0

Detection
Signal A0

Logic
A1

Register
A1

A1

Capture
A1

Detection
Signal A1

Figure 3.5: DWC Example

Duplication with compare consists of a primary copy and a secondary copy. Signals from
the primary copy propagate forward toward the outputs of the design. Signals from the secondary
copy only drive other components in the secondary copy and DWC error detectors. Only signals
from the primary copy affect the behavior the design. As a result, errors that originate from and
pertain to the secondary copy alone will not result in functional corruption of the design, but they
may still cause an error to be detected. Detecting an error without the occurrence of an actual
design failure results in a false positive.
Error detectors and logic used to collect detection signals are often duplicated [18]. These
components are duplicated to filter out false positives that originate from soft errors within the
detectors and collection logic. If both detector copies detect an error, the error likely originates
from the design itself (not from within the duplicate error detection or collection logic). If only
one copy detects an error, there is likely an error present in the detection or collection logic. By
having two detectors, false positives that originate from the detection logic can be filtered out.
Because errors in the secondary copy do not affect the functionality of the design, it is
expected that approximately half of the DWC error detections reported in a fully replicated design
will be false positives. For example, an error in logic block A1 of Figure 3.5 will result in an
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error detection, but the corrupt output from logic block A1 does not propagate to the output of the
circuit. This behavior is part of the overhead and trade-off of DWC. By allowing for false positives,
the system responds to false alarms, but it will also respond to errors that correspond to correctly
identified failure events.
Since only errors in the primary copy affect the functionality of the design, it is expected
that the likelihood of actual failure events remains similar before and after the implementation
of partial DWC. The primary copy remains largely an unchanged version of the original design.
Some change in placement and routing will occur due to the presence of a secondary copy nearby,
some changes in signal propagation will result from the additional load of error detectors; but the
primary copy closely resemble the original design. As such, the likelihood of failure in the primary
copy of the design is expected to be similar to that of the original design. Failures that occur in the
secondary copy are detected as false positives and do not contribute to the likelihood of failure in
the primary design.
Applying DWC increases resource utilization, power consumption, propagational delay,
and requires a response to error detection events. Full DWC requires twice as many resources plus
additional resources to support detection logic. The use of additional resources drives up power
consumption. DWC does not insert additional logic components into the critical path of a design.
However, it indirectly increases propagational delay by increasing resource and routing congestion.
The more congested a device is, the harder it is to meet timing. Since DWC does not correct errors
(it only detects them), there is additional overhead associated with allowing the system to respond
to error detection events.
The cost of DWC is justified by the benefit it provides. In theory, if both copies are perfectly
isolated (i.e., a soft error can affect only one copy at a time), then DWC will be able to detect all
errors. Some errors detected may be acceptable deviations from expected behavior (i.e., errors
only); but in detecting all errors, all failures are detected as well (all unacceptable deviations from
expected behavior will be detected). In one study of DWC in SRAM-based FPGAs [18], the
application of DWC to several circuits was able to detect approximately 99.85% of all circuit
errors. This percentage corresponds to 667× decrease in the frequency of undetected failures. As
demonstrated in this study, DWC carries a promise of significant ability to detect failures.
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The maximum obtainable benefit from DWC is limited by the presence of common-cause
or single-point failure factors. These factors are events that could corrupt both circuit copies or
a common dependency. Eliminating common-cause and single-point failure factors would allow
DWC to detect all errors. The approximately 0.15% of all errors that are not detected in [18] likely
correspond to common-cause or single-point failures.
Another factor that could prevent error detection is the accumulation of faults. If a fault
that disables the error detection logic occurs first, followed by a fault that causes an actual error,
then the accumulation of faults prevents the error from being detected. In SRAM-based FPGAs,
configuration scrubbing could help alleviate this issue. If a soft error disables the detection logic
(i.e., prevents it from detecting an error), then repairing the soft error via configuration scrubbing
may restore the detection logic to its proper functionality. In this way, configuration scrubbing
keeps the detection logic available, allowing more errors to be correctly identified.
Both DWC and TMR offer remarkable SEM benefits for SRAM-based FPGAs at significant cost. TMR combined with repair (including configuration scrubbing) has demonstrated orders
of magnitude improvement in lengthening MTTF. DWC similarly has demonstrated orders of magnitude reduction in the frequency of undetected errors. These benefits are desirable. At the same
time, TMR and DWC both require more resource utilization, power consumption, and they can
increase propagational delay. TMR requires at least three times as many resources, and DWC
requires at least two times as many resources. These costs are significant, but they support the benefits provided. Chapter 4 examines the use of TMR and DWC through partial circuit replication
so that a portion of the benefits of these techniques can be obtained at a portion of the cost of full
implementation.

29

CHAPTER 4.

PARTIAL CIRCUIT REPLICATION

Many SRAM-based FPGA designs that could benefit from TMR or DWC may not be able
to support full TMR or full DWC. Constraints on resources, power, or timing can prevent the
replication of all circuit components. In situations where constraints prevent full replication, it
may be desirable to take as much advantage of TMR and DWC as possible while still meeting
design constraints.
Partial circuit replication is the application of TMR or DWC in a partial or selective manner [34]. Under partial circuit replication, only a portion of the components in a circuit are replicated. To mask soft errors, components are triplicated. To detect soft errors, components are
duplicated. This is accomplished on a single device using any additional resources available to
implement redundant copies. Through partial circuit replication, some benefit from TMR or DWC
can be obtained at lower cost.
The primary objective of partial circuit replication is to obtain the greatest benefit from
TMR or DWC at the lowest cost. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature. This
chapter presents a brief literature review, discusses the implementation challenges of partial circuit
replication, presents the expected benefit of partial circuit replication, and outlines experiments
conducted in this dissertation. The experiments conducted advance the state of the art by demonstrating more benefit than expected when partial circuit replication is applied to critical components
and sub-regions as identified through attribute-based selection approaches and targeted fault injection. This chapter provides an understanding of the expected benefits and costs of partial circuit
replication, and it frames the experiments that are conducted.
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4.1

Partial Circuit Replication Literature Review
The literature contains several works related to partial circuit replication: [18], [24]–[34],

[56]–[60]. A brief summary of these works is presented in this section. A more detailed discussion
on the literature is contained in Appendix E.
Partial circuit replication techniques presented in the literature are distinguished by their
selection approaches and desired outcomes. Each proposed approach falls into one of five main
categories:
• Feedback-based partial circuit replication [24]–[26],
• Reduced precision redundancy partial circuit replication [27]–[32],
• Probability-based partial circuit replication [33], [58],
• Approximate logic based partial circuit replication [57], [59], [60], and
• Specific outcome driven partial circuit replication [34], [56].
These categories capture most of the partial circuit replication concepts conveyed in the literature.
Feedback-based partial circuit replication focuses on eliminating errors that linger in feedback paths [24]–[26]. Errors that linger, even after configuration scrubbing completes, are persistent [25]. By replicating logic within feedback groups, the likelihood of persistent errors can
be greatly reduced at a much lower cost than full circuit replication. In [26], TMR applied to
approximately 30% of a synthetic circuit was able to reduce the likelihood of persistent errors
by approximately 99.0% (a 100× improvement), and TMR in a DSP kernal design with approximately 8% of the circuit replicated was able to reduce the likelihood of persistent errors by a
similar amount.
Reduced precision redundancy (RPR) is a form of partial circuit replication that focuses on
replicating logic that is associated with the most significant bits of an arithmetic or a computational
operation [27]–[32]. By replicating the logic associated with the most significant bits, the magnitude of soft error induced discrepancy (outcome vs. expected outcome) can be reduced. This form
of partial circuit replication is helpful in applications where noise in computational operations can
be tolerated, such as digital signal processing applications. In [27], RPR is applied to a critical
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filter for digital communications such that less than half of the filter components are replicated,
this application of RPR improved MTTF by 20× (a 95% decrease in the likelihood of intolerable
error). Also in [27], RPR combined with TMR, using only half as many additional resources as
would be required by full TMR (RPR on a subset of the circuit, TMR on the rest of the circuit),
improved the MTTF of a recursive demodulator system for digital communications by 42× (a
97.6% decrease in the likelihood of intolerable error). In [28], it is shown that the magnitude of
error in a 16-bit ripple carry adder can be reduced by a factor of 16× by applying TMR to the
logic associated with the upper four most significant bits of the adder’s output. Ongoing research
into RPR is being conducted such as using different RPR comparison schemes [29], applying RPR
to different kinds of computational operations [30], [31], and developing automated RPR design
flows [32].
Probability-based partial circuit replication examines the propagation of signal probabilities
throughout a design to determine the components in a design that would provide the greatest benefit
if replicated [33], [58]. Signal probabilities are assigned to the outputs of gates based on the
operation performed and the signal probabilities entering the gate. Components are then selected
for replication based on which components will reduce the likelihood of error on the outputs.
In [58], applying TMR to 6.8% of logic gates in an example circuit yields a 94.4% reduction (a
27× improvement) in the probability of experiencing an error on output signals.
Approximate logic based partial circuit replication applies TMR to all input signals less
one [57], [59], [60]. Under this technique, one redundant copy is an over-approximation of the
protected logic and another copy is an under-approximation. The over-approximation copy assumes the excluded input signal is a logic one while the under-approximation copy assumes the
excluded input signal is a logic zero. Thus, an n-input lookup table can be partially protected from
SEUs using two additional (n − 1)-bit lookup tables. An error in any of the non-ignored signals
will be masked, but an error in the signal ignored by the redundant copies will propagate through
the majority voter. This approach is only applicable to TMR. In [57], the technique is applied
to an SRAM-based FPGA design. In [59], a survey is provided of the literature surrounding this
approach. In [60], a algorithm is developed to help determine the most beneficial signals to include
in TMR.
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Specific outcome driven partial circuit replication is the use of partial circuit replication to
reduce the likelihood of user-defined failure modes [34], [56]. Partial circuit replication approaches
that fall under this category use whatever means are available to minimize the likelihood of a userdefined specific outcome while lowering the cost of implementation. The objective of this form
of partial circuit replication is to maximize the specific desired benefit while lowering the cost.
In [56], the desired outcome is to minimize errors that originate in the ALU of a soft-core RiskV processor. In [34], several circuit attributes are exploited to minimize the percentage of clock
cycles in which the output of a targeted circuit is in error (maximize the benefit of partial circuit
replication) while minimizing associated costs.
This dissertation builds upon the contributions found in the literature to advance the state of
the art in partial circuit replication approaches. The literature provides insights into different styles
of partial circuit replication. Feedback, RPR, probability, approximate, and specific outcome based
partial circuit replication approaches explore a vast design space. This dissertation explores new
analysis and selection approaches and evaluates these new approaches on two complex FPGAbased networking designs and another FPGA design.

4.2

Partial Triple Modular Redundancy
Figure 4.1 provides a simple example of partial TMR applied to a circuit implemented on

an SRAM-based FPGA. In this example, three components are selected for partial TMR: a flipflip (FF), a look-up table (LUT), and another FF. The latter FF drives the former LUT, creating a
feedback loop, and it also drives another LUT that is not selected for partial TMR. When the selected components are triplicated, copies are made of each component, connections are triplicated
as needed, and voters are inserted.
Connections are established to support the added replication. Connections between selected components are fully triplicated; whereas connections from non-triplicated components to
triplicated components merely fan-out from the non-redundant source. Connections from triplicated components to non-triplicated components require special treatment that usually involves a
reduction voter. If the triplicated signal is a global clock or control signal (e.g., reset), then only a
single copy is used to drive a non-triplicated component without the use of a reduction voter.
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Figure 4.1: Example of Partial TMR on a Simple SRAM-based FPGA Circuit

Voters are inserted as needed to support the partial TMR, and additional voters are added
to avoid single points of failure and to improve reliability [61]. In Figure 4.1, a reduction voter
is used to reduce the triplicated signal that drives the non-triplicated LUT. This voter is needed in
order to take full advantage of the partial TMR applied. This voter is accompanied by additional
voters in triplicate to avoid having a single point of failure in the feedback path. Placing the voters
in the feedback path is desired to allow for self-synchronization of the circuit when a soft error
occurs within the feedback group [17].
Another diagram of partial TMR is presented in Figure 4.2. In this diagram, no feedback

B1
A

B2
B3

Domain 1

Domain 2
Domain 3

C1
C2

V

D

C3

Non-Triplicated Triplicated Reduction Non-Triplicated
Source
Sink
Route/Edge Voter
Triplicated
Component

Non-Triplicated
Component

Figure 4.2: Diagram of Partial TMR with a Reduction Voter

is present. Two of the design components have been triplicated (B and C) while the remaining two
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components (A and D) have not been triplicated. Additional connections and a reduction voter
have been added to support the triple redundancy. Since component A is not triplicated, its output
signal is a non-triplicated source. The triplicated output signal of component C drives a reduction
voter. The reduction voter transitions the triplicated output signal to a simplex signal that can then
be used to drive component D, a non-triplicated component. Since component D is not triplicated,
its input signal is a non-triplicated sink.
A route is a collection of edges that all share the same signal source. A route represents a
physical connection between a single driver (i.e., a source) and one or more sinks (i.e., terminals
driven by a source). A route is able to fan-out from a single source to multiple sinks; whereas an
edge includes only a single source-sink pair. Multiple edges that share a common source pertain
to the same route. There is one edge for each fan-out of a route. The distinction between route and
edges is made because edges are used as an attribute to guide some of the replication selections
made in Chapter 6.
Edges between triplicated components are also themselves triplicated. An SEU-induced
error in any copy of a triplicated edge can occur without defeating TMR so long as only a single
copy is in error. In this way, triplicated edges and components are protected from SEU-induced
errors. Since multiple edges pertain to the same route, it is possible for a route to be partially
triplicated. This occurs when a triplicated source drives triplicated and non-triplicated sinks.

4.3

Partial Duplication with Compare
Figure 4.3 uses the same original circuit and selection shown in Figure 4.1 to provide a

simple example of partial DWC. The process for applying partial DWC is very similar to that of
applying partial TMR. The selected components are duplicated, non-duplicated signals that drive
duplicated components are fanned-out, and connections between duplicated components are fully
duplicated themselves. The greatest difference between the implementation of partial DWC and
partial TMR is found in how signals transition from duplicated components to non-duplicated
components and the logic that supports partial DWC.
In partial DWC, when a duplicated signal drives a non-duplicated component, only the
first or primary copy of the signal is to drive the non-duplicated component. Instead of voters,
detectors are used to detect disagreement between duplicates. Detectors themselves are duplicated
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Figure 4.3: Example of Partial DWC on a Simple SRAM-based FPGA Circuit

to filter out soft errors that occur in the detectors and collection logic. To take full advantage of
partial DWC, detectors need to be placed on signals that drive non-duplicated components from
duplicated components. Additional detectors may be added as desired, but detectors placed on
transitions from replicated to non-replicated components are necessary to support partial DWC.
The detection signals themselves are then aggregated or collected through additional logic so that
the system may be aware of any errors detected.

4.4

Implementing Partial Circuit Replication on SRAM-Based FPGAs
There are several implementation considerations associated with partial circuit replication

in SRAM-based FPGAs. The most important consideration is deciding which components to replicate. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the selection of components to replicate determines,
in large part, the effectiveness of a partial circuit replication implementation. Other design considerations are peripheral details for successfully implementing partial circuit replication on complex
SRAM-based FPGA designs.
The actual implementation of partial circuit replication is performed using the design flow
detailed in Appendix G. A list of all circuit components, their connections, and respective properties are extracted as a netlist from the original design. Various replication selection approaches
are taken to determine which subset of components are to be replicated. The selected components
are replicated in an automated fashion using custom netlist analysis and transformation tools. A
modified netlist is presented vendor tools for final implementation into a configuration file that
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can be loaded onto a target FPGA device. Significant tools development was undertaken to make
possible the netlist analyses and transformations used in this dissertation.
The sub-sections that follow discuss the selection and design considerations of partial circuit replication in detail. Section 4.4.1 discusses the most important aspect of creating a good
implementation: selecting components to replicate. Section 4.4.2 discusses general design considerations for partial circuit replication implementations and how these considerations are addressed
in design implementations included in this dissertation.

4.4.1

Selecting Components to Replicate
Selection is the process of deciding which components to replicate. The design space

of choosing what to replicate is very large. For any given circuit with n components, there are
2n possible selections that could be made, ranging from no replication to full replication. Any
selection made carries with it possible benefits and associated costs. The selection made is likely
the most influential factor in the benefit outcome of an implementation.
Some selections will prove more beneficial than others. A good selection will yield a large
amount of benefit at a low cost. A poor selection will yield a small amount of benefit or even a
negative benefit at a high cost. The benefits and costs associated with a selection are the result
of a complex interplay between selected components, circuit stimulus, desired outcome, required
support logic, constraints on resource, timing, power constraints, placement and routing, inherent
logic masking, component importance, etc.
The same selection can provide a different amount of benefit depending on the failure mode
being considered. Partial circuit replication may be used to mitigate all errors, or it may be used
to mitigate a specific type of error.1 One type of error may be more mitigated than another by the
same selection. For example, the partial TMR selections made in [26] reduce the percentage of
sensitive bits for persistent failures by a greater portion than they do for non-persistent failures.
Thus, the same selection can be seen as providing more or less benefit based on the type of failure
that is being mitigated (any error, persistent errors, specific user-defined failures, etc.).
Also, some components or groups of components may provide more benefit if replicated
than others. The importance of individual components or grouping of components may be un1 An

error is considered any deviation from expected behavior.
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equally distributed [62]. Some components may matter more for a particular function of a design
than others. For examples, components on the primary path of data flow, in a computer networking
application, may matter more for the proper transfer of data than components used for peripheral
statistics counters. Other components may contribute more toward an average failure rate than
others. For example, a 6-input LUT is associated with more routing sources and CRAM resources
than a 2-input LUT. Certain groupings of components may also be more beneficial to replicate than
others.
This dissertation explores several new selection approaches and applies them to two complex FPGA-based networking designs and another FPGA design. First, partial TMR and partial DWC are applied to as many components as possible in the computer networking design to
demonstrate benefit from partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs. Second, several new
attribute-based selection approaches are applied to another FPGA design to demonstrate the importance of component selection and to identify more beneficial selection approaches. Third, new
empirical analysis techniques are used to identify important components to replicate in the complex FPGA-based networking design and these components are replicated along with surrounding
logic resulting in effective implementations.

4.4.2

Design Considerations
This section addresses the following design considerations:

• Configuration scrubbing,
• Working with multiple clocks,
• Working with encrypted portions of third-party IP,
• Preserving original design constraints through implementation, and
• Single-point failure and common-cause failure.
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Configuration Scrubbing
For configuration scrubbing, the experiments in this dissertation make use of internal and
external configuration scrubbing. The partial TMR experiment on the commercial networking
design in Chapter 5 makes use of internal configuration scrubbing while all other experiments
made use of external configuration scrubbing. During fault injection, injected faults are removed
by externally writing correct values to configuration memory. Employing configuration scrubbing
adds repair to the system, lowers the likelihood of persistent errors, and lowers the likelihood of
fault accumulation for causing TMR defeat.

Working with Multiple Clocks
Considerations associated with multiple clock domains center around the issue of crossclock domain synchronization [63]. If mechanisms used to synchronize signals between clock
domains are blindly synchronized, it can cause some redundant copies to advance in operation
before others, invalidating the alignment of copies (i.e., masking or detecting errors due to misalignment of data instead of radiation exposure). When working with designs that contain multiple
clocks, such as the two complex FPGA-based networking designs, care must be taken to address
this issue. For the experiments in this dissertation, clock analysis was performed to identify clock
domain crossings and synchronization mechanisms. Out of an abundance of caution, registers,
combinational logic, and chains of registers (i.e., synchronizers) between clock domains, as well
as block memory elements driven by multiple clocks were excluded from replication. More aggressive selections likely could be made with all synchronizers triplicated and voters placed on
their output (forcing synchronized advancement of the circuits). Not knowing the intricacies of the
circuit, a more conservative route was taken.

Working with Encrypted Portions of Third-Party IP
The complex FPGA-based computer networking designs in this dissertation contain portions of third-party IP that are encrypted. While an encrypted block as a whole can be encrypted
(i.e., the entire module together), the contents of the block are unknown; it could contain feedback
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loops, multiple clocks, or other issues that would deter block level replication [64]. In this dissertation, a more conservative approach is taken when handling encrypted third-party IP. Encrypted
portions of the circuit are excluded from replication along with any down stream combinational
logic up to and including the first register or chains of registers after the module. This level of
exclusion prevents issues that might arise from clock-domain crossings, but is likely more conservative than needed.

Preserving Original Design Constraints Through Implementation
For preserving original design constraints through implementation, redundant connections
were added through hierarchical structures. When modifying a netlist, it is common to flatten the
circuit prior to adding redundancy. Flattening the circuit places all leaf-cell instances in a single
level of hierarchy [65]. This makes adding redundant instances and connections trivial. However,
many of the design constraints present in the complex FPGA-based networking designs depend
upon the hierarchical structure of the design to limit their scope of application; modifying the hierarchical structure of the design is not permissible. Thus, in the design implementations included in
this dissertation, redundant connections are instead made through hierarchy as necessary to support
newly created redundant instances (see Appendix G).

Single-Point Failure and Common-Cause Failure
For single-point failures and common-cause failures, this dissertation recognizes their impact on TMR and DWC. The likelihood of single-point failure or common-cause failure diminish
the benefit of TMR and DWC. These factors place a hard-limit on the amount of improvement that
can be gained. Modifications could be made to low-level placement and routing implementation to
alleviate the effects or presence of single-point and common-cause failures [53], [54]. Rather than
modify the placement and routing of the design to avoid single-point failure and common-cause
failure, the effects of these factors on the benefit of TMR and DWC are simply recognized, and the
composite effects of selection are examined.
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4.5

Metrics
This dissertation aims to demonstrate that more benefit than expected can be obtained in

complex FPGA designs when partial circuit replication is applied to critical components and subregions of a circuit as identified through attribute-based selection approaches and targeted fault
injection. To accomplish this goal, a set of standard metrics must be used to quantify implementation effectiveness. Effectiveness reflects the amount of benefit provided compared to the amount
of cost incurred. It is anticipated that some partial circuit replication implementations will be
more effective than others. By using a set of common metrics, direct comparisons can be made of
implementation effectiveness.
Common metrics used to quantify the likelihood of radiation-induced failure are MTTF,
and FIT (see Section 2.4). These metrics assume a constant hazard rate (a uniform distribution of
failure likelihood), and they are typically normalized to a reference environment such as operating
in New York City at sea-level during average solar activity [1]. These failure rate measurements
can be estimated on SRAM-based FPGA designs using accelerated radiation testing and purposeful
injection of faults into device configuration memory (see Appendix F). The measurements returned
from these tests are used to estimate MTTF or FIT before and after partial circuit replication is
applied to a design.
In order for partial circuit replication to be beneficial, the benefit it provides must be absolute, meaning that it reduces the likelihood of unmasked or undetected failures as compared to
having no circuit replication at all. The benefit of masking or detecting soft errors translates to
masking or detecting design failures. If the effects of a soft error on a circuit can be masked or detected, then design failures that would result may be masked or detected as well. For partial circuit
replication to be beneficial, the resulting circuit must experience unmasked or undetected failures
with a lower likelihood. A lower likelihood of failure corresponds to a lower average failure rate
or a longer MTTF. If unmasked or undetected failures become more likely with the application of
partial circuit replication, then the application is counterproductive.
The sub-sections that follow discuss the metrics that are used in this dissertation to capture
the effectiveness of a partial circuit replication implementation. Section 4.5.1 discusses MTTF
improvement as a common metric used in the literature to represent benefit gained from soft error
mitigation techniques. Section 4.5.2 discusses average failure rate reduction as a metric that carries
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the same information as MTTF improvement and is more easily compared against cost to capture
effectiveness. Section 4.5.3 discusses benefit-cost ratio as the metric used in this dissertation to
capture the effectiveness of a partial circuit replication implementation. MTTF improvement and
average failure rate reduction are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, but only average failure rate is used to evaluate benefit-cost ratios of partial circuit replication implementations.

4.5.1

MTTF Improvement
Studies in the literature (see Section 4.1) compare the MTTF (or a related metric) before

and after the application of a soft error mitigation techniques to quantify the benefit provided.
Often this measurement will be a simple MTTF improvement ratio, ω, of the new MTTF after soft
error mitigation, MTTF0 , to the MTTF before soft error mitigation,
ω=

MTTF0
.
MTTF

(4.1)

For example, in [13], the MTTF of a soft core processor in GEO orbit without TMR is estimated
to be 501 days, the MTTF with TMR is estimated to be 27,889 days; this corresponds to an estimated 56× improvement in MTTF. Similar comparisons are made using cross section results
from accelerated radiation testing and sensitivity results from fault injection to determine MTTF
improvement of an soft error mitigation technique.
The benefit of DWC can also be presented as an MTTF improvement. DWC benefit is
typically reported as the percentage of total errors that are correctly detected by DWC. In [18], a
report of 99.85% detection of all errors by DWC is given. Assuming that this refers to only the
original copy, this percentage indicates that 0.15% of errors go undetected with DWC; whereas,
previously, all errors were undetected. If undetected errors occurred at a rate of 1.0 errors per day
before DWC, then, with an ability to detect 99.85% of all errors, the use of DWC would decrease
the rate of undetected errors to 0.0015 errors per day. This corresponds to a 667× improvement in
MTTF, where failure is defined as the occurrence of an undetected error.
Converting detection benefits of DWC from percentage of failures accurately detected to
MTTF improvement for undetected failures allows for the direct comparison of the benefits from
TMR and DWC. Under this representation (using common metrics), the benefit of TMR and DWC
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can be fairly compared (mean time to unmasked failure verses mean time to undetected failure).
Reports of MTTF improvement are commonly found in the literature for TMR. MTTF improvement is not commonly reported for DWC, but is easily derived and makes for a direct comparison.
End users of soft error mitigation and repair techniques tend to be invested in the outcome
of MTTF improvement. To an end user, an MTTF improvement ratio translates directly into improved up-time, lower maintenance, increased confidence in successful operation, etc. A soft error
mitigation and repair scheme that offers an MTTF improvement ratio of 10× means that the design is now 10× less likely to fail, may operate on average 10× longer before a failure occurs, etc.
The improvement ratio is the driving force in the application of a soft error mitigation and repair
schemes.

4.5.2

Average Failure Rate Reduction
While common place and intuitive, MTTF improvement is a non-linear representation of

benefit gained. As the average failure rate of a system approaches zero, MTTF improvement experiences hyperbolic growth (i.e., growth beyond exponential). This behavior makes it difficult to
accurately represent effectiveness as a comparison of benefit against cost. For example, including
more components in partial circuit replication in a linear fashion (1%, 2%, ..., 100%) does not have
a linear map to MTTF improvement. This makes it difficult to quantize effectiveness using MTTF
improvement.
A linear representation of MTTF improvement is the average failure rate reduction, γ. The
average failure rate reduction, γ, provides a linear representation of benefit and allows effectiveness
to be captured as a linear comparison between benefit and cost. It is a linear representation of
MTTF improvement. The average failure rate reduction is the percentage decrease in average
failure rate from before soft error mitigation to after,
γ = 1−

λavg 0
,
λavg

(4.2)

where λavg is the average failure rate before soft error mitigation and λavg 0 is the average failure
rate after soft error mitigation. Average failure rate reduction is a metric not commonly used in the
literature, but it provides a useful view of the benefit gained from partial circuit replication.
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MTTF improvement, ω, and average failure rate reduction, γ, are two different representations of the same information. They both represent the benefit gained from soft error mitigation.
They are related as follows,
ω=

MTTF0
=
MTTF

λavg
=
λavg 0

1
, and
1−γ

λavg 0
MTTF
1
= 1−
γ = 1−
0 = 1− .
λavg
MTTF
ω

(4.3)

MTTF improvement is commonly reported in the literature, and average failure rate reduction
is provided in this dissertation for linear comparison of benefits gained to costs incurred when
capturing effectiveness. Average failure rate reduction can be thought of as a percentage decrease
in average failure rates. For example, if an average failure rate decreases from 1.0 failures a day to
0.0015 failures a day, then the average failure rate is reduced by 99.85% for an average failure rate
reduction of 0.9985. This reduction corresponds to a 667× MTTF improvement.
A visual representation of the relationship between MTTF improvement and average failure
rate reduction is shown in Figure 4.4. As the average failure rate reduction, γ, increases linearly
on the x-axis of the graph, the MTTF improvement, ω, increases with hyperbolic growth on the
y-axis (with the scale being logarithmic on the y-axis). The function of this graph is,
ω=

1
.
1−γ

(4.4)

It is important to note that MTTF improvement and average failure rate reduction reflect
any change, good or bad. While associated with benefit as an improvement and reduction, these
metrics can also represent a degradation in MTTF and average failure rate. They can represent
an MTTF and an average failure rate that is worse after a change is applied to circuit than before.
Thus, if the application of a soft error mitigation technique makes the MTTF or average failure
rate worse, the degradation will be captured by the MTTF improvement and average failure rate
reduction metrics. An MTTF improvement ratio less than 1.0 and an average failure rate reduction
less than 0.0 reflect an MTTF and an average failure rate that is worse after the circuit is altered than
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Figure 4.4: Average Failure Rate Reduction Verses MTTF Improvement

before. MTTF improvement is bounded on [0, ∞) and average failure rate reduction is bounded on
(−∞, 1].
The average failure rate reduction reflects the portion of the original average failure rate
that has been mitigated to obtain a certain level of improvement. To provide a 2× improvement
ratio, a 50% reduction in average failure rate must be obtained. To provide a 5× improvement
ratio, an 80% reduction in average failure rate must be obtained. An additional reduction of 30%
off of the original failure rate is needed to increase improvement from 2× to 5×, but an additional
reduction of only 10% (from 80% to 90%) increases improvement from 5× to 10×. A 9% additional reduction (from 90% to 99%) increases improvement from 10× to 100×, and an additional
reduction of less than 1% (from 99% to 99.9%) increases improvement from 100× to 1000×. The
reduction percentage reflects the amount of mitigation that must be achieved (in terms of reducing
the average failure rate) in order to obtain a certain MTTF improvement ratio.

4.5.3

Benefit-Cost Ratio
A standard metric is needed to quantify the effectiveness of a partial circuit replication

implementation. Some implementations will likely return more benefit for the same or less amount
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of cost than others. Other implementations may return less benefit for a greater cost. A standard,
simple metric is needed to distinguish the effectiveness of an implementation. The benefit gained
from partial circuit replication needs to be normalized by the cost incurred.
One possible metric that could be used to quantify partial circuit replication effectiveness
is a benefit-cost ratio (BCR). A BCR is simply a comparison of benefit gained to cost incurred.
The higher the BCR, the more benefit gained for the same or lower amount of cost. The lower the
BCR, the less benefit is gained for the same or higher amount of cost.
BCR in this dissertation is calculated using the average failure rate reduction, γ, as the
benefit and the percentage of components replicated, ρ, as the cost,
BCR =

γ
.
ρ

(4.5)

Each circuit component, regardless of type, contributes a single count in determining the percentage of components replicated. The average failure rate reduction is bounded from (−∞, 1], and
the percentage of components replicated is bounded from [0, 1] with 0 being 0% of components
replicated and 1 being 100% of components replicated. Thus, BCR is bounded from (−∞, ∞).
A negative BCR indicates that the application of partial circuit replication actually increased the
average failure rate or made the average failure rate worse.
Other metrics could be used in the calculation of a benefit-cost ratio, but the metrics selected for BCR in this dissertation simplify the benefit-cost ratio while allowing it to remain meaningful. Average failure rate reduction is chosen as the benefit because of its linear expression of
benefit (i.e., a linear increase as the average failure rate is further reduced). The percentage of components replicated is chosen as the cost because it too is linear (from 0% to 100%), and it loosely
reflects other costs (e.g., increased power, degradation of the maximum operating frequency).

4.6

Expected Benefit
Partial circuit replication covers a very large design space. Applications of partial circuit

replication can provide zero benefit at zero cost or a large benefit at a large cost and everything in
between. The coveted or best application of partial circuit replication is the one that provides maximal benefit at zero cost. This dissertation explores the vast design space and finds new benefit-cost
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ratio observations that are beyond the previously known Pareto optimal frontier. This is accomplished by using new selection approaches that expand the current state-of-the-art understanding
as to what makes partial circuit replication more effective.
The benefit gained from partial circuit replication is expected to be proportional to the
amount of the original circuit replicated. The more components replicated, the more benefit expected. Stated more formally, the benefit gained is expected to mirror the partial circuit replication
coverage, with coverage being the percentage of components replicated, ρ, also used as cost in
the calculation of BCR. If a coverage of 50% is applied (i.e., 0.5), then the average failure rate is
expected to be reduced by 50%. This corresponds to an expected BCR of 1.0.
The expectation of a 1.0 BCR operates under three assumptions: no penalty due to overhead, a sufficiently large repair rate, and equal component importance. Overhead from the insertion
of reduction voters for TMR can lessen the benefit offered due to the addition of single-point failures. The effect would decrease the BCR. Also for TMR, if the repair rate were low enough to
allow for frequent soft error accumulation that defeats TMR, the benefit cost ratio would also be
lower. If some components are more important than others (i.e., some contribute more toward the
average failure rate than others), then replicating those components would return a higher benefit
cost ratio.
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that more benefit than expected is obtained in complex FPGA designs when partial circuit replication is applied to critical components and subregions as identified through attribute-based selection approaches and targeted fault injection.
Given the benefit of average failure rate reduction and the cost of the percentage of components
replicated, it is anticipated through this work that selections will be identified that provide larger
benefit than their associated costs.

4.7

Overview of Experiments
In this dissertation, several experiments are conducted to advance the state of the art for

using partial circuit replication to mask and detect soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs. These experiments demonstrate that more benefit than expected is obtained from partial circuit replication
in complex SRAM-based FPGA designs when partial circuit replication is applied to critical components and sub-regions as identified through attribute-based selection approaches and targeted
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fault injection. The sets of experiments conducted progress in their level of sophistication; the first
set applies partial TMR and partial DWC blindly to a large number of components in the complex
FPGA-based networking designs to provide initial samples of benefits and challenges of partial
circuit replication, the second set examines the effectiveness of several selection approaches on a
simple FPGA-based design, and the third set applies TMR and DWC to critical components as
identified through targeted fault injection. Here are the experiments conducted:
• Initial Sample
– Partial TMR
* Commercial FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
* Open-Source FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
– Partial DWC
* Commercial FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
* Open-Source FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
• Selection Approach Exploration – Partial TMR – Another FPGA Design
• Selections Guided by Targeted Fault Injection
– Partial TMR – Open-Source FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
– Partial DWC
* Commercial FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
* Open-Source FPGA-Based Computer Networking Switch
The intent of these experiments is to understand the benefits and challenges of partial circuit replication, to identify principles that guide the effective use of partial circuit replication, and to demonstrate effective applications of partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs.
Each set of experiments centers around fundamental research objectives. The first set of
experiments examines the effects of partial circuit replication on complex FPGA designs (see
Appendix I). The second set of experiments examines the effectiveness of various selection approaches for determining which components to replicate. The third set of experiments examines
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the effectiveness of partial circuit replication when guided by the results of targeted fault injection.
Each set of experiments helps to advance the effective use of partial circuit replication for masking
and detecting soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs.
The initial sample set of experiments applies partial TMR and partial DWC to some portion
of the two complex FPGA designs. These designs are used in FPGA-based computer networking
applications. In these experiments, the target circuit is replicated as-much-as-possible while maintaining circuit functionality and meeting design constraints. In this experiment set, the benefit of
partial circuit replication for a specific failure mode is examined in the commercial design and the
benefit of partial circuit replication for any observed failure is examined in the open source design
to look at different benefit aspects of partial circuit replication, and benefit is observed in both designs. These experiments present the challenges of applying partial circuit replication to complex
designs (e.g., multiple clock domains, third-party IP, strict design and resource constraints) and
demonstrate gained benefit (i.e., longer MTTF).
The second set of experiments examines different selection approaches as applied to another FPGA design. The design used is a common FPGA reliability benchmark design [19]. Several selection approaches are examined in this experiment (all components minus IO and test logic,
registers only, LUTs only, random, maximum edge and minimum voter, and feedback based selections). This experiment finds that some selection approaches are more effective than others
(i.e., provide greater benefit for lower cost) and that some selection approaches actually worsen
the MTTF.
The final set of experiments uses results from targeted fault injection and principles from
the previous experiment set to apply partial circuit replication in a more efficient way to areas of
the FPGA-based computer networking applications. These selections guard against persistent failures induced by radiation. Targeted fault injection identifies regions and specific components in
the design that are more closely associated with radiation-induced persistent failures – undetected
persistent loss of network traffic in the commercial design, and any persistent failures in the open
source design. Using principles from the previous experiment set, benefits is observed by replicating only the identified sensitive components, and a significant increase in benefit is seen when also
replicating logic surrounding the identified sensitive components that are replicated. Replicating
components identified as critical and surrounding logic places focused effort on the more sensitive
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area of the circuit. This set of experiments provided the largest amount of benefit at the lowest
cost.
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CHAPTER 5.

PARTIAL CIRCUIT REPLICATION IN COMPLEX FPGA DESIGNS

This chapter applies partial TMR and partial DWC to FPGA-based computer networking
switch applications to observe the potential benefits of these techniques within a complex system.
Two computer networking switch applications are chosen: one commercial and one open source
(see Appendix I). The associated FPGA designs are complex. They have multiple clock domains,
several independently developed modules, third-party IP that is encrypted, tight constraints (resource, power, timing, etc.), and they use a significant number of resources.
To observe the benefit of partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs, four experiments are conducted. Two of the four experiments are for partial TMR. The other two experiments
are for partial DWC. The goal of these experiments is to apply partial TMR and partial DWC to
both the commercial and open-source computer networking switch to observe the benefit of partial
circuit replication in these complex designs. A portion of the components in each design is replicated. The benefits observed are compared against the benefits expected. These experiments show
that partial circuit replication can provide significant benefit to complex FPGA designs.

5.1

Partial TMR
Partial TMR within this section is applied to two complex FPGA-based computer network-

ing designs: one commercial and one open source. The desired outcome is to observe the benefit
of partial circuit replication in these designs. The benefit measured is an improvement in MTTF, or
reduction in average failure rate, as estimated through radiation testing and fault injection testing
(see Appendix F). Under the assumption of equal component importance, a benefit proportional to
the amount of components triplicated is expected. The benefits observed in these experiments are
compared against the benefit expected. The results are used as a reference for additional partial
circuit replication implementations. It is anticipated that some benefit will be observed in each
experiment.
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5.1.1

Commercial Networking Switch
The commercial networking switch investigated is a campus backbone switch. These kinds

of devices connect multiple computer networks together within a single building or among multiple
buildings. The commercial networking switch itself is capable of processing terabits of data each
second. The switch is able to detect and recover from several types of errors; but in rare instances,
it can experience a radiation-induced failure mode where network flow is lost indefinitely without
detection. This failure mode is referred to as a persistent undetected loss of network traffic. Partial
TMR is used in the experiment within this section to improve the MTTF of persistent undetected
loss of network traffic failure events in the commercial FPGA-based computer networking switch.
Partial TMR within this section is applied to a small portion of the components within
the commercial networking switch. A specific hardware module was selected for partial circuit
replication. Selecting a specific module limited the scope of partial TMR, making it easier to implement. The module selected, named “packet-reader,” was chosen for its importance in directing
network traffic. As its name indicates, this module parses packet header information. This information is used later on to direct network traffic. Partial TMR is applied using the FPGA design tool
flow outlined in Appendix G. The portion of the circuit selected for replication, in this experiment,
makes up only 1.4% of the components in the design.
Not all of the components in the “packet-reader” module could be replicated. Replicating
all components resulted in timing closure issues. Design constraints required all combinational
paths to have a propagation delay less than the period of a 212 MHz clock cycle (less than 4.7
nanoseconds). To meet this constraint, several components were excluded from partial TMR.
Components excluded include proprietary IP and combinational logic along critical paths. In the
end, approximately 28% of the components in the packet reader module were replicated, which
works out to 1.4% of the components in the design overall. It may have been possible to replicate
more of the components in the packet reader module; but timing constraints were met with a small
amount of margin, so no further attempts were made to include more components in the selection.
Table 5.1 presents the portion of components replicated compared to the design as a whole.
The design as a whole consists of 266,139 components (e.g., flip-flops, LUTs, multiplexers, block
memories, distributed memories, IOs, buffers, digital signal processing units, etc.).1 The packet
1 Each

component, regardless of type, contributes a single count toward the aggregate total count of components.
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reader module makes up approximately 5% of all components in the design (approximately 14,000
components). Only 28% of the components in the packet reader module were selected for TMR.
This corresponds to replicating 1.4% of the components in the overall design, or a 2.8% increase
in the number of components instanced, not including the insertion of voters. Overall, the amount
of replication applied is modest.
Table 5.1: Overhead of Partial TMR Insertion

Overall Design
Packet Reader Module
Partial TMR Selection
Overhead

Components
266,139
13,647
3,750
7,500

Percentage
–
5.13% of Overall Design
27.5% of the PR Module
2.82% increase in overall size

Replicating this small area of the design, in part, may demonstrate that some components
are more beneficial to replicate than others. Under the assumption of equal component importance,
replicating 1.4% of components corresponds to an expected MTTF improvement of 1.01× (see
Section 4.5.2). Replicating 1.4% of components is expected to reduce the average failure rate by
the same amount, which corresponds to the MTTF improvement given (see Equation 4.4). If the
components replicated are more important than other components in the design for the undetected
persistent loss of network traffic failure mode, then a more significant MTTF improvement may
be observed. The portion of the design replicated is thought to be more important due to the role
of the module selected for partial TMR in processing network traffic; thus, a larger than expected
MTTF improvement may be observed.
To estimate MTTF improvement from partial TMR, a random fault injection campaign and
an accelerated neutron radiation test are conducted. Additional information on estimating failure
rates through fault injection and accelerated radiation testing can be found in Appendix F. The test
setup used for these experiments is shown in Figure 5.1. In this experiment, data is configured
to travel through four ports of the networking switch, creating an extended loopback to a traffic
generator. A loss network traffic greater than 10% of total throughput without system detection or
recovery is considered a failure. This threshold captured the great majority of undetected persistent loss of network traffic failure events. The JTAG configuration manager (JCM) is only used in
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the fault injection experiment. It introduces and removes faults in configuration memory (see Figure 5.2). The neutron radiation test was conducted with internal configuration memory scrubbing
disabled for the baseline design and enabled for the partial TMR design.

Traffic
Generator

Modular Network Board

ASIC

Console

Host

JCM

FPGA

JTAG

Figure 5.1: Commercial Networking Switch Test Infrastructure: 4-Port Loopback

JTAG
Configuration
Manager

JTAG
Connection

Loopback
Connection

Traffic
Generator
Connection

Figure 5.2: Fault Injection Setup

The test setup used for this partial TMR experiment consists of four network ports placed
in a loopback configuration. A similar test setup is used for the experiments in Section 5.2 and
Section 7.4.1. More details on the test setup and infrastructure for the commercial FPGA-based
computer networking switch can be found in Appendix I.

54

Fault Injection Testing
Three fault injection tests were conducted. The first test estimates the MTTF of the baseline
design without partial TMR. The second test estimates MTTF of the baseline design with configuration scrubbing. The final test estimates the MTTF of the partial TMR design with configuration
scrubbing. The test results are used to estimate the benefit gained from partial TMR and to help
distinguish between the benefits gained from configuration scrubbing and partial TMR.
Table 5.2 presents the fault injection data collected. Note that the number of injected faults
between the baseline and non-TMR with scrubbing mode is the same. The non-TMR with scrubbing test mode uses the same data as the baseline but filters out the failures that were resolved when
the injected fault was removed via configuration scrubbing. The total number of faults injected
and the total number of failures observed are given. Fault Injection Sensitivity is the percentage
of faults that result in a failure. FIT and MTTF are estimated using the sensitivity, the size of the
CRAM, and the SEU FIT/mbit of the device (see Appendix F). 95% confidence intervals are given
for sensitivity and MTTF improvement.
Table 5.2: Fault Injection Testing Results

Version
Injected Faults
Total Failures
Fault Injection Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Approx. FIT
Approx. MTTF (years)
MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Baseline
49,376
590
1.19%
(1.1%, 1.3%)
67
1,703
1.0×
–

Non-TMR
w/ Scrubbing
49,376
397
0.80%
(0.73%, 0.88%)
45
2,535
1.48×
(1.2×, 1.8×)

Partial TMR
w/ Scrubbing
35,264
75
0.21%
(0.16%, 0.26%)
12
9,506
5.62×
(4.2×, 7.8×)

Overall, fault injection demonstrates a 5.6× improvement in MTTF. The full MTTF improvement estimate cannot be solely attributed to partial TMR. Configuration scrubbing, independent of partial TMR, provides MTTF improvement. Greater MTTF improvement is obtained from
partial TMR with configuration scrubbing. The two soft error mitigation techniques work together
to enhance their individual benefit contributions [20]. The MTTF improvement from configuration
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scrubbing (1.5× improvement) and the MTTF improvement from the application of partial TMR
with configuration scrubbing (an additional 3.8× improvement) compound to yield the composite
5.6× MTTF improvement.
A much larger benefit than expected is observed through fault injection based MTTF estimates. The MTTF improvement expected is 1.01×, assuming equal component importance; the
MTTF improvement estimated from the addition of partial TMR to the baseline design with configuration scrubbing is 3.8×. A 3.8× improvement corresponds to a 73% reduction in average
failure rate (e.g., sensitivity from 0.80% to 0.21%, FIT from 45 to 12). Given that only 1.4% of the
design was replicated, a benefit cost ratio of 73% reduction to 1.4% replication or a BCR of 52 is
estimated. This BCR estimate is far greater than the BCR of 1.0 expected. These results indicate
that the components replicated contribute to the average failure rate disproportionately.

Neutron Radiation Testing
Neutron radiation testing was conducted on the commercial network switch design in December of 2017 at the TRIUMF Neutron Facility on the BL1B beam path [66]. The TRIUMF
Neutron Facility is a spallation neutron source with a wide energy spectrum similar to that found
in terrestrial environments. FPGAs within the product were aligned perpendicular to the one and
one-half inch collimated beam. Two modules were placed in the beam back to back to accelerate
data acquisition. The distance of each FPGA from the beam source was recorded and the flux of
the beam was degraded in analysis to compensate for the distance [1]. Both the baseline version
of the design, without partial TMR and without internal configuration scrubbing, and the partial
TMR version of the design, with internal configuration scrubbing enabled, were tested to estimate
the MTTF for the persistent loss of network traffic.
The data obtained from neutron radiation testing, presented in Table 5.3, suggests an overall
MTTF improvement of 6×. Scaling the fluence exposure of both versions of the design to ground
level in New York, the baseline and partial TMR versions of the design received the equivalent
of 250 and 525 years respectively of terrestrial radiation. Although this data represents centuries
equivalence of real-time testing, there is still significant overlap in the 95% confidence intervals
between the two versions of the design as shown in Figure 5.3. More time testing than was available
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would be needed to remove this overlap. Non-overlapping confidence intervals of 50% confidence
are provided to better gauge the MTTF improvement observed in neutron radiation testing.
Table 5.3: Neutron Radiation Testing Results

Version

Baseline

pTMR

Total Fluence
Total Failures
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)

2.89×108
3
1.0×10−8
(2.1×10−9 , 3.0×10−8 )

6.01×108
1
1.7×10−9
(1.7×10−10 , 9.3×10−9 )

FIT Rate
(95% Conf. Interval)
(50% Conf. Interval)
MTTF (years)

135
(27, 395)
(97, 225)
852

22
(2, 121)
(14, 56)
5,185

MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
(50% Conf. Interval)

6×
(0.2×, 183×)
(1.7×, 16×)

Baseline
pTMR

0

50

100

150

FIT Rate
Figure 5.3: 95% Confidence Interval Overlap, FIT with Error Bars Shown

Unlike fault injection testing, the MTTF improvement gained attributable to configuration
scrubbing verses partial TMR with configuration scrubbing are not distinguishable in the neutron
radiation test results. An MTTF improvement of 6× is observed between the baseline and partial TMR design bounded between 1.7-16× with 50% confidence, but it is not clear how much
of this improvement is due to enabling configuration scrubbing verses adding partial TMR. An
improvement in estimated MTTF is observed; but due to lack of additional information from neu-
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tron radiation testing of this partial TMR application, a greater dependence is required, on fault
injection results to determine the benefit offered by of partial TMR.
Fault injection testing of partial TMR on the commercial FPGA-based networking design
demonstrates greater benefit than expected when partial TMR is applied to an area of the circuit
thought to be more critical based on its role in the design. Partial TMR was applied to 1.4%
of the components in the design. Fault injection estimates an MTTF improvement of 3.8× with
partial TMR and configuration scrubbing over the baseline design with configuration scrubbing.
This corresponds to a BCR of approximately 52, which is much greater than the expected BCR
of 1.0. From the neutron radiation test, the attribution of the MTTF improvement (configuration
scrubbing verses partial TMR with configuration scrubbing) is unknown, but a significant MTTF
improvement is observed. These experiments demonstrate that a large amount of benefit can be
obtained from partial TMR within a complex FPGA design while replicating only a small portion
of the design.

5.1.2

Open-Source Networking Switch
The commercial FPGA switch carries many challenges that make adding partial TMR

difficult. The commercial FPGA design uses 86% of the slices available on its Vertex-7 FPGA
(XC7VX330T), uses more than half of the registers and block memories, and uses more than a
third of the LUTs. The commercial design has multiple clock domains, and it makes use of thirdparty IP (some of which is encrypted). The commercial design supports many features and functions beyond the core functionality that is tested through fault injection and radiation testing, and
it makes use of several independently developed modules. The purpose of components within the
commercial FPGA-design is largely unknown, which makes the study of partial circuit replication
on this design interesting and difficult.
Lessons applicable to partial circuit replication on the commercial FPGA-based computer
networking design can be learned from a design that is less involved. The open-source networking
switch used in this dissertation provides the core basic functionality as the commercial switch (i.e.,
directing network data) with fewer ports, less total bandwidth, and fewer features. Yet the opensource networking design has some of the same implementation challenges as the commercial
networking switch (multiple clock domains, tight constraints, use of third-party encrypted IP, etc.).
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Use of the open-source design makes it possible to study the implementation of partial circuit
replication on a complex design without the overhead associated with the commercial networking
switch design. Lessons learned from the open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch
are therefore applicable to the commercial design. Using the open-source FPGA-based computer
networking design also makes additional data samples available for comparison.
The application of partial TMR to the open-source FPGA-based computer networking design differs from the application of partial TMR to the commercial design in that a larger area of
the design is targeted, and a wider scope of failures is considered. In the commercial design, partial
TMR is limited to a specific module; in the open-source commercial design, partial TMR can be
applied to any component in the design. In the commercial partial TMR experiments, the failure
mode targeted is undetected persistent loss of network traffic without recovery; in the open-source
partial TMR experiments of within this section, the failure mode targeted is any observed deviation
from expected behavior. Partial TMR in the commercial design examines the benefits of partial
TMR toward a specific failure mode whereas partial TMR in the open-source design examines the
benefits of partial TMR toward avoidance of any failure mode.
Partial TMR within this section is applied to 71% of the components within the open-source
FPGA-based computer networking switch. The MTTF for any deviation from expected behavior
is estimated through fault injection and radiation testing. A baseline design without any circuit
redundancy is compared against the partial TMR implementation. External configuration scrubbing is applied to both design versions. Under the assumption of equal component importance,
the expected MTTF improvement is 3.4× (see Section 4.5.2). In these experiments, the MTTF
improvement estimated is compared against the MTTF improvement expected. It is anticipated
that partial TMR will provide some benefit, and since the targeted failure mode is any.
Not all of the components in the open-source networking switch could be replicated. Several components were excluded from TMR including I/O elements, global buffers, blackboxes
(encrypted portions of third party IP with unknown contents), and components not considered to
be general logic elements (clock controllers, JTAG registers, etc.). Clock domain analysis was also
performed to exclude synchronizers from replication to preserve synchronization between circuit
copies [63]. Any combinational logic that was only driving or driven by an excluded element
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was also excluded from replication. In the end, 71% of design components were triplicated (see
Appendix I for original design resource utilization).
In addition to replicating 71% of the design components, a total of 13,126 voters were
inserted into the design; 4,066 groups of three voters were inserted into feedback paths, and 928
were inserted as reduction voters between replicated elements and non-replicated elements. Voters
themselves are triplicated where possible to avoid single-point failures. Voters are also placed into
feedback paths to allow for self-synchronization between circuit copies [17]. Resource utilization
for the TMR version of the open-source networking switch design is shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Resource Utilization of the Partial TMR Ethernet Switch Design

Kintex 7 Device
Slices
Registers
LUTs
Block Memories
Global Clock Buffers
I/O

Used
22,807 (45%)
69,699 (17%)
59,040 (29%)
344 (77%)
8 (25%)
53 (13%)

Increase from Baseline
2.70×
2.35×
3.22×
2.87×
1.00×
1.00×

In the partial TMR design, the calculated maximum operating frequencies are 107 MHz and
140 MHz for the system clock domain and the interface clock domains, respectively. Both of these
clock rates are notably slower than the baseline design, which operates at maximum frequencies of
120 MHz for the system clock domain and 160 MHz for the interface clock domains (a 10.8% and
a 12.5% reduction respectively). The required frequency for the system clock domain is 100 MHz
and 125 MHz for the interface clock domains. Anything lower than these clock rates is unable to
support external hardware resources (e.g., the actual Ethernet PHY). The clock rates under partial
TMR still meet the requirements of the design, but the reduced clock rates demonstrate how the
application of TMR could cause a design to fail timing closure in implementation. The open-source
design has the luxury of greater slack in timing paths compared to the commercial design.
The test setup presented in Appendix I is used for both fault injection and radiation testing. The four ports of the open-source networking switch are connected to four ports on a traffic
generator [67]. The network traffic generator provides full-duplex randomized data to and from
each port in all possible combinations while keeping track of the successful arrival of each net60

work packet. The JCM is used in both fault injection and radiation testing to manage configuration
memory, to operate the traffic generator through an auxiliary Ethernet connection, and to orchestrate the tests. The management of configuration memory by the JCM includes the performance
of configuration scrubbing for both the baseline and partial TMR versions of the design and the
injection and removal of faults for fault injection.

Fault Injection Testing
Fault injection testing follows test flow discussed in Appendix I. A random fault is injected
while the FPGA design is actively directing network traffic. Any observable deviation from expected behavior (a dropped packet, a misdirected packet, a corrupted packet, etc.) resulting from
the injection of a random fault is considered a failure. A number of random faults are individually
assessed for causing failure. The results are aggregated. Results are shown in Table 5.5. Approximately 1.11% of the CRAM bits in the baseline design are observed to cause a failure when
upset. After TMR was applied, CRAM sensitivity dropped to 0.17%, resulting in a 6.5× MTTF
improvement.
Table 5.5: Fault Injection Results

Mode
Baseline
Partial TMR
Total Injections
1592674
297896
Total Failures
17659
509
CRAM Sensitivity
1.11%
0.17%
(95% Conf. Interval)
(1.09%, 1.12%) (0.15%, 0.19%)
Approx. FIT
60
9
Approx. MTTF (years)
1,909
12,388
MTTF Improvement
–
6.49×
(95% Conf. Interval)
–
(5.74×, 7.47×)

These results suggest an 83-87% reduction in the average failure rate for any deviation
from expected behavior (e.g., sensitivity reduced from 1.11% to 0.17%, FIT reduced from 60 to
9). Given that partial TMR is applied to 71% of the circuit components, this reduction in average
failure rate corresponds to a benefit-cost ratio of 1.2 with 95% confidence intervals from 1.17-1.23.
The BCR observed is much closer to the BCR expected of 1.0. Likely, the observed BCR is close
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to 1.0 for two reasons. First, as more components are replicated, both high importance and low
importance structure are replicated, which leads to a BCR that is closer to 1.0. Second, since the
target failure mode is any deviation from expected behavior, as opposed to a specific failure mode,
components in the design have more equal importance in their contribution toward a failure. This
experiment once again suggests that partial TMR can provide significant benefit to complex FPGA
designs.

Neutron Radiation Testing
Neutron testing was performed at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) in
December of 2018. As shown in Figure 5.4, the FPGA of the network switch was positioned
perpendicular to a two inch collimated neutron beam. Degradation of the neutron-flux over the
distance from the source was taken into consideration.

Figure 5.4: Placement of the Open-Source Networking Switch for Radiation Testing

A test flow similar to that used for fault injection testing is used for neutron radiation
testing. To expose the FPGA device to radiation, the beam shutter that blocks the flow of neutrons
is opened while the FPGA-design is actively directing network traffic. The occurrence of any
observable output error is recorded. If the FPGA designs enters an unrecoverable state, the device
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is reprogrammed or power cycled to bring the device back into a working state. The total amount of
radiation exposure received while the device is directing network traffic is recorded along with the
total number of failure events observed. Table 5.6 presents the neutron radiation data of the baseline
switch design along with the partial TMR design. Based on this data, the baseline switch would
experience a deviation from expected behavior with an MTTF of 2650 years at a NYC neutron
flux rate of thirteen neutrons per square centimeter per hour (13 n cm−2 h−1 ) [1] (see Appenix F).
This equates to a FIT rate for the baseline design of 43. The MTTF and FIT of the partial TMR
design is 13,450 years and 8.5 respectively. This represents a 5.05× MTTF improvement due to
the application of partial TMR.
Table 5.6: Neutron Testing Results

Mode
Total Fluence
Total Upsets

Baseline

TMR

3.43×1010 n cm2
10682

8.59×1010 n cm2
26836

Total Failures
113
56
Cross Section
3.30×10−9 cm2
6.52×10−10 cm2
(95% Conf. Interval) (2.7×10−9 , 3.9×10−9 ) (4.8×10−10 , 8.2×10−10 )
MTTF (NYC Flux)
2650 Years
13450 Years
(95% Conf. Interval)
(2250, 3250)
(10550, 18250)
FIT (NYC Flux)
43
8.5
(95% Conf. Interval)
(35, 51)
(6.2, 11)
MTTF Improvement
–
5.05×
(95% Conf. Interval)
–
(3.29×, 8.13×)

The MTTF improvement estimated through fault injection and neutron radiation testing are
in agreement based on their confidence intervals. Fault injection estimates a 6.49× improvement
with 95% confidence intervals from 5.74-7.47×, and neutron radiation testing estimates a 5.05×
improvement with 95% confidence intervals from 3.29-8.13×. While there are differences in the
MTTF estimate confidence intervals between the two estimation approaches (fault injection and
radiation testing), they are in statistical agreement concerning the MTTF improvement gained
from partial TMR. Unlike the neutron radiation test of partial TMR in the commercial FPGAbased computer networking design in Section 5.1.1, sufficient information is obtained through
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neutron radiation testing of partial TMR in the open-source FPGA-based networking switch in this
experiment to attribute the MTTF improvement observed to the use of partial circuit replication.
Like fault-injection, the BCR observed through neutron radiation testing is much closer
to the expected BCR of 1.0. The 5.1× MTTF improvement observed through neutron radiation
testing from the use of partial TMR corresponds to an 80% reduction in average failure rate (i.e.,
FIT reduced from 43 to 8.5) with 95% confidence intervals in reduction from 70-88%. Given that
partial TMR was applied to 71% of components, the BCR observed is 1.13 with 95% confidence
intervals from 0.99-1.24, close to 1.0.
The closeness of the observed BCR to 1.0 is likely due to the target failure mode for mitigation being any observable deviation from expected behavior. When any deviation is considered
a failure, likely any fault in a utilized component will result in a failure. Thus, each component
has near equal importance in sustaining the functionality of a design to prevent the occurrence of a
failure. This close to uniform distribution of responsibility is potentially present in this experiment
where a BCR of close to 1.0 is observed.
Partial TMR in both the commercial an open-source designs demonstrates significant MTTF
improvement. A 3.8× MTTF improvement with a BCR of 52 is observed through fault injection
for partial TMR on the commercial design; and a 6× MTTF improvement with a BCR near 1.0 is
observed through fault injection and radiation testing in the open-source design (with the difference in BCR likely attributable to the difference in the failure mode targeted for mitigation). These
results suggest that partial TMR can provide significant benefit in complex FPGA designs.

5.2

Partial DWC
In the partial DWC experiments within this section, partial DWC is applied to two complex

FPGA-based computer networking designs: one commercial and one open source. Like the partial
TMR experiments in Section 5.1, the desired outcome of partial DWC experiments in this section
is to observe the benefit of partial DWC in FPGA designs that are complex. The benefit measured
is an improvement in mean time to undetected failure (MTTF for undetected failures) as estimated
through radiation testing and fault injection. Partial DWC should increase design awareness of
failures that occur. Similar to partial TMR, a benefit proportional to the amount of components
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replicated is expected, assuming equal component importance. If components replicated are more
beneficial to replicate than others, a benefit greater than expected may result.
The partial DWC experiments within this section are similar to the partial TMR experiments conducted in Section 5.1, only these experiments make use of partial DWC instead of
partial TMR. In the commercial design, a larger portion of the design is included in partial DWC
within this section than was included in partial TMR in Section 5.1.1, and more ports are added to
the loopback configuration in the test setup. In the open-source design, a subset of the components
selected for partial TMR in Section 5.1.2 is selected for partial DWC within this section. Partial
TMR masks errors to prevent failures, and partial DWC detects errors to prevent failures from being undetected. It is anticipated that partial DWC in both the commercial and open-source designs
will provide an MTTF improvement (i.e., increased average time to undetected failure).

5.2.1

Commercial Networking Switch
Partial DWC within this section is applied to the commercial networking switch design

to detect network disruptions that are persistent and otherwise undetected. The objective of this
experiment is to observe the benefit of partial DWC in a complex SRAM-based FPGA design. A
subset of components within the design is replicated for partial DWC. The benefit expected is an
ability to detect otherwise undetectable persistent loss of network traffic failures. Being able to
detect these failures should also allow for a reduction in the MTTF for undetected failures.
Partial DWC is applied to three sub-modules in the design that are thought to be more
closely associated with the correct transmission of network traffic due to the role they play in
the design and based on based on results from targeted-fault injection analysis in Chapter 7. The
sub-modules selected are the “packet-reader” (PR), the “traffic-manager” (TM), and the Interlaken
network protocol interface (INTER). These two partial DWC variants of the baseline design are
generated. The first variant applies DWC to number of components within the three selected modules. This variant includes 29% of the components in the design in partial DWC and requires more
than twenty-six hundred pairs of error detectors. The second variant applies partial DWC to components within the three selected modules that are identified as logic between strongly connected
components (SCC) [17]. This resulted in a design with 8% DWC coverage. In this second partial
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DWC design version, the number of detection pairs needed is reduced to less than seventeenhundred.
MTTF estimates for partial DWC in the commercial design are only made using accelerated
neutron radiation testing. An extensive sensitivity analysis of the baseline commercial design is
conducted via fault injection in Chapter 7. This analysis evaluates the relative sensitivity of each
of the three selected sub-modules and identifies specific components that are associated with the
undetected persistent loss of network traffic failure mode. However, MTTF estimates are not made
on the partial DWC implementations of the commercial design through fault injection.
The number of components within the three sub-modules (PR, TM, and INTER) make up
approximately 31.8% of all components within the design, yet only 29% of all components within
the design as a whole are duplicated for partial DWC in the first design variant. The components
within these modules that are excluded from partial DWC are excluded to alleviate impact on
timing and resource utilization, to avoid the duplication of synchronizes [63], and to lower the
number of detectors needed. In order to lower the number of detectors needed, only clusters of
components (weakly connected groupings of components) greater than one-hundred components
are selected for DWC.
Table 5.7 shows the resource utilization for each design version. The number of BRAMs,
global clock buffers (BUFGs), registers, LUTs, and IO are included along with their percent utilization (percentage of total device resources utilized). The DWC Coverage row indicates the percentage of the original design components (registers, lookup tables, other primitive components)
that were covered by DWC. Detector Pairs is the number of detector pairs inserted into the design
for partial DWC.
The partial DWC experiment for the commercial FPGA-based computer networking switch
uses the test setup and test flow described in Appendix I. Sixteen networking ports are placed in
a loopback configuration with network traffic from a traffic generator being constantly passed
through the ports. External configuration scrubbing is employed. A host computer continuously
monitors the flow of network traffic and reports any persistent loss of network traffic that is not
detected by the system or by partial DWC. The total amount of radiation exposure received is
recorded along with the number of failure events experienced.
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Table 5.7: Design Variant Resource Utilization (Vertex 7 330 T)

Resource

Baseline

Slices
Registers
LUTs
BRAMs
BUFGs
IOs
DWC Coverage
Detector Pairs

40,826 (80%)
136,766 (34%)
99,165 (49%)
457.5 (61%)
30 (94%)
622 (89%)
0%
0

Version
Partial DWC
PR/TM/INTER
49,016 (96%)
180,516 (44%)
134,639 (66%)
569 (76%)
30 (94%)
622 (89%)
29%
2,627

Partial DWC
Between SCC
44,814 (88%)
152,106 (37%)
113,278 (56%)
477 (64%)
30 (94%)
622 (89%)
8%
1,687

Neutron radiation testing of the baseline design and DWC variants was conducted at the
ChipIR experiment of the ISIS neutron source of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the United
Kingdom [68] in March of 2019. The commercial network switch was aligned perpendicular to the
neutron beam aperture such that one of the Virtex-7 330 T FPGAs on a modular network board was
directly in line with the neutron beam flight path. This setup is shown in Figure 5.5. A two-inch
collimator was used.

Neutron Beam Flight Path

Figure 5.5: Accelerated Neutron Beam Test Setup at ChipIR

For this experiment, the beam shutter was only opened after the network system was in
a working state, with traffic flowing correctly. The beam shutter was closed once a failure was
detected in order to allow the system time to reboot between failures without influencing results. A
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detailed log of the neutron fluence and device events was used to record the total fluence exposure
for each design version.
Data obtained from neutron radiation testing is analyzed in two ways. First, the neutron
cross sections of SEUs, loss of network traffic failures that are persistent and undetected by the
system (Failure Occurrences), and loss of network traffic failures that are persistent and undetected
by partial DWC (Undetected Failures) are examined in Table 5.8. Second, the percentage of failure
events that are correctly detected by partial DWC are examined in Table 5.9. The goal from this
analysis is to determine the accuracy of the measurements and to determine if any benefit was
obtained from partial DWC.
Table 5.8 shows the cross section results from radiation testing. It includes the total fluence
of exposure for each design, the number of SEUs and corresponding single-bit upset cross section,
the number of failure occurrences for each design with the corresponding cross section, the number
of undetected failures for each design with the corresponding cross section, the NYC normalized
FIT rate for undetected failures and its corresponding MTTF, and the MTTF improvement observed
for undetected failures.
It is difficult to ascertain the MTTF improvement for undetected failures obtained from
partial DWC because of the overlap in 95% confidence intervals on the cross section of undetected
failures between the three different design versions. The estimated cross section for an upset in a
single CRAM bit agrees with the estimate provided in the vendor reliability report [9], which gives
confidence in the dosimetry of the test. The cross section estimates for failure occurrences are similar between the three different designs, which is expected behavior (see Section 3.3). Comparing
the cross sections of undetected failure suggests an MTTF improvement of 1.4× for the Partial
DWC PR/TM/INTER design, and an MTTF improvement of 1.2× for the Partial DWC Between
SCC design over the baseline design; but the overlap in cross section confidence intervals lowers
the confidence in the accuracy of the MTTF improvement observed.
Some confidence that benefit has been obtained is found by examining the percentage of
observed failures that are correctly detected by partial DWC. Tables 5.9 display partial DWC detection accuracy from accelerated neutron testing. Total Failures are the number of persistent loss
of network traffic events that are undetected by the system. Detected Failures are the number of
failure events correctly detected by partial DWC. Accuracy is the percentage of failures correctly
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Table 5.8: Accelerated Neutron Testing Results
Version

Baseline

Partial DWC
PR/TM/INTER

Partial DWC
Between SCC

9.37×108

1.35×109

2.17×109

SEUs
Cross Section
(95% Conf. Interval)

459
6.18×10−15
(5.0×10−15 , 7.3×10−15 )

675
6.31×10−15
(5.4×10−15 , 7.3×10−15 )

1024
5.95×10−15
(5.2×10−15 , 6.7×10−15 )

Failure Occurrences
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)

11
1.17×10−8
(5.7×10−9 , 2.1×10−8 )

20
1.48×10−8
(9.0×10−9 , 2.3×10−8 )

32
1.47×10−8
(1.0×10−8 , 2.1×10−8 )

Undetected Failures
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)

11
1.17×10−8
(5.7×10−9 , 2.1×10−8 )

11
8.17×10−9
(3.3×10−9 , 1.3×10−8 )

22
1.01×10−8
(5.9×10−9 , 1.4×10−8 )

Undetected FIT
(95% Conf. Interval)
MTTF (years)
MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

152
(74, 273)
751
–
–

106
(43, 169)
1,076
1.4×
(0.44×, 6.35×)

132
(77, 187)
864
1.2×
(0.40×, 3.55×)

Fluence (n cm−2 )

detected by partial DWC. False Positives are the percentage of DWC detection events that do not
correspond to an actual failure event. False Positives for the partial DWC designs are close to 50%,
which is to be expected (see Section 3.3). The partial DWC implementations are able to accurately
detect some portion of the failure events that occur.
Table 5.9: Partial DWC Accuracy in Accelerated Neutron Testing

Version
Total Failures
Detected Failures
Accuracy
False Positives

Baseline
11
0
0%
0%

Partial DWC
PR/TM/INTER
20
9
45%
61%

Partial DWC
Between SCC
32
10
31%
58%

Based on the accuracy of partial DWC error detection events shown in Table 5.9, an MTTF
improvement of 1.8× is estimated for the Partial DWC PR/TM/INTER design version, and an
MTTF improvement of 1.4× is estimated for the Partial DWC Between SCC design version. These
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estimates correspond to BCRs of 1.6 and 3.8 respectively, which is above the expected BCR of 1.0
under the assumption of equal component importance. For these estimates to hold, the MTTF for
failure occurrence must be the same or similar between the baseline and the partial DWC designs.
It is likely safe assume that the MTTF for failure occurrence is similar between the baseline and
partial DWC designs (see Section 3.3). Under this assumption, benefit is observed from partial
DWC.
In this experiment, partial DWC was applied to the commercial networking switch design.
Two partial DWC design versions were tested. The replication of 29% of components in the Partial
DWC PR/TM/INTER design was able to detect 45% of otherwise undetectable failures, a benefitcost ratio of 1.6. Similarly, partial DWC of only 8% of design components in the Partial DWC
Between SCC design was able to detect 31% of errors, a benefit-cost ratio of 3.8. These observances are above the expected BCR of 1.0 under the assumption of equal component importance.
Benefit is observed from the use of partial DWC. More confidence in partial DWC benefit is seen
in Sections 5.2.2 and 7.4.

5.2.2

Open-Source Networking Switch
Within this section, partial DWC is applied to 42% of the components within the open-

source FPGA-based networking switch design to observe the benefit of partial DWC in a complex
SRAM-based FPGA design. The selection made for replication is a subset of the previous selection made for partial TMR in Section 5.1.2. Beginning with the partial TMR selection, additional
components were excluded to reduce the number of detectors needed. Some exclusions also resulted from redundant components that were not driving a detector (i.e., removed by optimization).
Thus, the percentage of components replicated for partial DWC is less than it was for partial TMR
in Section 5.1.2. Fewer components were replicated in an effort to reduce the number of detectors
needed, but benefit from adding redundancy is still anticipated.
This experiment uses DWC to detect any deviation from expected behavior in the opensource computer networking switch. The objective of this experiment is to observe the benefit
of partial DWC in a complex system. Under the assumption of equal component importance, a
benefit proportional to the amount of components replicated is expected. This experiment applies
partial DWC to a portion of the components in the open-source computer networking switch FPGA
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design and estimates the MTTF improvement for undetected failures through fault injection and
radiation testing. Unlike TMR, which is able to mask failures, DWC can only detect errors. The
benefit provided by DWC is estimated and compared to the benefit expected.
Like the commercial networking design, the open-source networking design has some ability to detect unexpected behavior internally. The self-checking mechanisms of the open-source design are discussed in Appendix I and in further detail in [67]. For this experiment, the self-checking
ability of open-source networking switch is ignored. Ignoring this ability places the focus of the
experiment on the benefit gained from partial DWC. The interplay between self-checking logic
and partial DWC (errors detected by one or the other or both) is covered in [67].
The DWC design uses no more than 2× any resource as compared to the baseline design.
This includes additional logic used to capture error detection signals and report them over JTAG.
A total of 432 detectors (216 pairs of detectors) were inserted into the design. DWC resource
utilization is presented in Table 5.10. Resource utilization of the baseline design is available in
Table I.2.
Table 5.10: Resource Utilization of the DWC Design

Kintex 7 Device
Slices
Registers
LUTs
Block Memories
Global Clock Buffers
I/O

Used
15,768 (31%)
50,577 (12%)
33,755 (17%)
232 (52%)
8 (25%)
53 (13%)

Total
50,950
407,600
203,800
445
32
400

Increase from Baseline
1.86×
1.71×
1.84×
1.93×
1.00×
1.00×

The DWC design has the maximum operating frequencies of 114 MHz and 160 MHz for the
system and interface clock domains, respectively. This represents a 5% slow down for the system
clock and no difference for the interface clocks compared to the baseline design. For the baseline
design, the maximum operating frequency is 120 MHz for the system clock domain and 160 MHz
for the interface clock domains. It is observed that DWC has a less significant impact on timing
than TMR. DWC decreased the maximum operating speed in the system clock domain by 5%
with no change in the interface clock domains; whereas TMR decreases the maximum operating
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speed in the system clock domain by 10.8% and decreased the maximum operating frequency in
the interface clock domains by 12.5% (see Section 5.1.2).

Fault Injection Testing
Faults are randomly injected into the baseline and partial DWC version of the design to
estimate the MTTF for any deviation from expected behavior that goes undetected. The MTTF for
any failure occurrence (detected or undetected) is also estimated. Using these estimates, the MTTF
improvement for undetected failure (any deviation from expected behavior that goes undetected) is
also estimated. The MTTF improvement estimate is compared against the benefit expected under
the assumption of equal component importance.
Table 5.11 presents fault injection data for this experiment. The total number of random
faults injected is given with the data broken down into four sections. The first section looks at total
failure occurrences (detected or undetected). The second section looks at undetected failures and
detection improvement. The third section estimates MTTF for undetected failures and estimates
MTTF improvement for undetected failures. The final section looks at the occurrence of false
positive detection events, which are close to 50% as expected (see Section 4.3).
Partial DWC applied to 42% of the components in the design is able to detect approximately
86% of all deviations from expected behavior. This corresponds to an estimated reduction of
86% in the occurrence of undetected failures (i.e., from 100% of errors being undetected to 14%
of errors being undetected). This in turn corresponds to an estimated 7.0× improvement in the
correct detection of failures assuming the MTTF of failure occurrence between the two designs
is the same. The estimated MTTF improvement for undetected failure is 7.6×, which considers
the small difference MTTF for failure occurrence between the two designs (i.e., 7.6=1.08*7.0).
Overall, the BCR of this partial DWC implementation is estimated to be 2.0, which is greater than
the BCR of 1.0 expected assuming equal component importance.

Neutron Radiation Testing
Neutron radiation testing was performed at LANSCE in December of 2018 during the same
visit used to collect TMR data within Section 5.1.2. The same physical setup was used. The FPGA
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Table 5.11: Fault Injection Results

Version
Faults Injected
Failure Occurrences
Failure Occurrence Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
FIT (Detected or Undetected)
(95% Conf. Interval)
MTTF (years)
MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
Correctly Detected Failures
Percentage of Total Failures
(95% Conf. Intervals)
Undetected Failures
Percentage of Total Failures
(95% Conf. Intervals)
Detection Improvement
(95% Conf. Intervals)
Undetected Failure Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Undetected FIT
(95% Conf. Interval)
MTTF (years)
MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
False Positive Events
Percentage of Detection Events

Baseline
876,416
12,001
1.37%
(1.34%, 1.39%)
77
(76, 79)
1,475
–
–
0
0.0%
–
12,001
100%
–
–
–
1.37%
(1.34%, 1.39%)
77
(76, 79)
1,476
–
–
0
–

Partial DWC
834,569
10,562
1.27%
(1.24%, 1.29%)
72
(70, 73)
1,591
1.08×
(1.04×, 1.12×)
9,053
85.7%
(85.1%, 86.4%)
1,509
14.3%
(13.6%, 15.0%)
7.0×
(6.7×, 7.3×)
0.181%
(0.172%, 0.190%)
10.2
(9.7, 10.7)
11,176
7.6×
(7.1×, 8.1×)
9,958
52.4%

was positioned perpendicular to the beam flight path such that the two inch collimated beam would
pass directly through the FPGA. Degradation of the neutron-flux over the distance from the source
is taken into consideration in the report of total fluence exposure. Table 5.12 presents the data
collected from the neutron radiation test for this DWC experiment.
Similarities between fault injection and neutron radiation testing are observed. As with
fault injection, the cross section of failure occurrence (detected or undetected) remains similar
between the baseline and partial DWC version. As with fault injection, slightly more than half of
all DWC detection events were false positives.
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Table 5.12: Partial DWC Neutron Testing Results

Version
Total Fluence (n cm−2 )
Total Upsets

Baseline

DWC

3.43×1010
10,682

1.15×1011
34,390

Failure Occurrences
113
Failure Occurrence Cross Section (cm2 )
3.30×10−9
(95% Conf. Interval)
(2.7×10−9 , 3.9×10−9 )
Failure Occurrence Improvement
–
(95% Conf. Interval)
–
Correctly Detected Failures
Percentage
(95% Conf. Intervals)
Undetected Failures
Percentage of Total Failures
(95% Conf. Intervals)
Detection Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

0
0.0%
–
113
100.0%
–
–
–

402
3.50×10−9
(3.2×10−9 , 3.8×10−9 )
0.94×
(0.7×, 1.2×)
322
80.1%
(76.2%, 84.0%)
80
19.9%
(16.0%, 23.8%)
5.0×
(4.2×, 6.3×)

Undetected Failure Cross Section (cm2 )
3.30×10−9
6.96×10−10
(95% Conf. Interval)
(2.7×10−9 , 3.9×10−9 ) (5.43×10−10 , 8.48×10−10 )
Undetected FIT
43
9
(95% Conf. Interval)
(35, 51)
(7, 11)
MTTF (years)
2,660
12,608
Improvement
–
4.7×
(95% Conf. Interval)
–
(3.2×, 7.2×)
False Positives
Percentage of Detection Events
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)

0
–
0
–
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359
52.7%
3.11×10−9
(2.8×10−9 , 3.4×10−9 )

The results from radiation testing suggest that the application of partial DWC provided an
MTTF improvement for undetected failures of 4.7×. The cross section for undetected failure was
reduced from 3.3×10−9 cm2 to 7.0×10−10 cm2 . The equates to a 79% reduction bounded by 95%
confidence intervals from 69% reduction to 86% reduction. Given that partial DWC was applied
to 42% of all components in the design, a BCR of 1.9 is estimates with 95% confidence from 1.6
to 2.0. The BCR estimated is above the expected BCR of 1.0, and benefit from partial DWC is
confidently observed.
The partial TMR and partial DWC experiments in this chapter demonstrate masking and
detection benefits from partial circuit replication in complex FPGA-based computer networking
designs. These techniques are applied to a commercial and an open-source computer networking
switch designs. A range of BCRs was observed across the several experiments, suggesting that
some groupings of components are more beneficial to replicate than others. These experiments
demonstrate the possibility of gaining more benefit than expected from partial circuit replication
by replicating components that are more critical. From the outcomes of theses experiments, it
becomes desirable to explore various selection approaches to further advance the effective use of
partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs (i.e., higher benefit for lower cost). Such
exploration is the undertaking of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 6.

THE IMPACT OF REPLICATION SELECTION ON EFFECTIVENESS

This chapter explores several selection approaches to determine what makes for a better
replication selection. A replication selection determines which components in a circuit are replicated. In the previous chapter, the benefit of partial circuit replication is observed in two different
FPGA-based computer networking designs. The benefit observed, in terms of MTTF improvement, sometimes exceeded the benefit expected. This finding suggests that there are areas of the
circuits that are more beneficial to replicate than others. Understanding what makes for a better
selection allows for more benefit to be obtained at an equal or lesser cost. The goal of this chapter
is to identify principles that improve the effectiveness of a selection.
In this chapter, six different selection approaches are evaluated for partial circuit replication. Selections made from the different approaches are used to apply partial TMR to an SRAMbased FPGA design. For comparison, a full TMR and a non-TMR design version are evaluated as
well. A total of twenty-five different design versions are tested through fault injection and accelerated neutron radiation testing. Each partial TMR design version falls under one of the six selection
approaches evaluated. The effectiveness of each selection approach is evaluated and compared.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents a description of each evaluated
selection approach. The reasoning for including each approach is given. Section 6.2 sets forth
the experiment conducted to evaluate the selection approaches. This section introduces the FPGA
design and test setup used. Section 6.3 presents the results from fault injection and radiation testing.
From the results, some selection approaches are found to be more effective than others. The main
takeaways from the experiment are general principles that lead to more effective selections (i.e.,
selections with a higher benefit at a lower cost).
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6.1

Selection Approaches
A selection approach is a set of rules that is followed for choosing components to replicate.

Components are only replicated if they are included in a selection. Selections range from no
replication, to full replication, to everything in between. There are numerous selections that can
be made and various selections approaches that can be taken. In a design with n components,
there are 2n possible selections for replication. A selection approach offers a constrained means
for exploring possible selections.
• All Components,
• All Flip-Flops,
• All LUTs,
• Random,
• Maximum Edges / Minimum Voters, and
• Feedback Based.
The evaluated selection approaches offer valuable insights into what makes a selection
effective. The selection approaches chosen for evaluation are not meant to be the best or most
optimal; they are meant to explore possible selections and provide insights into what can be done
to make selections better. These selection approaches represent a small sampling of all possible
selection approaches. By examining the effects of these selection approaches upon a target design,
useful insights can be gained as to what makes a selection better or worse.
Selections made for partial TMR are compared against a baseline design version (without
any TMR) and a full TMR version of the target design. This comparison reveals the MTTF improvement obtained from each selection and provides a reference to the MTTF improvement that
is obtained when all of the design is triplicated.
The subsections that follow cover each individual selection approach.

77

6.1.1

All Components
The “All Components” selection approach replicates all of the components in the target

design except for I/O ports and auxiliary logic used to support the conducted experiment. In many
partial circuit replication applications, I/O and some additional logic may be fixed and cannot
be altered. The “All Components” selection demonstrates the impact of such exclusions. The
impact that exclusions have on the effectiveness of circuit replication can be significant [21]. When
compared against the full TMR design version, it is anticipated that the “All Components” will
return a lower MTTF improvement.
All other selections made, besides full TMR, are subsets of the “All Components” selection.
As such, the “All Components” selection likely sets an upper bound on the amount of benefit that
can be obtained outside of full TMR for this experiment set. All of the remaining selections exclude
I/O and support logic from circuit replication. The “All Components” selection includes more
components in circuit replication than any subsequent selection made using the other selection
approaches.

6.1.2

All LUTs
The “All LUTs” selection approach triplicates all of the LUTs in a target design. A LUT

with n-inputs requires at least 2n CRAM bits to implement, one for each possible binary input
combination. Replicating a LUT also triplicates at least some portions of the routes that connect
to the LUT. Non-LUT components (FFs, BRAMs, multiplexers, DSPs, etc.) are not selected for
replication by this selection approach.
The benefit of replicating a LUT may be greater then the loss of benefit incurred from
inserting a reduction voter (see Section 4.2). Replicating LUTs improves MTTF, whereas inserting
a reduction voter may cause MTTF to degrade due to the insertion of a single-point failure. If the
increase in MTTF from LUT replication is greater than the decrease in MTTF from voter insertion,
then an overall improvement (increase) in MTTF will result. Replicating all LUTs requires a
reduction voter for TMR, or an error detector for DWC, to the placed on any signal driving a nonreplicated element. As a result, a large number of reduction voters may be inserted that could cause
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an overall decrease in MTTF. Notwithstanding the insertion of a large number of reduction voters,
the replication of LUTs may still provide an overall increase in MTTF.
The replication of “All LUTs” should provide a benefit, even with the insertion of a large
number of reduction voters. A voter requires a 3-input LUT, which corresponds to eight CRAM
bits and associated routing resources. Under normal operation of the voter, without CRAM corruption, only two of the eight entries in a majority voter are exercised: the all zeros and all ones input
cases. An upset in one of other six entries will not result in an erroneous output unless another
component in the circuit is corrupted at the same time. As a result, an added voter may introduce
as little as two CRAM bits of single-point failure vulnerabilities. A replicated LUT in some architectures can be a 6-input LUT, which corresponds to sixty-four CRAM bits to support its entries
and approximately twice as many routing resource as a 3-input LUT. Thus, replicating a 6-input
LUT potentially protects more than 32× as many CRAM bits as are introduced as single-point
failures with the addition of a reduction voter. These characteristics suggest that more benefit may
be gained by triplicating only LUTs than is lost by inserting reduction voters.

6.1.3

All Flip-Flops
Under TMR, triplicating only flip-flops is referred to as local TMR (LTMR) [64]. It is

suggested in [64] that this form of circuit replication will likely perform poorly in SRAM-based
FPGAs due to the susceptibility of routing connections and LUTs to radiation-induced corruptions.
Flip-flops require far fewer raw resources to implement than LUTs. By comparison, a flip-flop may
only correspond to a single CRAM bit, whereas a 6-input LUT corresponds to at least sixty-four
CRAM bits. Replicating flip-flops improves MTTF, but adding a reduction voter degrades MTTF
by adding a non-replicated component. As a result, the overall MTTF can be degraded. It is
anticipated that selections made using this approach will degrade the MTTF of the target design.

6.1.4

Random
Under the “Random” selection approach, components are chosen at random for inclusion

in a selection. It is anticipated that random selections will likely yield mediocre to subpar MTTF
improvement due to the amount of unrelated components replicated and amount of reduction voters
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needed to support the replication. When related logic is triplicated together, it likely requires fewer
reduction voters than triplicating components that are scattered throughout a design. This selection
approach is evaluated to study the importance of using a methodical selection approach. It is anticipated that randomly selecting components (LUTs, flip-flops, etc.) will yield counterproductive
results.

6.1.5

Maximum Edge, Minimum Voter or Detector
The “Maximum Edge, Minimum Voter or Detector” selection approach strives to replicate

as many edges as possible while using fewer reduction voters. It has been found in several studies [69], [70] that more than half of all utilized CRAM bits pertain to routing configuration and that
a majority of SEU-induced failures result from SEUs in CRAM bits dedicated to routing. Replicating as many connections as possible may disproportionately improve the overall reliability of
the design based on the number of components replicated.
This selection approach solves a set of constraints to minimize the cost of a selection based
on a cost function. The cost function is set to be the sum of required reduction voters (or error
detectors) less the sum of replicated edges. Items are only counted once per set of copies, not
once per individual copy. To setup constraints, a directed graph of connectivity is generated from
the targeted design. Each vertex in the graph represents a component in the design. Each edge in
the graph represents a connection in the design. Constraints are set so that a component could be
either included or excluded from replication. Subsequent constraints are set to indicate the need
for a reduction voter (or error detector) and to reflect the inclusion of an edge in circuit replication
(see Section 4.2 for terminology).
An optimizer is used to identify a selection with the minimum cost for a the given level
of allowable coverage (percentage of original components included in replication). This selection
approach will require far few reduction voters and triplicate far more edges than the random selection for a comparable coverage level. It is anticipated that these selections will yield more benefit
at lower cost since they will replicate more routes for the same number of replicated components.
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6.1.6

Feedback Based
“Feedback Based” selection approaches choose components for replication based on feed-

back relationships between components. Feedback occurs when the future output of a component is
dependent on its current output. Previous research has exploited feedback relationships to mitigate
the occurrence of persistent errors in SRAM-based FPGAs [25], [26]. The experiment conducted
in this chapter explores using feedback relationships to guide partial circuit replication selection
for mitigating the occurrence of any output error.
Two main types of feedback relationships are explored. The first type is associated with
strongly connected components (SCC). A directed graph is said to be strongly connected if and
only if every vertex is reachable from every other vertex. An SCC is a maximal subgraph that is
strongly connected [71]. The second type of feedback is tight feedback (TF). TF occurs when a
signal’s next state depends on its current or previous state within only a few clock cycles. TF can
occur as nested feedback within a larger feedback structure.
Figure 6.1 presents TF examples. Figure 6.1a is a simple example of tight feedback that is
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(a) Nested Feedback
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(b) Counter Selection

Figure 6.1: Tight Feedback Examples

nested. There is tight feedback from FF1 back to itself nested inside a larger, more loose feedback
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structure between FF1 and FF2 . Nested feedback decomposition (identifying feedback nesting
within a circuit) can help identify groups of related logic components within a larger SCC subset.
Figure 6.1b provides an example of TF found within a counter circuit.
The analysis performed to make feedback-based selections begins with a connectivity
graph, which is a mathematical representation of the test design where each vertex in the graph
represents a component, and each directional edge represents a connection between two components. This graph is decomposed to aid the different selection approaches (SCC or TF).
The SCC-based selections use an SCC decomposition of the connectivity graph where each
SCC in the graph is replaced with a single representative vertex. SCCs are identified using Tarjan’s
SCC algorithm [71]. With the graph decomposed in this manner, different selections can be made
based on which SCC is the largest or how components drive or are driven by SCCs.
The TF-based selections use a decomposition of the connectivity graph that is designed
to created a hierarchical organization of nested feedback (see Appendix H). This decomposition
first eliminates non-sequential vertices (e.g., LUTs) by replacing them with edges between associated sequential vertices. This creates a sequential connectivity graph. This graph is then further
decomposed using a modified depth-limited breadth-first search to identify groups of components
within tight feedback (components in a closed walk with a minimal number of edges). Each group
identified is replaced with a single representative vertex. The decomposition continues with the
newly created vertices until all tight feedback has been folded into a hierarchical organization of
nested feedback. For the purpose of this dissertation, the decomposition provides an alternative
view of feedback within a target design. Similar to an SCC-based selection, a TF-based selection
uses different aspects of TF (size of groupings, order of grouping, purpose of groupings, etc.) to
make different selections.
The amount of components replicated for each selection varies. For the “All components,”
“All LUTs,”, and “All FFs” selections, the amount of replication is fixed by the number of components within the design. For the “Random” and “Maximum Edge, Minimum Voter” selections,
the number of replicated components is set to a certain percentage of the circuit components (9%,
20%, 38%, 50%, and 75%). For the feedback based selection approaches, the number of components replicated depends on the scheme. The number of components replicated is taken into
consideration when comparing selection approaches.
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All of these selection approaches are chosen to help address the greatest challenge of partial
circuit replication: deciding what to replicate. Each selection approach and individual selection
comes with its own associated costs and provided benefits. The importance of each component
and the determent of overhead (addition of voters, etc.) varies greatly. These selection approaches
are evaluated in the experiment that follows. By examining these selection approaches, general
principles may be discovered that guide selections toward greater effectiveness.

6.2

Experiment Methodology
This section presents the experiment methodology used to evaluate the selection approaches.

A target design is chosen for the application of partial TMR. The selection approaches described
in the previous section are used to make selections within a target design of which circuit components to replicate. Selections of components to replicate are governed by the various selection
approaches. Different design versions generated from the selections made are loaded into a test
infrastructure. The benefits gained from the selections made are evaluated through fault injection
and radiation testing. The results from these evaluations are presented in Section 6.3.

6.2.1

Target Design
The target design selected for evaluating the various selection approaches is a digital circuit

from the ITC’99 benchmark suite [72] known as the “B13.” This design has been included in
several FPGA reliability studies [19], [36], [54], [57]. Its use in the evaluation of theses selection
approaches is intended to allow for comparison to other work [19]. The B13 consists of a set of
five interdependent finite state machines. Implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA, this design
consists of lookup tables (LUTs), registers (FFs), and supporting connections. Table 6.1 shows a
breakdown of the primitive resources used by the B13.
Table 6.1: ITC’99 B13 Benchmark Resource Utilization

Resource FF LUT-1 LUT-2 LUT-3 LUT-4 LUT-5 LUT-6 Total
Count
56
1
7
12
13
7
4 100
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A total of twenty-five different design versions of the B13 are evaluated (see Table 6.2).
The first two versions evaluated are the baseline and full TMR versions of the design. Versions
three through five are the “All Components,” “All LUTs,” and the “All FFs” selections respectively.
Versions six through ten are “Random” selections that include 9%, 20%, 38%, 50%, and 75% of
components in replication, respectively. Versions eleven through fifteen are “Maximum Edge /
Minimum Voter” selections that include the same percentage of components as the previous. The
percentage of components included in partial TMR are varied for the “Random” and “Maximum
Edge / Minimum Voter” selections to observe the variations in benefit gained as more components are included in partial TMR. Versions sixteen through seventeen are “SCC” selections based
on strongly connected feedback relationships between components. Versions eighteen through
twenty-five are “TF” selections based on tight feedback relationships between components.

6.2.2

Test Infrastructure and Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness of a selection, the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of each selection is

estimated through accelerated neutron radiation and random fault injection testing. BCR is the ratio
of average failure rate reduction to the percentage of components replicated (see Section 4.5.3). A
reduction in neutron cross section or fault injection sensitivity proportionally reduces an average
failure rate estimate (see Appendix F). Thus, benefit in this experiment is measured as a percentage
of reduction in neutron cross section or fault injection sensitivity compared to the baseline design.
The test infrastructure presented here supports the collection of neutron cross section and fault
injection sensitivity information for each design version.
To accelerate data collection in both radiation testing and fault injection, 256 instances of
the same design version are tested together in a single FPGA. Each design instance is connected to
logic that supports the experiment. The logic that supports the experiment supplies input stimulus
to each design instance and detects any discrepancy between the outputs of the design instances.
Any incorrect output or discrepancy between outputs triggers a failure event in the monitoring
circuit (located on the monitor development board outside of the beam or influence of fault injection). The I/O pins and supporting comparison logic are only triplicated in the “Full TMR” design
version. All other design versions include non-triplicated I/O and non-triplicated comparison logic.

84

Figure 6.2 shows the actual physical test setup used in accelerated radiation and fault injection [73]. The setup consists of three components: a custom memory controller (JCM), a golden
FPGA, and the test FPGA. The custom memory controller orchestrates the test. It performs fault
injection and configuration memory scrubbing operations as needed. The golden FPGA continuously provides input stimulus to the test FPGA and compares output from the test FPGA against expected values. The custom memory controller collects statistics and restarts the devices as needed
when a failure occurs. Only the test FPGA is exposed to radiation or fault injection. Configuration
scrubbing is employed for both radiation and fault injection testing.

Figure 6.2: Physical Test Setup for the B13 FPGA Design [73]

Any discrepancy between the response of the test FPGA and the response expected by the
golden FPGA indicates that a failure has occurred. The golden FPGA, which supplies input test
vectors to the test FPGA, expects the test FPGA to respond with output values that correspond to
the input values given. A fixed set of test vectors is used. There are approximately eight-thousand
10-bit test vectors in the stimulus set, which includes a test vector that resets the design and clears
all of the state held by the design. These test vectors are provided to the design under test at a
50 MHz clock rate. Furnishing the set of test vectors completes in 160 us. A large number of
disagreements caused by an upset is considered a single failure event collectively.
Neutron radiation testing for this experiment was conducted in October of 2019 at the Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE). Figure 6.3 displays the setup for the experiment in the
neutron beam flight path. A stack of five test platforms was aligned perpendicular to the neutron
beam aperture such that the two-inch collimated beam would pass directly through the FPGAs on
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Figure 6.3: Neutron Radiation Test Setup

the test boards. The high-energy (greater than 10MeV) neutron flux at the fission ion chamber
was measured to be 1.11×106 n cm−2 s−1 . The distances from the tungsten target to the fission
chamber and from the fission chamber to each test board were used to appropriately attenuate the
measured neutron flux for each board in the experiment. The attenuation caused by other boards in
the flight path is assumed to be negligible. Five boards were used to accelerate data collection so
that statistically significant data could be obtained. Most of the twenty-five tested design variants
were exposed to a neutron fluence of approximately 3.2×1010 n cm−2 with the design under test
running continuously. The baseline design (without any TMR applied) and a few other design
variants were exposed to a higher level of fluence (approx. 8×1010 n cm−2 ) to improve ninety-five
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percent confidence intervals. The sum of fluence observed across the five test boards in the beam
for the tested designs was 1.16×1012 n cm−2 .
Random fault injection testing is also included in this experiment. Through random fault
injection, one hundred thousand output errors were observed over approximately eleven million
randomly injected faults spread over all twenty-five tested design variants. On average, approximately four-hundred thousand random faults were tested on each design variant. The data collected
via random fault injection is in statistical agreement with the data collected via neutron radiation
testing. Measured values of reliability improvement between the two modes of testing fall within
each other’s ninety-five percent confidence intervals. For some design variants, fault injection data
provides more conclusive results. Fault injection data is provided in this chapter as an additional
means of verification.

6.3

Results
Neutron radiation and fault injection testing are conducted to determine the benefit-cost

ratio (BCR) of each selection made. The data collected reveals the effect that different selections
have on neutron cross section and fault injection sensitivity. A reduction in neutron cross section
or fault injection sensitivity corresponds to a reduced average failure rate (see Appendix F). The
effectiveness of a selection is determined by comparing the reduction observed against the percentage of components replicated. Such comparison returns the BCR (see Section 4.5.3). A positive
BCR indicates that the estimated average failure rate has decreased (improved) while a negative
BCR indicates that the average failure rate has increased (worsened). A BCR greater than unity
indicates that more reduction is achieved per component replicated than expected given equal component importance. Results are given for the 256 instances of the target design on the test FPGA
combined, not for a single instance of the target design.
Design statistics associated with each selection are also collected as part of the results.
The components selected for replication determine the number of connections replicated and the
number of reduction voters inserted. The same number of components can be replicated while
replicating a different number of connections and inserting a different number of reduction voters.
The grouping of replicated components into clusters also depends upon the components replicated.
Clusters are maximal subsets of replicated components that are weakly connected. All of the
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components within a cluster can be reached from any other component in the cluster while ignoring
the direction of connections, which makes a cluster a weakly connected component (WCC). Some
selections will result in small clusters that are scattered throughout a design while other selections
will result in fewer clusters that are larger in the number of components included within each
cluster.
It is observed that design statistics loosely correlate with BCR. It is found that selections
with higher BCRs tend to be selections with fewer reduction voters, selections with fewer but
larger clusters of replicated components, and selections that replicate more connections or single
bit edges between replicated components. Having design statistics, neutron radiation, and fault
injection results presented together allows for this correlation to be considered.
Design Statistics, Neutron Radiation testing, and Random Fault Injection results are presented in Table 6.2. The first major column contains Design Statistics. The second major column
contains Neutron Radiation testing results. The final major column in Table 6.2 contains Random
Fault Injection testing results. Each selection made is grouped together with related selections.
The Design Statistics column includes four measurements that result from the selection
made. First, the amount of TMR applied or coverage (Cov.) is listed as a percentage of components
triplicated under the given selection. Second, the number of triplicated edges (Edg.) is included
(see Section 4.2). The third measurement is the number of reduction voters (Vot.) required to
support the selection. The fourth measurement is the number of WCCs or clusters among the
selection.
The measured neutron cross section for any output error is given with ninety-five percent
confidence intervals. The percentage of cross section reduction (Red.) for a given selection is
determined by comparing the design variant cross sections against the cross section measurement
of the baseline design (i.e., without any TMR). The BCR is the quotient of the reduction percentage
and coverage percentage (see Section 4.5.3). The BCR indicates the effectiveness of the selection
(reduction per percent replicated). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals on reduction and BCR
are provided.
Fault injection data is presented in terms of sensitivity (Sens.) or the percentage of randomly injected faults that result in an observable output error. The reduction and BCR metrics in
this column carry the same meaning as they do for neutron radiation testing; only the reduction
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Table 6.2: Design Statistics and Test Results
Design Statistics
Design

Neutron Radiation

Cov. Edg. Vot. WCC Cross Section (cm2 ) Red. (%)

Random Fault Injection
BCR

Sens. (%) Red. (%)

BCR

0%

0

0

0

2.6 ± 0.3 × 10−9

–

– 1.06 ± 0.03

–

–

Full TMR

100%

234

9

1

2.0 ± 0.8 × 10−11

99 ± 1

0.99 ± 0.01 .002 ± 0.01

98 ± 1

0.98 ± 0.01

All Components

100%

234

9

1

4.1 ± 1.3 × 10−10

84 ± 5

0.84 ± 0.05 0.14 ± 0.01

86 ± 1

0.86 ± 0.01

34 ± 14

0.77 ± 0.32 0.80 ± 0.03

25 ± 5

0.56 ± 0.11

Baseline

All LUTs

44%

17

37

28

1.7 ± 0.4 × 10−9

All FFs

56%

24

54

33

3.9 ± 1.0 × 10−9

−51 ± 37 −0.92 ± 0.66 1.66 ± 0.04

−56 ± 8 −1.01 ± 0.15

9%

3

9

6

3.5 ± 0.7 × 10−9

−36 ± 25 −3.96 ± 2.78 1.33 ± 0.03

−26 ± 7 −2.86 ± 0.79

−2 ± 22 −0.09 ± 1.08 1.39 ± 0.03

−31 ± 7 −1.57 ± 0.36

−3 ± 22 −0.07 ± 0.57 1.29 ± 0.03

−22 ± 7 −0.58 ± 0.18

Random 9%
Random 20%

20%

9

18

12

2.6 ± 0.6 × 10−9

Random 38%

38%

32

28

13

2.7 ± 0.6 × 10−9

Random 50%

50%

60

37

11

2.5 ± 0.5 × 10−9

5 ± 21

0.09 ± 0.42 1.28 ± 0.03

Random 75%

75%

134

39

2

2.6 ± 0.6 × 10−9

0 ± 21

0.00 ± 0.28 0.82 ± 0.03

−21 ± 7 −0.41 ± 0.14
22 ± 5

0.30 ± 0.06

Max Edg. / Min Vot. 9%

9%

20

3

1

2.1 ± 0.5 × 10−9

21 ± 18

2.32 ± 2.00 1.06 ± 0.03

0±6

0.04 ± 0.66

Max Edg. / Min Vot. 20%

20%

60

3

1

1.8 ± 0.4 × 10−9

32 ± 17

1.58 ± 0.84 0.90 ± 0.03

15 ± 5

0.74 ± 0.26

Max Edg. / Min Vot. 38%

38%

101

2

1

2.0 ± 0.5 × 10−9

25 ± 18

0.65 ± 0.46 0.71 ± 0.02

33 ± 4

0.86 ± 0.12

Max Edg. / Min Vot. 50%

50%

135

7

1

1.6 ± 0.4 × 10−9

40 ± 14

0.81 ± 0.28 0.66 ± 0.02

38 ± 4

0.75 ± 0.08

Max Edg. / Min Vot. 75%

75%

191

4

1

7.6 ± 2.3 × 10−10

71 ± 9

0.94 ± 0.12 0.40 ± 0.02

63 ± 3

0.83 ± 0.04
0.72 ± 0.05

SCC Largest

69%

163

24

1

1.4 ± 0.3 × 10−9

46 ± 10

0.67 ± 0.14 0.53 ± 0.02

50 ± 4

SCC Output

31%

40

9

7

2.4 ± 0.5 × 10−9

9 ± 18

0.28 ± 0.58 1.15 ± 0.03

−9 ± 6 −0.28 ± 0.20

TF Level 1

64%

149

18

4

1.4 ± 0.3 × 10−9

47 ± 12

0.73 ± 0.19 0.65 ± 0.02

38 ± 4

0.60 ± 0.06

TF Level 2

28%

40

14

4

2.4 ± 0.4 × 10−9

7 ± 17

0.26 ± 0.60 1.08 ± 0.03

−2 ± 6 −0.05 ± 0.16

TF Largest v1

32%
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14

1

2.1 ± 0.4 × 10−9

20 ± 17

0.64 ± 0.53 0.84 ± 0.03

20 ± 5

0.64 ± 0.16

TF Largest v2

34%
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15

1

2.0 ± 0.4 × 10−9

23 ± 17

0.67 ± 0.50 0.80 ± 0.03

24 ± 5

0.71 ± 0.14

TF 2nd Largest

12%

25

5

1

2.1 ± 0.4 × 10−9

21 ± 17

1.74 ± 1.42 0.83 ± 0.03

22 ± 5

1.80 ± 0.43

26 ± 14

0.95 ± 0.53 0.85 ± 0.03

20 ± 5

0.73 ± 0.19

−4 ± 20 −0.40 ± 2.22 1.09 ± 0.03

TF Counter
TF In-Between
TF Feed Forward

27%

70

5

1

1.9 ± 0.4 × 10−9

9%

9

6

1

2.7 ± 0.5 × 10−9

13%

12

1

1

2.5 ± 0.5 × 10−9

4 ± 19

0.27 ± 1.45 1.17 ± 0.03

−3 ± 6 −0.36 ± 0.66
−10 ± 6 −0.78 ± 0.49

refers to fault injection sensitivity as opposed to neutron cross section. The reduction compares the
observed sensitivity to the baseline sensitivity as a percentage (see Section 4.5.2). The reduction
percentage is then used to calculate BCR.
The results from neutron radiation testing and fault injection testing are discussed in two
ways. First, each selection approach is analyzed and compared within Section 6.3.1. Then, general
principles are extracted and discussed in Section 6.3.2. The chapter concludes with a summary of
the findings.

6.3.1

Selections
This section discusses the results of each selection made. The results are organized by

selection approach. Each selection approach explores a specific class of possible selections. The
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baseline and full TMR selections provide a reference for no replication and full replication. The
other selection approaches explore the effects of specific selection rules. These selection approach
results are the findings of a broad search to better understand what makes a selection more effective.
A discussion follows of the results for each selection approach. The discussion is placed
within the context of the other selection approaches evaluated. Selection approaches are compared
and general observances are made. From these results, general principles that make for an effective
selection are extracted and given in Section 6.3.2.

Baseline and Full TMR
The baseline and full TMR design versions serve as reference points for comparing the
other selections. The evaluation of the baseline design, without TMR, shows the neutron cross
section of all design instances and support logic together to be 2.6×10−9 cm2 with a fault injection
sensitivity of 1.06%. This equates to an MTTF estimate of 3,375 years from neutron radiation
testing and 1,625 years from fault injection testing (see Appendix F). Full TMR returns a neutron
cross section of 2.0×10−11 cm2 and a fault injection sensitivity of 0.002%1 , which equates to
MTTF estimates of 439,000 years and 861,000 years respectively – an MTTF improvement over
baseline of 130× and 530×. Since the full TMR design version replicates all design components,
support logic and I/O, it represents an upper bound improvement. Partial TMR selections return
less MTTF improvement than full TMR with varied improvement compared to the baseline design.

All Components
The “All Components” selection triplicates all of the components in the design except for
I/O ports and logic that support the experiment. Neither the I/O ports on the device nor the I/O
ports on each B13 instance are replicated. The logic excluded distributes input stimulus and compares the output of the B13 instances. Being a small design, the 256 instances of the B13 together
with the I/O and supporting test logic consume approximately 27,000 components. Of these components, approximately 7% are excluded from TMR. Excluding components from replication decreases the potential benefit of TMR. The exclusion of 7% of components in this design drops
1 Data

for the full TMR design version is taken from [54].
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MTTF improvement from 130× to 6× in radiation testing and from 530× to 8× in fault injection. A significant loss in MTTF improvement is sustained due to exclusion of components from
TMR. This example is illustrative; a conventional design may have a smaller ratio of I/O to design
elements and would thus experience a smaller impact when excluding I/O.

All LUTs
The “All LUTs” selection triplicates all of the lookup tables in the B13 instances with the
following response. 44% of the circuit components within the B13 are replicated, with only 17
connections between replicated components. 37 reduction voters are added. The selection has
almost as many reduction voters as it has in number of components replicated. The groupings of
replicated components are small in size and large in number. This selection reduces the neutron
cross section over baseline by 34%, from 2.6×10−9 cm2 to 1.7×10−9 cm2 ; it reduces fault injection
sensitivity over baseline by 25%, from a sensitivity of 1.06% to a sensitivity 0.80%. The BCR
estimates from neutron radiation and fault injection respectively are 0.77 and 0.56. Significant
benefit was gained from replicating only LUTs.
In the “All LUTs” selection, the MTTF improvement gained from replicating LUTs (corresponding to a reduction in cross section and sensitivity) exceeded any degradation in MTTF
incurred from inserting reduction voters. Overall the MTTF improved by a factor of 1.5× in neutron radiation testing and 1.3× in fault injection testing. Despite having a large number of inserted
voters to replicated components, and despite having a large number of small replicated clusters,
this selection provided a net increase in MTTF. As describe in Section 6.1.2, this overall improvement is likely due to having more sensitive CRAM bits associated with the replicated components
than with the inserted reduction voters.
The outcome of the “All LUTs” selection is significant because it shows that benefit from
partial TMR can be gained by replicating only LUTs. The benefit gained is significant and modest. The MTTF improvement factor is greater than unity, but not orders of magnitude greater.
The benefit of replicating the LUTs in this selection outweighed the loss of benefit incurred from
inserting voters. While the improvement is modest, it is visible and allows the end user to see
if the replicated LUT was in fact associated with the failure mode targeted by partial TMR. By
knowing which LUTs or key points in the design matter, logic surrounding these points can also
91

be replicated to increase the overall MTTF improvement. This observance comes into play in
Chapter 7.

All Flip-Flops
The “All FFs” selection triplicated only FFs with the following response. The neutron
cross section and fault injection sensitivity were increased (made worse) by 51% and 56% respectively. This selection replicated 56% of the components in the B13, had 24 connections between
components selected for replication, required 54 reduction voters, and created 33 small distributed
clusters of replicated components throughout the design. Estimates for MTTF are shorter (worse)
by a factor of 2.04× and 2.27× respectively.
The “All FFs” and “All LUTs” selections are similar in their characters, but their results are
very different. Both selections replicate close to the same number of components, both replicate
a similar number of connections between components, both require a large number of reduction
voters, and both create a large number of small triplicated component clusters. Yet their outcomes
are far different. The “All LUTs” selection reduces cross section and sensitivity by a third while
the “All FFs” selections increases cross section and sensitivity by a half. This suggests that the
type or role of the component replicated influences the effectiveness of the selections just as much
as these other characteristics (number of reduction voters, replicated edges, etc.).
This selection demonstrates that the benefits of triplicating only flip-flops are likely outweighed by the loss of benefit incurred from the insertion of reduction voters. As described in
Section 6.1.3, it is likely that the number of CRAM bits associated with a single flip-flop is less
than the number of CRAM bits associated with a reduction voter. Thus, the decrease in susceptible
CRAM bits from replicating flip-flops may be less than the increase in susceptible CRAM bits due
to the insertion of reduction voters.
These results affirm the suggestion in [64] that triplicating only registers should not be applied to SRAM-based FPGA designs. The reason given for this in [64] is that the susceptibility of
the registers is overshadowed by the use of non-register components and connections. The reason
found in this experiment on the B13 is that the insertion of reduction voters counteracts the replication of registers, causing the MTTF to be shorter (worse). While the reasoning is different, the
takeaway is the same. Replicating only flip-flops does not perform well in SRAM-based FPGAs.
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Random
The “Random” selections choose components at random up to a fixed percentage of components to replicate. All random selections (9%, 20%, 38%, 50%, and 75% replication) provided
little to no benefit in cross section or sensitivity reduction. The BCR of the random selection that
replicates 9% of components is among lowest BCRs observed. This mean that cross section and
sensitivity increase (worsen) more per component replicated for this selection than for many other
selections made.
These results demonstrate that the lack of methodical selection leads to counterproductive
results. The cross sections of random selections that replicate more components largely overlapped
with the baseline design, suggesting no change in cross section. Fault injection results suggest an
increase in sensitivity for random selection except for the selection that replicates 75% of components. These results suggest that random selections may become less counterproductive as more
components are replicated. A methodical selection in partial TMR will likely provide more benefit.
Replicating random components also leads to increased overhead (requiring more reduction voters,
etc.). These results suggest that randomly scattered clusters of triplicated logic are less likely to be
helpful overall.

Maximum Edge and Minimum Voters
The “Max Edg. / Min Vot.” selections triplicate a subset of components, up to a fixed
percentage of components, that maximize the number of edges (connections between components)
replicated and minimize the number of reduction voters according to a specified cost function
(minimize the sum of voters less the sum of triplicated edges) (see Section 6.1.5). This selection
demonstrates the benefit of replicating related components as each selection is a single cluster of
components, and it demonstrates the benefits of replicating routing resources. These selections
require far few reduction voters and triplicate far more edges than their random selection counterparts. All of the selections prove beneficial in reducing the neutron cross section. The selection
with 9% coverage had the highest benefit-cost ratio return of any selection for neutron cross section benefit; however, fault injection results were much less optimistic for this selection. Reduction
for neutron cross section and fault injection sensitivity improve as more components are included
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in TMR. These findings support the notion that, since routing resources make up a considerable
portion of vulnerable resources [69], [70], significant benefit may be had from replicating as many
routing resources as possible.

Strongly Connected Components
The “SCC” selections choose components based on strongly connected component relationships (a type of feedback relationship present in the design, see Section 6.1.6). The first selection, “SCC Largest,” demonstrates significant benefit in replicating large groups of components
that are related by feedback. At 69% coverage, this selection is able to reduce the cross-section and
sensitivity by approximately half. The second selection, “SCC Output,” replicates the components
that are not included in the largest SCC. This selection contains multiple TMR clusters. It demonstrates no change in neutron radiation testing and and counterproductive results in fault injection.
These outcomes suggest that benefit is to be gained from replicating components related by feedback. The lower benefit-cost ratio of the “SCC Largest” selection suggests that some components
replicated in the feedback selection are less beneficial to replicate than others.

Tight Feedback
The TF selections leverage tight feedback relationships described in Section 6.1.6. Several
different selection were made based on tight feedback relationships:
TF Level 1

All sequential registers with a return distance of one and associated combinational logic (i.e., LUTs that drive and are driven by the selected registers).

TF Level 2

Registers and associated combinational logic with a return distance of two;
registers with a return distance of one are excluded from this selection.

TF Largest v1

A sizable feedback group.

TF Largest v2

The same components as TF Largest v1 with the addition of a nearby register
and LUT.

TF 2nd Largest

The next smallest sizable feedback group.

TF Counter

All of the sequential registers and combinational logic associated with a sevenbit counter used in the design (see Figure 6.1b).
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TF In-Between

Sequential registers and associated combinational logic that are in between
tight feedback groups.

TF Feed Forward Any components not contained in a feedback group that are downstream from
tight feedback (i.e., driven by components that are themselves contained in
tight feedback).
These selections explore the benefits of replicating groups of components based on feedback relationships. A variety of different selections were explored. Selections that excluded tight
feedback (“TF Level 2,” “TF In-Between,” and “TF Feed Forward”) proved counterproductive.
Selections containing tight feedback (“TF Level 1,” “TF Largest v1,” “TF Largest v2,” “TF 2nd
Largest,” and “TF Counter”) demonstrated significant reduction in neutron cross section and fault
injection sensitivity with large BCRs. The “TF Largest” provided a BCR of approximately 1.8, the
largest BCR observed in fault injection.

6.3.2

Effective Selection Principles
This chapter explores the impact of selection on the effectiveness of partial circuit replica-

tion. Twenty-five different versions of a target design were evaluated with a different partial TMR
selection made for each version. Selections ranged from no TMR, to full TMR, to a number of
selections in between, based on the six different selection approaches discussed in Section 6.1. The
selection approaches explored were chosen to examine different aspects of partial circuit replication (the impact of excluding components from replication, replicating by component type, making
random selections, etc.).
From the selections made and the results gathered, general principles emerge as to what
makes for a more effective selection. Here are four general principles identified:
1. Excluding a small amount of important components causes a significant benefit decrease.
2. To be beneficial, partial circuit replication must add more benefit than is lost by the insertion
of reduction voters or other single point failures.
3. Due to the adverse effects of overhead, effective selections cannot be made randomly.
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4. Replicating related components tends toward higher benefit-cost ratio.
Excluding a small portion of components is observed to significantly reduce the MTTF improvement provided by partial TMR when the components pertain to the failure mode in question.
The failure mode examined in this study is any deviance from expected behavior (any incorrectly
produced output signal). As such, it is expected that all components are important for maintaining
proper behavior. In other settings with a different failure specification, only a subset components
may be considered important (see Chapter 7). Excluding from replication 7% of components in
the “All Components” selection decreased MTTF improvement under full TMR from 130× to 6×
in radiation testing and from 530× to 8× in fault injection. The decrease in benefit observed is
characteristic of excluding a small amount of important components from partial circuit replication
(see Section 4.5.2).
Replicating components adds benefit, while inserting reduction voters or other single-point
failures incurs a loss of benefit; to be beneficial, partial circuit replication must add more benefit
through component replication than is lost through the insertion of reduction voter or other singlepoint failures. This principle is evident in the sharp contrast of results found in the “All LUTs” and
“All FFs” selections. The “All LUTs” selection reduces neutron cross section by a third and fault
injection sensitivity by a quarter. More reduction is sustained through the replication of LUTs than
is undone by the addition of reduction voters. On the other hand, the “All FFs” selection increases
neutron cross section and fault injection sensitivity by half. The benefit gained from replicating
registers was less than the benefit lost by inserting reduction voters. Through these selections, it
is observed that beneficial selections provide more benefit from replication than lost through the
insertion of reduction voters.
Random selections are found to be counterproductive. Similar to the “All FFs” selection,
random selections are found to require more overhead through reduction voter insertion than can
be compensated for by the replication of selected components. The result in an increase in neutron
cross section and fault injection sensitivity or an indistinguishable change. Random selections tend
to create a large amount of small replicated clusters and require a large amount of reduction voters.
It appears that methodical selection is necessary for a selection to be effective.
Finally, it is found that replicating components that are related by certain measures tends
toward higher benefit-cost ratios. In the “Max Edge / Min Voters” selections, related components
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are selected based on the density of connections between selected components. All of these selections created a single cluster of related components, and most of these selections performed well
in terms of benefit-cost ratio. Similarly, the feedback-based selections that include components
that are related by having feedback paths between them tend toward fewer but larger clusters and
higher benefit-cost ratios. Selections chosen purposefully for the lack of feedback yielded poor
results with lower benefit-cost ratios. Replicating components related by certain measures produce
more effective selections.
The significant, improvement-identifying findings of this chapter are incorporated into
Chapter 7. From this chapter, Chapter 6, it is observed that selection significantly impacts the
effectiveness of partial circuit replication. Knowing the impact of selection on effectiveness, new
selections are made in Chapter 7 on the FPGA-based networking applications. Fault injection is
used to identify specific components that contribute to the failure mode in question. These LUTs
are replicated to observe benefit, and then surrounding logic is added to the selection. The principles identified in this chapter remain applicable, and significant improvement in benefit-cost ratio
is observed in Chapter 7 among the new selections made.
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CHAPTER 7.
USING TARGETED FAULT INJECTION TO FIND MORE EFFECTIVE
REPLICATION SELECTIONS IN COMPLEX FPGA DESIGNS

Since some replication selections are more effective than others, it follows that some components or sub-regions of a design may contribute more toward the design’s sensitivity to radiationinduced failure than other components or sub-regions. Contributing more to design sensitivity does
not necessarily mean that components or sub-regions identified as sensitive are more susceptible to
radiation effects. Rather, it means that a design is more likely to fail if radiation effects affect the
components or sub-regions identified as sensitive. Significant benefit from partial circuit replication is observed in two complex SRAM-based FPGA designs in Chapter 5. It is hypothesized that
partial circuit replication targeted toward sensitive components or sub-regions will provide greater
benefit-cost ratios than previously observed.
This chapter generates selections for partial circuit replication using information gathered
from targeted-fault injection analysis. Targeted fault injection analysis evaluates components and
sub-regions of a design for their contribution toward the design’s sensitivity to radiation-induced
failure by injecting faults into specific components or sub-regions and observing the response of
the design. By replicating components that contribute more toward design sensitivity than others,
greater benefit may be achieved at a lower cost (a higher benefit-cost ratio). Sensitive components
and sub-regions in the FPGA-based computer networking designs (see Appendix I) are identified
in this chapter through targeted fault injection based sensitivity analysis techniques. Components
identified as sensitive and surrounding logic are included in the partial circuit replication selections
made within this chapter. The benefit-cost ratios of these selections are estimated.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 presents new sensitivity analysis techniques and results obtained from sensitivity analysis experiments on the commercial and opensource FPGA-based computer networking designs. Section 7.2 defines logic surrounding components identified as sensitive. Section 7.3 evaluates two partial TMR selections on the open-source
FPGA-based computer networking switch: one selection only includes components identified as
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sensitive in Section 7.1, and another selection includes identified sensitive components and logic
surrounding these components. Section 7.4 evaluates partial DWC selections that consist of sensitive components and surrounding logic on the commercial and open-source FPGA-based computer
networking designs. These experiments are conducted to see if improved benefit-cost ratios can be
obtained by including more sensitive components in partial circuit replication selections.

7.1

Targeted Fault Injection
The identification of components or sub-regions that contribute more toward radiation-

induced failure is difficult. Design state is large, interactions between components are complex,
and the exact impact of every possible radiation effect is unknown [74]. Some analysis can be done
at the design level to identify important hardware modules (see Section 5.1.1), but the analysis may
be misleading. A practical approach for evaluating sensitive components or sub-regions is fault
simulation [74]. The insertion of fault mechanisms into a design is proposed in [75] to observe the
response of the design in hardware when a fault is introduced at a specific location. This approach
provides a sub-sampling of the possible faults and design responses. The information gathered can
be used to identify sensitive components and sub-regions, but adding fault mechanisms requires
the design to be modified.
New sensitivity analysis approaches are proposed within this section that allow for design
sensitivity analysis in hardware without making any modifications to the design. The proposed
approach uses fault injection. Fault injection is targeted to specific components or sub-regions in
a design to evaluate the contribution of the targeted region or resource to design sensitivity. This
analysis provides information that can be used to find more effective selections for partial circuit
replication; by including components or sub-regions identified as sensitive through this analysis,
a selection potentially can be made to be more effective. These new analysis techniques provide
information similar to sensitivity analysis at the design level, or through inserting fault mechanisms
in hardware – only they are likely more accurate, and do not require changes to be made to the
design.
The first new fault-injection-based analysis approach is targeted-region analysis (see Section 7.1.1), and the second is targeted-resource analysis (see Section 7.1.2). Targeted-region analysis limits the scope of random fault injection into specific sub-regions of a design. Targeted99

resource analysis uses fault injection to adversely affect a specific component in a design. Both
techniques return information that reflect the sensitivity composition of a design. These techniques
are applied to the commercial and open-source FPGA-based computer networking designs using
the same test setups as previous experiments (see Appendix I). The results from these targeted fault
injection experiments are used to create enhanced selections for partial TMR and partial DWC (see
Sections 7.3 and 7.4).

7.1.1

Targeted-Region
It is hypothesized that some logical regions in a design may contribute more toward a

design’s sensitivity to radiation-induced failure than others. This is likely to be especially true
when some errors caused by radiation are tolerable and not considered a failure. For example,
when the failure mode in question is the undetected persistent loss of network traffic in a computer
networking switch, components along a primary data path are more likely to be involved in the
occurrence of a failure than components related to peripheral features. Similarly, if the failure
mode is a state machine getting stuck in a certain state, components related to the state machine
are more likely to be involved in the occurrence of the failure than downstream data processing
logic. If regions contribute to proper behavior disproportionately, then some regions of a design
may contribute more toward a design’s sensitivity to radiation induced failure than others.
If this hypothesis is correct, that some logical regions in a design contribute more toward a
design’s sensitivity to failure than others, then identifying these logical regions would be helpful
for partial circuit replication. Applying partial circuit replication to regions that contribute more
toward a design’s sensitivity to radiation-induced failure would likely result in more effective selections (larger benefit for lower cost). If this hypothesis is correct, then it will be possible to provide
more efficient circuit replication by selecting regions of higher sensitivity. Being able to obtain
greater benefit at a lower cost greater would enhance the usefulness of partial circuit replication.
The hypothesis is evaluated through an experiment conducted on the commercial FPGAbased computer networking design. This same design is used in experiments found in Sections 5.1.1
and 5.2. For the experiment conducted within this section (Section 7.1.1), random fault injection
is targeted toward specific sub-regions of the design. The sub-regions are scoped to specific hardware modules in the hierarchy of the design. The modules are chosen for evaluation based on their
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important roles in processing networking data. The contribution of each region to the design’s
sensitivity toward radiation-induced failure is evaluated.
For this targeted-region fault injection experiment, three logical regions within the commercial FPGA-based computer networking design are marked for targeted-region fault injection.
These regions are the Packet Reader (PR), the Traffic Manager (TM), and Interlaken (interface
protocol) sub-modules of the design. The design as a whole consists of approximate 274,000 components. The PR sub-region contains approximately 15,000 components (5%), the TM sub-region
contains approximately 24,000 components (9%), and the Interlaken sub-region contains about
52,000 components (19%). These sub-regions, together, make up approximately 33% of the components instanced in the design. The Interlaken sub-module resides at the top level of the design.
The PR and TM sub-modules reside within the egress portion of the design (related to data exiting
the network switch). Other components, which are not included in the selected sub-regions, are
used to process incoming data (ingress), related to system level interfaces and setups (working
with CPUs, initializing the design, etc.), or are separate components within the egress portion of
the design.
Random fault injection was performed within the essential bits (see Section 2.3.2) of each
targeted region to estimate the number of sensitive bits within each region. Failure is defined
as an undetected persistent loss of network traffic event. Table 7.1 shows the total number of
fault injected, the number of failures observed, and the corresponding estimated sensitivity rate.
The number of sensitive bits within a region is estimated from the sensitivity rate and number
of essential bits for the evaluated region. The test infrastructure and setup used are described
Table 7.1: Essential Bits and Random Fault Results Within a Target Region

Region
Whole Device
Essential Bits
PR
TM
Interlaken

Essential
Bits (M)
79.3
27.1
1.7
2.1
4.9

Faults
Injected
8,920
29,624
3,628
23,402
19,627

Failures
38
360
104
467
435
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Sensitivity (%)
(95% Conf.)
0.4±0.1
1.2±0.1
2.9±0.5
2.0±0.2
2.2±0.2

Sensitive Bits (K)
(95% Conf.)
338±107
325±34
49±9
42±4
108±10

in Appendix I. More information on the process for identifying fault injection locations within
targeted-regions is described in Appendix F.
To support the hypothesis that some regions may contribute more toward design failure
than others, some regions must be more likely to cause failure per resource used than others. One
way to make this comparison is to compare the sensitivity of essential bits among the different
regions. The sensitivity of essential bits for the whole design is 1.2%. If sensitivity were uniformly
distributed, then essential bits within each sub-region would carry the same sensitivity. However,
the sensitivities for each evaluated sub-region vary in value. The evaluated sub-regions are found
to be more sensitive than the design as a whole, meaning that the evaluated sub-regions contribute
more toward design failure that other regions of the design.
Another way to view this result is to compare the percentage of essential bits that pertain
to a targeted region against the percentage of sensitive bits that are estimated to pertain to the same
region which is done in Table 7.2. If sensitivity were uniformly distributed, then the percentages of
essential bits and estimated sensitive bits pertaining to a specific region would match. As things are,
the evaluated regions are found to include a larger percentage of sensitive bits than the percentage
of essential bits (i.e., more sensitive per resource used). A ratio of these percentages provides a
comparison of sensitivity to the design as a whole. A ratio greater than unity reflects that the subregion is more sensitive per resource used than the design as a whole; whereas, a ratio less than
unity reflects that the targeted region is less sensitive per resource used than the design as a whole.
Table 7.2: Distribution of Sensitive Bits Among Sub-Regions of the Design

Region
PR
TM
Inter
All 3
Other

Percentage of
Essential Bits
6.1%
7.7%
18.0%
31.8%
68.2%

Percentage of
Sensitive Bits
14.4±4.7%
12.6±2.7%
32.9±7.1%
59.9±14.5%
40.1±14.5%

Sensitivity Compared
to Whole Design
2.36×
1.63×
1.83×
1.88×
0.59×

These findings suggest that sensitivity to radiation-induced failure is not evenly distributed
among sub-regions of the commercial FPGA-based computer networking design. Upsets in some
regions of the design are more likely to result in failures than others. Partial circuit replication may
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take advantage of this by targeting sub-modules that are more sensitive. For example, applying
DWC to all three targeted regions could potentially detect 59.9% of all failures while duplicating
only 31.8% of the design. Thus, replicating these sub-regions together offers a benefit-cost ratio of
1.9 if replicated in their entirety. A selection within the identified sub-regions may provide an even
greater benefit-cost ratio, but the total reduction in sensitivity provided by a subset selection is not
likely to exceed 59.9%. These findings within the commercial FPGA-based computer networking
switch support the hypothesis that some regions of a design contribute more toward a design’s
sensitivity to radiation-induced failure than others. As such, it should be possible to create more
effective selections for partial circuit replication by targeting more sensitive sub-regions.

7.1.2

Targeted-Resource
Sensitive components and sub-regions within a design can also be identified by introducing

faults into specific components of the design [75]. In [75], fault injection mechanisms are added
to hardware to allow artificial faults to be introduced into specific components. Introducing faults
into specific components allows any observed response to be associated with the affected component. Any component that causes a design failure when injected with a fault is identified as a
sensitive component. Sensitive components and logic surrounding these components are identified
as sensitive sub-regions of the design.
A new fault injection technique is used within this section in an experiment conducted
on the commercial and open-source FPGA-based computer networking designs. The new fault
injection technique introduces faults in CRAM that are targeted to specific componets within a
design (see Section F.2.2). The targeted components are LUTs. LUTs are targeted because most
signals within a design pass through these resources at some point, and there is a straight forward
mapping between LUTs and the CRAM bits associated with their logic equation. By injecting
faults into specific LUTs to invert their outputs, signals passing through the resource are guaranteed
to be affected by the injected faults. This allows any LUT in the design to be used as a built-in
fault mechanism. Sensitivity in this analysis is binary: either the inversion of the output of a LUT
causes a design failure, or it does not cause a design failure.
Targeted-resource fault injection is used in an experiment within this section that is conducted to identify sensitive LUTs in both of the FPGA-based computer networking designs. Faults
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are injected into individual LUTs such that the output of the affected LUT is inverted. The response
of the design (having the output of a LUT inverted) is then observed to see if a persistent failure
results and remains even after the introduced fault is removed. For the commercial design, persistent failures recorded are limited to undetected persistent loss of network traffic events; in the open
source design, any persist failure of data being corrupted, misrouted, or dropped are recorded. This
analysis returns a list of specific LUTs that are associated with the persistent failures – the failure
mode to be mitigated. This analysis is performed on the baseline versions of the commercial and
open-source networking designs (without partial circuit replication).
Table 7.3 presents the results from targeted-resource fault injection into the commercial
and open-source FPGA-based computer networking designs. Approximately 8% of LUTs in the
commercial design resulted in a persistent failure when inverted. In the open-source networking
switch design, 10,566 LUTs (49%) resulted in any observed failure, and only 1,677 (7.7%) resulted
in a persistent failure. Through this targeted-resource evaluation of designs, a subset of the LUTs
in the designs is found to be associated with the targeted persistent failure modes. All LUTs that
resulted in a persistent failure are identified as sensitive.
Table 7.3: Targeted-Resource Fault Injection Results

Design
Total LUTs
Invert Results in Persistent Failure

Commercial
106,069
8,594 (8.1%)

Open-Source
21,689
1,677 (7.7%)

Figure 7.1 displays the sensitive LUTs (colored in red) with their physical location on the
FPGA. LUTs identified as sensitive are found to be physically dispersed throughout the designs;
no single module or larger sub-region contains all of the sensitive LUTs exclusively. Clustering is
observed among smaller groups of sensitive LUTs; many sensitive LUTs are found to have similar
names, are close in proximity to each other in the netlist, and are found at the same hierarchical
level as other sensitive LUTs. Of the approximately 8,500 sensitive LUTs in the commercial design, approximately 4,000 are contained in the “TM” module, approximately 750 are contained in
the “PR” module, and approximately 2,300 are contained in the “Interlaken” sub-module – 83%
of all sensitive LUTs are found to be within these three sub-modules examined in Section 7.1.1.
A large portion of identified sensitive LUTs (upwards of 95%) contain the acronym FIFO in their
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(b) Open-Source

(a) Commercial

Figure 7.1: Location of Sensitive LUTs (Red)

name referring to a first-in-first-out buffer. It is plausible that many of these sensitive LUTs are
associated with FIFO control logic. The distribution of sensitive components suggests perhaps
that clusters of control logic spread throughout the designs are responsible for most the designs’
sensitivity to radiation-induced persistent failures (loss of network traffic that is persistent and undetected in the commercial design, and any packet corruption, misrouting, or drop that is persistent
in the open source design).
The information gained from targeted-resource fault injection in these designs is used in
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 to select components for partial circuit replication. In Section 7.3, partial
TMR is applied to the open-source networking design in two different ways. First, only sensitive
LUTs are replicated; second, sensitive LUTs and surrounding logic are replicated. In Section 7.4,
partial DWC is applied to sensitive LUTs and surrounding logic on both the commercial and open
source networking designs.
Several outcomes are desired from the experiments included in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4:
• To observe the benefit of partial TMR in a complex design while replicating only LUTs (see
Sections 6.1.2 and 6.3.1),
• To observe an increase in benefit from partial TMR when sensitive LUTs and surrounding
logic are replicated together,
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• To obtain more effective selections (higher BCR) by targeting sensitive components and
surrounding logic, and
• To observe error detection benefits from partial DWC that parallel the error masking benefits
of partial TMR.

7.2

Logic Surrounding Sensitive Components
Several partial circuit replication selections made in Section 7.3 and 7.4 consist of sensitive

LUTs (as identified in Section 7.1.2) and logic surrounding these sensitive LUTs. This section
provides the definition of surrounding logic. A simple example of a selection that includes sensitive
LUTs and surrounding logic is also provided in Figure 7.2.

Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register
Register

NonSensitive
LUT

Sensitive
LUT

Sensitive LUT and Surrounding Logic
Combinational
Logic

Combinational
Logic

Sensitive
LUT
NonSensitive
LUT

NonSensitive
LUT

Figure 7.2: Selection of Sensitive LUTs and Surrounding Logic

Figure 7.2 provides a simple example of a selection that includes sensitive LUTs and surrounding logic. Starting with the sensitive LUTs, all upstream or downstream connected components are examined (components that drive or are driven by the sensitive LUTs). If a connected
component is combinational and not a LUT, the component is added to the selection. Next, additional components connected to the already selected components are examined until all combi106

national components connected to the sensitive LUTs are included in the selection up to but not
including any non-sensitive LUTs. Finally, any registers found in-between already selected components are added to the selection. This selection now includes sensitive LUTs and surrounding
logic; it excludes non-sensitive LUTs, combinational components separated from sensitive LUTs
by non-sensitive LUTs, and any registers that are not found in-between sensitive LUTs or combinational components that are connected to sensitive LUTs.
Logic surrounding sensitive LUTs is defined as any combinational circuit component that
is connected to a sensitive LUT (either directly or indirectly through another connected combinational component) up to but not including any non-sensitive LUTs, and any registers that are
found in-between connected combinational components or sensitive LUTs. All of the LUTs in the
design have been characterized as sensitive or not; thus, the search for connected components is
limited to combinational components between LUTs and registers between connected components.
When a LUT is encountered in a search for connected components, it has already been included
or excluded from the selection based on its pre-determined sensitivity; thus, each LUT bounds the
search for connected components. Since FPGA designs are typically driven by a clock, it is likely
that the number of computational components between LUTs will be limited, making the search
for connected components feasible.
Logic surrounding sensitive LUTs is found by using a three step process. First, components directly connected to the sensitive LUTs (i.e., fan-in and fan-out logic) are examined. If a
connected component is combinational and not a LUT, such as being a multiplexer or a carry-chain
adder, the connected component is considered to be surrounding logic. LUTs not identified as sensitive (i.e., non-sensitive LUTs) are not considered to be surrounding logic. Second, additional
components connected to the newly considered surrounding logic are examined recursively until
all combinational logic connected to the sensitive LUTs, up to but not including any non-sensitive
LUTs, is considered to be surrounding logic. Finally, any registers found in-between components
already considered to be surrounding logic or sensitive luts are considered surrounding logic.

7.3

Enhanced Partial TMR on the Open-Source Networking Switch
Partial TMR selections made in the experiment within this section are enhanced through

the use of information gathered in Section 7.1.2. The information gathered identifies LUTs that are
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associated with a severe failure mode – any persistent packet data corruption, misrouting, or drop.
Knowing, with some confidence, which components contribute more to a design’s sensitivity to
radiation-induced failure than others, allows partial circuit replication to be targeted toward more
sensitive components. Applying partial circuit replication to more sensitive components should
enhance the effectiveness of partial circuit replication, providing a higher benefit at a lower cost.
As an experiment within this section, two different partial TMR selections are evaluated
through fault injection on the open-source FPGA-based computer networking design. The first
partial TMR selection includes only the LUTs identified as sensitive in Section 7.1.2. The second
section includes the sensitive LUTs and logic surrounding these components. The sensitivity of
these two partial TMR selections is estimated through fault injection testing (see Appendix F) and
compared against that of a baseline version of the same design (i.e., the open-source FPGA-based
computer networking design without any partial TMR).
Table 7.4 shows the number of components selected for partial TMR within the experiment
and the total number of components found in the three design versions evaluated. The design versions evaluated are the open-source networking FPGA-based computer networking switch without
any partial TMR (baseline), the same design with partial TMR applied only to sensitive LUTs
(Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs Only), and the same design with partial TMR applied to sensitive
LUTs and surrounding logic (Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs Plus Surrounding Logic). A large portion of the sensitive LUTs (83%) is included in the partial TMR selections. The sensitive LUTs
excluded (17%) are part of encrypted third-party IP cores that cannot be modified. Overall, the
partial TMR selections replicate only a small portion of the design; they replicate 2.6% and 5.1%
of the components within the design, respectively.
Table 7.4: Enhanced Partial TMR Component Selection and Voter Insertion (Open-Source)

Design

Baseline

Total Components
Sensitive LUTs Replicated
Components Replicated
Reduction Voters
Feedback Voters
Total Voters

53,761
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0
0
0

Partial TMR
Sensitive LUTs Only
57,795
1,391 (83%)
1,391 (2.6%)
1,252
0
1,252
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Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs
Plus Surrounding Logic
62,353
1,391 (83%)
2,722 (5.1%)
562
862
3,148

Fault injection to estimate design sensitivity is conducted using the test flow described in
Appendix I. The sensitivity results from random fault injection testing are presented in Table 7.5.
For each design version, the table includes the total number of random faults injected and the
total number of persistent failure events. MTTF improvement is estimated as a ratio of the baseline sensitivity to the sensitivity of the partial TMR designs, and the sensitivity reduction is the
proportional decrease in sensitivity from the baseline design to the partial TMR designs. BCR
compares the reduction in sensitivity against the percentage of components replicated as a ratio
(see Section 4.5.3).
Table 7.5: Enhanced Partial TMR Fault Injection Results on the Open-Source Networking Switch

Design
Total Injected Faults
Persistent Failures
Sensitivity
(95% Conf.)
MTTF Improvement
(95% Conf.)
Sensitivity Reduction
(95% Conf.)
Benefit-Cost Ratio
(95% Conf.)

Baseline
796,603
864
0.108%
(0.101%, 0.116%)
–
–
–
–
–
–

Partial TMR
Sensitive LUTs Only
677,771
488
0.072%
(0.066%, 0.078%)
1.5×
(1.3×, 1.8×)
34%
(23%, 43%)
13.1
(8.8, 16.5)

Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs
Plus Surrounding Logic
1,232,949
483
0.039%
(0.036%, 0.043%)
2.8×
(2.4×, 3.2×)
64%
(58%, 69%)
12.5
(11.4, 13.5)

The “Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs Only” selection demonstrates significant benefit from
partial TMR in a complex design while replicating only LUTs. The “All LUTs” selection in
Section 6.1 demonstrated a significant reduction in the neutron cross section and fault injection
sensitivity of the B13 design in Section 6.3.1. In this partial TMR experiment on the open-source
FPGA-based computer networking switch, a benefit similar to that observed in the B13 is observed
when only sensitive LUTs are replicated. Replicating only LUTs introduces a large number of reduction voters, which on its own, would make MTTF worse; but the MTTF improvement gained
from replicating the selected LUTs outweighs the loss of benefit incurred from inserting reduction voters. This general principle, first observed in Chapter 6, holds true for the open-source
FPGA-based computer networking design as well.
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The “Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs Plus Surrounding Logic” selection demonstrates a significant increase in benefit when related components are added to a selection. The observed increase in benefit parallels the benefits observed for the “Max Edge / Min Voter” selections and
feedback-based selections that included feedback paths in Section 6.1. This partial TMR selection
on the open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch includes sensitive LUTs and surrounding logic, which includes some feedback paths between components and deceases the number of reduction voters needed. The MTTF improvement estimate increases from 1.5× with only
sensitive LUTs included in the selection to 2.8× with sensitive LUTs and surrounding logic in the
selection. These findings suggest that replicating related components generally reduces overhead
and increases obtained benefit.
From this experiment, replicating sensitive components and surrounding logic is found to
greatly enhances the effectiveness of partial circuit replication. The selections evaluated (on the
open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch design) provide the highest BCRs observed
by any experiment up to this point (BCRs of 13.1 and 12.5 respectively). By focusing the application of partial circuit replication onto components that contribute more toward the sensitivity
of a design to radiation-induced failure, a higher benefit is obtained at a lower cost. This finding
strongly supports the idea that a large benefit can be obtained from partial circuit replication in a
complex design while replicating only a small portion of the design.
The selection process used in this section for partial TMR is applied to the commercial
and open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch designs for partial DWC selections in
Section 7.4. Having observed enhanced effectiveness in partial TMR when selections are targeted
toward more sensitive components, the same enhancement is expected for partial DWC using similar selections. This hypothesis is tested in Section 7.4 by applying partial DWC to sensitive LUTs
and surrounding logic in both the commercial and open-source FPGA-based computer networking
switch designs and observing the benefit gained.

7.4

Enhanced Partial DWC
In the previous section, Section 7.3, partial TMR applied to sensitive LUTs and surround-

ing logic (in the open-source FPGA-based computer networking design) reduced fault injection
sensitivity by 64% while replicating only 5.1% of the design – a BCR of 12.5. Just as targeting
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partial TMR toward more sensitive components and surrounding logic enhanced its effectiveness
in Section 7.3, it is hypothesized that a similar enhancement of partial DWC should be observed
when replicating a more sensitive subset of the design. This hypothesis is evaluated by applying partial DWC to a similar selection of components (as was used for enhanced partial TMR in
Section 7.3) and comparing the results.

7.4.1

Commercial Networking Switch
Within this section, an experiment is conducted on the the commercial FPGA-based com-

puter networking switch to evaluate the effectiveness of enhance partial DWC. Partial DWC is
enhanced by selecting for replication sensitive LUTs (as identified in Section 7.1.2) and surrounding logic (see Section 7.2). The effectiveness of partial DWC is measured in terms of BCR (see
Section 4.5.3). An enhancement is expected to increase the BCR. The previous partial DWC selections made in Section 5.2 returned BCRs of 1.6 and 3.9. It is anticipated that a selection made
using known sensitive components and surrounding logic will yield improved results.
In the experiment within this section on the commercial FPGA-based computer networking design, partial DWC is applied to 98% of the LUTs identified as sensitive (in Section 7.1.2)
and logic surrounding these components. A total of 6.1% of the components in the commercial
networking switch design are replicated. Table 7.6 presents design statistics for the partial DWC
selection.
Table 7.6: Enhanced Partial DWC Component Selection and Detector Insertion (Commercial)

Design
Total Components (Before Partial DWC)
Number of Components Selected
Number of Sensitive LUTs Selected
Detector Pairs Inserted
Detector Total Inserted

Partial DWC
255,480
15,613
8,386 (98%)
3,614
7,228

Random fault injection is used to estimate fault injection sensitivity on the baseline and
partial DWC versions of the design. Design sensitivity toward undetected persistent loss of network
traffic failure events is estimated. The estimates returned from the baseline and partial DWC
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version of the design are used to estimate the effectiveness of the partial DWC selection. Table 7.7
presents the results from random fault injection.
Table 7.7: Enhanced Partial DWC Commercial Networking Switch Fault Injection Results

Version
Faults Injected
Persistent Failures
Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Correctly Detected
(95% Conf. Interval)
Undetected
(95% Conf. Interval)
Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
Reduction
(95% Conf. Interval)
Benefit-Cost Ratio
(95% Conf. Interval)
False Positive Events

Baseline
6,237
139
2.2%
(1.9%, 2.6%)
–
–
139 (100%)
(100.0%, 100.0%)
2.2%
(1.9%, 2.6%)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Partial DWC
42,195
890
2.1%
(2.0%, 2.2%)
287 (32%)
(29%, 35%)
603 (68%)
(65%, 71%)
1.4%
(1.3%, 1.5%)
1.6×
(1.2×, 2.0×)
36%
(17%, 49%)
6
(3, 8)
1,213 (81%)

In this experiment, 32% of undetected persistent loss of network traffic failure events are
correctly detected by partial DWC. Partial DWC is applied to a small portion of the design, only
6.1% of design components; yet partial DWC, in the Partial DWC design, is able to correctly
detect 32% of persistent failure events that are otherwise undetected by the system with a 36%
overall reduction in sensitivity. This corresponds to a BCR of 6. Thus, the partial DWC selection,
which has been found using information from targeted-fault injection, demonstrates a significant
reduction in undetected persistent failures remaining undetected while replicating only a small
portion of the design.
The false positive events observed in the partial DWC design are higher than expected.
False positive events are expected to be near 50% of all detection events for DWC (half in the secondary copy, half in the primary copy – see Section 4.3). Having a significantly higher occurrence
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of false positive events, indicates that several of the errors detected do not actualize into failures.
These errors may be masked logically later on or may cause unexpected behavior that is tolerable.
The experiment within this section demonstrates that the effectiveness of partial DWC can
be enhanced by selecting components for replication that contribute more toward a design’s sensitivity to radiation-induced failure than others. The partial DWC selection made within this section
includes a large portion of components identified as sensitive through targeted-resource fault injection analysis in Section 7.1.2 and surrounding logic (see Section 7.2). This partial DWC selection
demonstrated a 36% reduction in sensitivity (to undetected persistent loss of network traffic failure
events) while replicating only 6.1% of the components in the design, offering a BCR of 6. The
partial DWC experiment in Section 5.2 returned BCRs of 1.6 and 3.8. From the enhanced partial
DWC selection, it is observed that replicating areas of a circuit identified as more critical offers a
significantly higher BCR.

7.4.2

Open-Source Networking Switch
An experiment within this section evaluates the effectiveness of enhanced partial DWC in

the open-source FPGA-based computer networking design. Partial DWC is enhanced by selecting
sensitive LUTs, Section 7.1.2, and surrounding logic (see Section 7.2). Sensitive LUTs are circuit
components (identified through fault injection) that, if corrupted, cause the design to experience a
persistent failure. Sensitive LUTs, in turn, help identify areas of the design that contribute more
toward a design’s sensitivity to radiation induced failure. Replicating these more sensitive areas
should enhance the effectiveness of partial DWC (i.e., increase BCR) and should demonstrate
an error detection benefit that parallels the error masking benefit of enhanced partial TMR in
Section 7.3.
In this experiment, partial DWC is applied to the same set of components as selected by
the “Partial TMR Sensitive LUTs Plus Surrounding Logic” selection in the previous section: Section 7.3. This selection replicates 5.1% of the components in the design and inserts 2,874 detectors.
Design statistics are included in Table 7.8.
Random fault injection testing is used within this experiment to estimate fault injection sensitivity. The test infrastructure and setup used to collect data is described in Appendix I. Sensitivity
to any persistent failure event (network packet data corruption, misrouting, or drop) is estimated in
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Table 7.8: Enhanced Partial DWC Component Selection and Detector Insertion (Open-Source)

Design

Baseline

Total Components
Sensitive LUTs Replicated
Components Replicated
Error Detector Pairs
Total Error Detectors

53,761
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0
0

Partial DWC Sensitive LUTs
Plus Surrounding Logic
59,355
1,391 (83%)
2,722 (5.1%)
1,437
2,874

the open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch with and without partial DWC applied.
Table 7.9 presents the data collected from random fault injection. The “Baseline” design has no
partial DWC, and the “Partial DWC 5.1%” design has partial DWC applied to sensitive LUTs and
surrounding logic.
Table 7.9: Enhanced Partial DWC Open-Source Networking Switch Fault Injection Results

Version
Faults Injected
Persistent Failures
Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
Correctly Detected
(95% Conf. Interval)
Undetected
(95% Conf. Interval)
Sensitivity
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)
Reduction
(95% Conf. Interval)
Benefit-Cost Ratio
(95% Conf. Interval)
False Positive Events

Baseline
796,603
864
0.108%
(0.101%, 0.116%)
–
–
–
–
864 (100%)
(100.0%, 100.0%)
0.108%
(0.101%, 0.116%)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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Partial DWC 5.1%
426,276
461
0.108%
(0.098%, 0.118%)
1.00×
(0.86×, 1.18×)
334 (72%)
(68%, 77%)
127 (28%)
(23%, 32%)
0.030%
(0.025%, 0.035%)
3.6×
(2.9×, 4.7×)
72%
(65%, 79%)
14.3
(12.8, 15.5)
363 (52%)

The partial DWC design is able to detect 72% of all persistent failure events. This corresponds to a 72% reduction in the likelihood of having a failure event that is not detected. This
reduction corresponds to a 3.6× MTTF improvement for undetected failures and a benefit-cost
ratio of 14.3. The previous partial DWC selection, Section 5.2.2, offered an 86% reduction in
the likelihood of not detecting any failure while replicating 42% of the design, a BCR of 2. The
BCR provided by the enhanced partial DWC selection (toward detecting persistent failure events)
is significantly larger. The amount of reduction obtained for the portion of the design replicated
suggests that the effectiveness of partial DWC can be greatly enhanced by selecting areas of the
circuit for replication that contribute more toward the sensitivity of the design to radiation-induced
failure.
This experiment, on the open-source FPGA-based computer networking switch, demonstrates a significant enhancement in the effectiveness of partial DWC on a complex FPGA design.
The partial DWC effectiveness enhancement is obtained by replicating areas of the design that
contribute more toward the design’s sensitivity to radiation-induced failure than other areas of the
design. Replicating components identified as sensitive and surrounding logic provided a BCR of
14.1, the highest and BCR observed yet. These results support the notion that a large amount of
benefit from partial circuit replication can be obtained in complex FPGA-designs while applying
the technique to only a small portion of the design.
This chapter demonstrates enhancement of the effectiveness of partial circuit replication
made though its application to more sensitive components and sub-regions of a design. New analysis techniques are used to identify specific components and sub-regions that contribute more
toward design sensitivity to radiation-induced failure in the commercial and open-source FPGAbased computer networking switch designs. It is found in Section 7.1.1 that some sub-modules in
the commercial design contribute more toward sensitivity to undetected persistent loss of network
traffic failure than others. In Section 7.1.2, specific components are identified to be associated with
persistent failures in both the commercial and open-source designs. Component sensitivity information is used to make new selections that enhance the effectiveness of partial circuit replication.
The results from Sections 7.3 and 7.4 suggest that partial circuit replication can work well
for real-world, complex FPGA-based designs like the commercial and open-source FPGA-based
computer networking switch designs. The applications of partial TMR in Section 7.3 and partial
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DWC in Section 7.4 returned a significant amount of benefit in the commercial and open-source
designs while replicating only a small portion of the design. As sensitive components and subregions in other designs are identified, additional real-world designs will be able to benefit from
partial circuit replication as well.
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CHAPTER 8.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation demonstrates that partial circuit replication can provide soft error mitigation benefit to complex SRAM-based FPGA designs. A reliability model is given to explain the
benefits expected from partial circuit replication. More benefit than expected is obtained when
partial circuit replication is applied to critical components and sub-regions as identified through
attribute-based selection approaches and targeted fault injection analysis. It is observed that some
components and sub-regions in a design contribute more toward design sensitivity to radiationinduced failures than others. By applying partial circuit replication to critical components and
sub-regions, more benefit is obtained per resource replicated. This increase in effectiveness is observed on two complex SRAM-based FPGA computer networking designs for both partial TMR
and partial DWC.
This dissertation advances the state of the art for partial circuit replication with the following contributions:
• A reliability model and accompanying metrics that explain the expected benefit of partial
circuit replication,
• Implementations of both partial TMR and partial DWC that demonstrate soft error mitigation
benefits from partial circuit replication on complex SRAM-based FPGA designs,
• The development and evaluation of several attribute-based selection approaches to identify
general principles that make for a more effective replication selection, and
• The use of targeted-fault injection, without design modification, to identify critical components and sub-regions so that more effective selections can be made.
Using the contributions of this dissertation, approximately 70% of persistent failures in the open
source FPGA-based computer networking design were able to be masked or detected by applying
partial circuit replication to only 5% of the components in the design. These implementations
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of partial TMR and partial DWC demonstrate a benefit-cost ratio of approximately 14.0, which
is much greater than the expected benefit cost ratio of 1.0 given equal component importance.
Using the techniques and tools developed by this dissertation, complex FPGA designs can now
take greater advantage of partial circuit replication.
The state of the art for partial circuit replication previously stood with successful demonstrations of various partial circuit replication techniques. This dissertation provides a reliability
model and accompanying metrics to formally explain the expected benefit of partial circuit replication, it demonstrates effective use of partial circuit replication on complex FPGA-designs, it
develops and evaluates several selection approaches that have not been examined before, and it
identifies critical components and sub-regions using targeted fault injection analysis methods that
may be used on additional designs without design modification. The state of the art now contains
better understanding of the benefits expected from partial circuit replication, additional selection
approaches and understanding of what makes for a more effective selection, and formal evidence
of the soft error mitigation benefits that can be obtained from partial circuit replication on complex
FPGA-based designs. These advancements make partial circuit replication a more viable soft error mitigation technique for real-world applications that require high reliability in the presence of
ionizing radiation.
Moving forward, additional partial circuit replication algorithms can be developed with
more in-depth analysis as to why critical components and sub-regions, as identified through targeted fault injection, cause a design to fail. By identifying circuit structures and component attributes that correlate with design failure, additional replication selection algorithms can be developed to find sensitive structures or components systematically in an automated fashion. This
information could also be used for the development of additional design level mitigation techniques, such as including periodic resets or automatic recovery from corrupted design state. As
things are, partial circuit replication can be used to provide soft error mitigation benefit to complex SRAM-based FPGA designs; but as circuit structures and additional component attributes are
identified that relate to radiation-induced design failure, more effective selections can be made and
additional design level mitigation techniques can be developed.
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APPENDIX A.

PUBLICATIONS

I have authored or co-authored a number of publications related to partial circuit replication
in SRAM-based FPGAs. Early on in my research, I anticipated having the opportunity to study
partial circuit replication in complex FPGA designs. My research began with the study of full TMR
in an FPGA-based soft-core processor and branched into partial circuit replication in complex
FPGA designs. Along the way, a number of important discoveries and developments were made.
These are documented in the publications listed below. Each publication includes a brief summary.
• SEU Mitigation and Validation of the LEON3 Soft Processor Using Triple Modular Redundancy for Space Processing [13] – This paper presents the results of applying TMR to a soft
core processor system implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA. This study demonstrates
a 50× improvement in design reliability, suggesting that the applied mitigation techniques
were successful and that use in space may be feasible.
• Using On-Chip Error Detection to Estimate FPGA Design Sensitivity to Configuration Upsets [76] – This thesis investigates the use of on-chip comparison to determine sensitivity of
a design to soft errors. Aspects from both TMR and DWC were integrated into this work.
• Benefits of Complementary SEU Mitigation for the LEON3 Soft Processor on SRAM-Based
FPGAs [20] – This paper demonstrates the complimentary nature of different SEU mitigation techniques especially TMR and repair. As part of this work, the synergistic benefit of
configuration memory scrubbing (repair) with TMR is shown.
• Dynamic SEU Sensitivity of Designs on Two 28-nm SRAM-Based FPGA Architectures [77]
– In this paper, TMR is applied to two different FPGA designs on two FPGAs from different
vendors. TMR provided more benefit on one design for the first FPGA and more benefit
on the other design for the second FPGA. This result alludes to implementation factors that
affect the effectiveness of TMR.
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• Improving the Effectiveness of TMR Designs on FPGAs with SEU-Aware Incremental Placement [54] – This paper identifies architectural features that limit the effectiveness of TMR
when circuit copies are placed near each other on an SRAM-based FPGA. Low-level implementation approaches are explored to improve the effectiveness of TMR. This paper demonstrates the significant impact that even improvements can make on full TMR implementation.
• Strategies for Removing Common Mode Failures from TMR Designs Deployed on SRAM
FPGAs [53] – This paper explores additional low-level implementation approaches that can
be used to improve the effectiveness of full TMR, and it begins to establish a reliability
model that explains the impact of TMR exclusions or incompleteness on expected benefits.
• Impact of Soft Errors on Large-Scale FPGA Cloud Computing [5] – This paper explores the
scaling effects of soft errors in terrestrial environments and the impact that soft errors can
have on terrestrial based computing. One area that partial circuit replication can be used is in
highly-scaled terrestrial applications such as computer networking. This paper demonstrates
that soft errors can be an issue for concern in highly-scaled terrestrial applications.
• Single-Event Characterization of a Stratix® 10 FPGA Using Neutron Irradiation [78] - This
paper demonstrates the use of vendor tools to characterize the soft error behavior of a device
placed in an accelerated radiation beam. The characterized device is employed in terrestrial
applications.
• Modeling Common Cause Failures in Systems with Triple Modular Redundancy and Repair [52] - This paper further develops the reliability model presented in [53] and generalizes
it toward the use of TMR in more generic settings. It shows the compounding effect on benefit improvements that results from removing common cause failures in the implementation
of TMR.
• Using Partial Duplication With Compare to Detect Radiation-Induced Failure in a Commercial FPGA-Based Networking System [79] - This paper applies partial DWC to a commercial
FPGA-based networking system and employs novel techniques to identify beneficial areas
of application. It is demonstrated in this paper that significant benefits can be obtained from
the application of partial DWC.
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• Improving the Reliability of TMR With Nontriplicated I/O on SRAM FPGAs [21] – This paper demonstrates the significant impact that small exclusion can have on benefits obtained
from TMR. It explores several low-level implementation approaches that improve the effectiveness of TMR while excluding circuit components from TMR.
• Netlist Analysis and Transformations Using SpyDrNet [65] – This paper outlines the analysis
and transformation framework that is used by this to implement partial TMR and partial
DWC on SRAM-based FPGAs. SpyDrNet is the name given to the computer aided design
(CAD) tool framework. The framework presented in this paper allows FPGA designs to be
read into a custom development environment where they can be manipulated for application
specific purposes such as the application of partial circuit replication.
• Partial TMR for Improving the Soft Error Reliability of SRAM-Based FPGA Designs [80] –
This paper explores the effectiveness of several partial TMR selection approaches.
• The Impact of Terrestrial Radiation on FPGAs in Data Centers [81] – This paper extends the
study of soft errors in highly scaled terrestrial deployments of FPGAs. It includes findings
from an accelerated radiation test and an accompanying follow up fault injection study.
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APPENDIX B.

AVERAGE FAILURE RATE SCALING

This dissertation is motivated in part by the actual occurrence of radiation-induced failures
in highly scaled deployments of FPGAs in data centers for computer networking [6], [79]. This
appendix provides reasoning for why mitigating against seemingly improbably failure events is
actually beneficial. The likelihood of radiation-induced design failures (in terrestrial environments)
tends to be extremely low for a single device; but when many devices are deployed, the likelihood
of a failure event among any instance increases. This appendix covers how average failure rates
scale based on deployment location and quantity. It shows that even a small propensity toward
radiation-induced failure is something worth mitigating against.
An example of highly scaled deployments of FPGAs is the use of FPGAs in data centers for
computer networking. Data centers contain tens to hundreds of thousands of computers or network
nodes that all need to be connected together. To support a large number of network connections,
a large number of FPGAs are used. An SRAM-based FPGA provides an ideal platform for implementing a computer networking switch because a single device can process terabits of information
per second and is furnished with a number of high speed connections. The use of SRAM-based
FPGAs for networking also allows networking approaches to be tried and proven before they are
taped out to an ASIC, and it allows networking technology a more timely market entrance.
The likelihood of an SEU occurring in a single FPGA instance (in a terrestrial environment)
is very low. The most susceptible region of memory on an SRAM-based FPGA is configuration
memory (CRAM), and modern FPGAs experience SEUs in CRAM at a rate of 5-76 FIT/Mbit [9].
Modern FPGAs contain tens of millions to billions of CRAM bits. The frequency of SEUs increases with more bits and higher FIT rates, but it still tends to be low for a single device. For
example, an FPGA containing fifty million CRAM bits at 25 FIT/Mbit experiences one SEU every
hundred years on average. If only a single instance is to be considered, then the frequency of SEUs,
let alone radiation-induced failure, may be of little concern.
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Because a large number of FPGAs are in use in data centers, mitigating against even an
unlikely failure mode may be beneficial. A single SRAM-based FPGA deployed in a terrestrial
environment is unlikely to experience a soft error very often and even less likely to experience a
soft error induced design failure. A highly-scaled deployment of FPGAs, on the other hand, is far
more likely to experience soft errors among the deployed FPGAs. The per device likelihood does
not change, but the overall likelihood of a soft error among any of the devices increases with the
number of deployed devices. For this reason, mitigating against even unlikely soft error induced
failure modes to begin with is of interest. A small likelihood of failure can be of significant concern
in a highly-scaled deployment.
The SER for an FPGA used in a related work [5] (a Stratix V GX A7 FPGA) and another
comparable FPGA from a different vendor [77] is shown in Table B.1. The SERs shown are the
neutron SERs for SEUs in CRAM, normalized to the NYC neutron flux. The SEU CRAM FIT per
device is the product of FIT/MBit and the number of CRAM bits in the device. A single instance of
these FPGAs would experience one SEU approximately every twenty years on average, which by
itself is not very frequent. When considering larger quantities, the SERs of these device becomes
more concerning.
Table B.1: Neutron SER for 28-nm FPGAs

Device
CRAM FIT/Mbit
CRAM Bits
CRAM FIT/Device
CRAM MTTU NYC

Stratix V GX A7
63
˜99,000,000
6,200
18.3 years

Kintex 7 325T
74 ± 18%
˜73,000,000
5,400
21.2 years

Two main factors play a key role in the overall SER: location, and the number of FPGAs
deployed. Soft error rates are usually normalized to a fixed location and a fixed number of susceptible components (e.g., one megabit of memory, or a single device). The scaling of soft error rates,
based on location and number of deployed devices, affects the overall impact of soft errors. Soft
errors rates increase as FPGAs are deployed in locations where more radiation is present, and they
also increase as more FPGAs are deployed.
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B.1

Scaling by Location
SERs reflect, in part, the surrounding environment. SERs in terrestrial environments are

likely to be much lower than SERs in space or high-energy physics environments. Often times,
SERs will be normalized. It is common for SERs to be normalized to the environment of New York
City (NYC), outside, at sea level, during average solar activity [1]. One of the primary factors that
influence SERs in terrestrial environments is the presence of high-energy (greater than 10 MeV)
neutrons. The average neutron flux or rate of neutron exposure in the normalized environment is
approximately 13 high-energy neutrons (i.e., greater than 10 MeV) per square centimeter of area
per hour (13 cm−2 h−1 ). This information can be used to scale normalized soft error rates to other
locations.
SERs are higher at higher altitudes because there is less atmospheric shielding of cosmic
radiation at higher altitudes. Several factors influence the amount of neutron radiation present including geomagnetic cutoff, solar activity, and atmospheric depth or elevation; but elevation is the
most influential parameter that affects terrestrial neutron flux [1]. Table B.2 shows neutron flux as
measured in various locations compared to the reference flux of NYC. As elevation increases, neutron flux increases exponentially. Some areas have considerably higher neutron flux. For example,
the White Mountain Research Center in the USA receives 15× the reference flux with a flux of
approximately 195 n cm−2 h−1 . This increase in radiation is expected to increase soft error rates
by the same factor.
Table B.2: Neutron flux at various locations

Location
Seattle, WA
Moscow, Russia
Chicago, IL
Denver, CO
Los Alamos Natl. Lab.
Leadville, CO
White Mtn. Res. Sta.

Elevation
160 ft
490 ft
590 ft
5280 ft
7380 ft
10170 ft
12500 ft

132

Relative Neutron Flux
1.05
1.14
1.19
3.76
5.60
10.79
15.07

B.2

Scaling by Quantity
The use of large quantities of FPGAs also increases the overall soft error rate. The soft

error rate of SEUs in CRAM increases linearly as more and more devices are deployed [82]. The
per instance or per device SER remains unchanged, but the overall SER for the complete system
increases. Table B.3 shows how the SER increases in a hypothetical situation as the number of
deployed Stratix V GX A7 FPGAs increases. The SER is given in terms of the mean time to SEU
in CRAM based on a NYC reference flux. A large scale deployment of 100,000 FPGAs would
experience one SEU every hour-and-a-half on average. This suggests that large-scale deployments
of FPGAs in data centers could result in a significantly high SER.
Table B.3: Stratix V GX A7 Mean Time to SEU at NYC Neutron Flux

FPGAs

Years

Days

Hours

Min.

Sec.

1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000

18
1

127
304
67
6

15
23
0
16
16
1

28
8
30
51
5
36
9

27
50
53
5
6
30
39
57

Total
(Sec.)
6E+8
6E+7
6E+6
6E+5
6E+4
6E+3
6E+2
6E+1

A real world example of SER scaling caused by location and the number of devices deployed is found in [83]. This study reports that one SEU was observed in FPGA CRAM every
1025 machine days on average (i.e., for a single FPGA instance). The FPGA deployed is a Stratix
V GS D5 FPGA. This FPGA has approximately 79 million CRAM bits based on reports generated
by vendor tools. Using a FIT/Mbit of 63 from [77] scaled to the number of CRAM bits in the
devices yields a whole device SEU rate of approximately 5000 FIT. This equates to one upset every 8333 machine days. The difference in soft error rates (1025 vs 8333) suggests that the FPGAs
used in [83] are deployed in a data center where the neutron flux is approximately 8× greater than
it is in NYC (8333 divided by 1025). This estimate is reasonable given the scaling of neutron flux
shown in Table B.2. An SER of 1025 machines days for the 50,000 node study equates to one SEU
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every half hour. Thus, the scaling of SER based on location and number of devices deployed is
observed in real world system. The occurrence of SEUs every half hour brings into question the
effects of SEUs on FPGAs in large-scale data center deployments.
Average failure rate scaling (by location and by quantity) is important to partial circuit replication because through scaling, a small issue becomes large enough that it needs to be addressed.
An important application of partial circuit replication is the mitigation of radiation-induced failures
in terrestrial environments. The likelihood of soft error induced failures in terrestrial environments
is typically low to begin with, but large-scale deployments of FPGAs experience radiation-induced
failures more frequently overall. This scaling justifies the need for soft error mitigation against
seemingly insignificant likelihoods of failure. It also justifies the use of partial circuit replication
to mitigate against severe failure modes that occurs infrequently.
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APPENDIX C.

ADDITIONAL SOFT ERROR MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

Partial circuit replication, triple modular redundancy, duplication with compare, configuration scrubbing, and many other soft error mitigation techniques are included in a larger field
of study that is information theory. Information theory is the study of information entropy, storage, communication, and processing through various channels. Powerful forward error correction
(FEC) codes, hashes, cryptographic measures, etc. have been developed as part of this field of
study.
This appendix ties partial circuit replication and related soft error mitigation techniques
into information theory. It demonstrates that partial circuit replication is a form of error correction
coding, that some additional error correction coding schemes can be used to aid soft error mitigation in addition to partial circuit replication, and it demonstrates that partial circuit replication
offers unique benefits in protecting logical operations that cannot be replaced by any other error
control coding approach.
Many soft error mitigation and repair techniques make use of redundancy. Redundancy
is any repetition of data or utilized resources in partial or complete form. Some examples of
redundancy include complete copies of data or utilized resources, parity bits, checksums, hashes,
etc. Soft error mitigation and repair techniques use redundancy in data or resources to mask or
detect the effects of soft errors. This is seen in partial circuit replication and other soft error
mitigation techniques.
A form of redundancy that allows groups of data to be protected from certain types or
levels of corruption is error correction coding (ECC) [84]. The use of ECC allows corruption to be
detected or even corrected. For example, an ECC scheme of a Hamming code with an additional
parity bit is able to correct any single bit error and detect any double bit errors among a protected
group of bits. This is known as a single-error correction, double-error detection (SECDED) code.
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ECC, such as this, adds purposeful redundancy to allow for the detection and possible correction
of errors.
ECC is included in soft error mitigation and repair features that are built-in to SRAM-based
FPGAs. These features include internal CRAM scrubbing, and block memory (BRAM) ECC [14],
[15]. CRAM is divided into frames of data that are ECC encoded such that a certain number or
type of errors can be corrected or detected within each frame. Collections of CRAM data (a single frame, a group of frames, or all CRAM data) may be protected by a cyclic redundancy check
(CRC), which is an ECC code capable of detecting a broad range of errors [50], [84]. Encoding
CRAM data allows the data to be scanned for errors without an explicit golden copy. If the encoding scheme allows for it, some detected errors can be corrected. If not, in many cases, errors can
at least be detected. Built-in ECC protection of block memories is available, but ECC protection
of user block memories only extends to the contents of the block memories. Any upsets in CRAM
that affect the behavior of the memory, connection to the memory, or the cascading of memory
blocks together, including any multiplexer logic, are not protected by ECC. Upsets affecting these
resources will have an immediate affect on the design and may cause incorrect values to written to
or read from the block memory. In some cases, ECC protection alone of block memories may be
insufficient.
Built-in ECC features by themselves improve the average failure rate and recovery of a
design, but additional soft-error mitigation techniques may be needed to meet design requirements.
Additional post-manufacturing soft error mitigation and repair techniques such as TMR, DWC,
etc. may be needed to assist a design in meeting its MTTF and FIT requirements.
TMR and DWC are the only soft error mitigation techniques that can protect general computational logic from the negative side effects of soft errors [85]. Elegant, low-overhead FEC
encoding schemes exist for improving the soft error rate performance of data transmission and
storage, but the same approaches cannot be used for data processing or computation. Much like
cryptography, where data must be decrypted before it can be processed, the checksum, parity bits,
or additional redundancy added to data to protect it from errors must often be excluded from computational operations and are unable to trail protection through the operation. There are some
arithmetic codes and residue codes (among other techniques [85]) that can be applied and carried
through arithmetic operations; but, under fairly general assumptions, there is no hamming distance136

d code short of d-fold replication that can preserve bitwise logical operations such as AND, OR,
and EQUIVALENCE. Thus, full duplication (2-fold replication, Hamming distance 2) is required
to detect errors in these operations, and full triplication (3-fold replication, Hamming distance 3)
is required to mask the effects of soft errors in these operations [85].
Circuit replication (TMR and DWC) can protect arbitrary logic from the negative effects
of soft errors in an automated fashion. Other techniques exist such as self-checking circuitry
(residue codes, arithmetic codes, watch dog timers, etc.) that could potentially be used in place
of circuit replication, but circuit replication allows for protection of arbitrary logic in a potentially
automated fashion. Readers interested in self-checking circuitry and other encoding schemes are
directed to [85].
Circuit replication effectively applies an ECC encoding scheme on the output signals of a
circuit by replicating each output signal and the supporting logic behind each replica. Two-fold
replication places the outputs a Hamming distance of two apart meaning that errors on the exact
same output signals of each duplicate would be required in order to remap the value to another valid
codeword. Three-fold replication places the outputs a Hamming distance of three apart meaning
that errors on the exact same output signal of each triplicate would be required in order to remap the
value to another valid codeword. Under two-fold replication, errors in a single duplicate places the
output signals equidistant from valid codewords. Under three-fold replication, errors in a single
triplicate place the output signals more near a certain codeword than others. Error detection is
possible with two-fold replication, and error correction is possible with three-fold replication.
Spatial circuit replication (physical copies) is the type of replication studied in this dissertation. Replication can be implemented through space (spacial), or it can be implemented through
through time (temporal). Temporal TMR performs the same computation on the same hardware
three separate times and votes on the outcome of the three separate operations. This approach can
mitigate the effects of SETs and SEUs in pipeline registers, but the duration of an SEU in CRAM
is far too long for this approach to be effective in an SRAM-based FPGA [86]. Note that is may be
desirable to spatially triplicate operands when triplicating operations temporally as in [87]. Spacial TMR physically triplicates the instances of hardware that are used to implement a design. This
allow redundant operations to be performed at the same time in parallel on separate resources.
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APPENDIX D.

RELIABILITY MODELING

Reliability is defined as the probability of no failure within a given operating period [16].
Thus, in the context of soft errors, reliability is the probability of no soft error within a given
operating period. The probability of experiencing no soft errors within a given operating period
of time is commonly modeled using an adaptation of the Poisson distribution where the average
number of events is replaced with an average constant rate of events (a constant hazard rate), i.e.,
P(k events in interval t) =

(λt)k exp(−λt)
,
k!

(D.1)

where λ is the average number of events per unit time. Setting k to zero models the probability of
no soft error within an operating period t, which is also the reliability function, R(t),
R(t) = P(no soft errors within operating period t) = exp(−λt).

(D.2)

The probability of experiencing soft errors within a given operating period is the complementary
probability,
P(soft errors within operating period t) = 1 − P(no soft errors within operating period t). (D.3)
A plot of the reliability function for the occurrence of no soft errors within a given period of
operation (for a simplex, non-redundant system) is presented in Figure D.1. At t = 0, the reliability
is 1.0. A reliability of 1.0 underscores the assumption that the device begins operation in a perfect
state without errors. As time continues, the reliability decreases. This behavior reflects that there
is greater opportunity for soft errors to occur as the device is allowed to operate longer. At t = ∞,
the reliability is 0.0. A reliability of 0.0 indicates that at least one soft error will occur given a long
enough operating period. This curve follows an exponential decrease and it is the same for any
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given λ due to the normalization of the timescale to λ . It is assumed that for a given environment,
the rate of soft error occurrence can be represented as a constant, (i.e., a constant hazard rate).
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Figure D.1: The soft error reliability of a device in relation to soft error occurrence as function of time
normalized to the average rate of soft error occurrence, λ .

A reliability curve can also be estimated from empirical data [16]. Given a large number of
samples, the reliability of a device equates to the percentage of samples that are still functioning
correctly at time t. At t = 0, it is assumed that 100% of all samples are functioning correctly.
As time goes on, the percentage of survivors decreases until no more survivors remain. Thus, the
reliability function can be estimated as,
R(t) =

Number of survivors at time t
.
Total number of samples

(D.4)

MTTF relates directly to reliability as follows,
Z ∞

MTTF =

R(t) dt.

(D.5)

0

The MTTF is the integral of the reliability function over time, from t = 0 to t = ∞ [16], [41].
Unlike a probability density function which integrates to 1.0 over the same domain, the integral of
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the reliability function yields the average time it takes for equal deployments of the same system to
experience a failure. This effectively integrates the percentage of survivors over time, which yields
the average amount of time that a sample is expected to survive or operate without failure.
MTTF or FIT are single value metrics that reflect the overall reliability of a system. The
MTTF is the integral of the reliability function, which for the occurrence of soft errors (or a failure
in a non-redundant, simplex system) is,
MTTF =

1
,
λ

(D.6)

or the inverse of the average rate of soft error occurrence. MTTF is related to reliability in this
way, and FIT is inversely related to MTTF. A long MTTF or a low FIT reflects a reliability that is
overall very high. Conversely, a short MTTF or a high FIT reflects a reliability that is overall very
low. Thus, MTTF or FIT can be used to capture overall reliability. MTTF and FIT are used in this
dissertation as a key indicator of overall reliability.

D.1

Triple Modular Redundancy
Implementing TMR on a system creates a k-out-of-n system where k is two and n is three

meaning that at least 2-out-of-3 components must be functioning correctly for the system to function correctly. So long as two or more circuit copies are functioning correctly, the system will
function correctly. If more than one copy becomes compromised at the same time, the functionality of the system may also become compromised. Therefore, the reliability, or probability of no
failure within a given operational period for a 2-out-of-3 system is different than it is for a simplex
(non-replicated) system.
Let the probability of no failure for a simplex (non-replicated) circuit be p. Let the probability of a no failure for a triplicated circuit be pt . Given that pt is the probability of no failure in
at least 2-out-of-3 circuit copies [16],
3

 
3 k
pt = ∑
p (1 − p)3−k = 3p2 − 2p3 .
k=2 k
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(D.7)

Examining the value of pt for various values of p from 0.0 to 1.0 inclusive reveals that pt
is less than p when 0.0 < p < 0.5 and pt is greater than p when 0.5 < p < 1.0. In other words,
when the probability of no failure in a single copy is less than 0.5 (i.e., more likely to fail than
to succeed), then the probability of no failure in a triplicated system is less than that of a simplex
system (i.e., the reliability of TMR is worse). If multiple copies are more likely to fail than succeed,
then a 2-out-of-3 system is more likely to fail than succeed and more so compared to a single copy.
Thus, when a single copy is more likely to fail than succeed, TMR is counterproductive; but when
a single copy is more likely to succeed than fail, TMR is beneficial.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the reliability of a design can be measured in many ways. Reliability is the probability of no failure within an operational period. Conventionally, for soft error
induced failures, it is assumed that a design initializes into a state of proper functionality, but over
time, with a constant hazard rate (or mean occurrence of SEU induced failures), the likelihood
that a failure will have occurred increases. The reliability of a simplex (non-replicated) system
is modeled using exponential decay as in Equation D.2 [41] where λ is the average failure rate
(failures per unit time) of the simplex system for the given system and environment and t is the
operational period since initialization. Thus, reliability begins at 1.0 and monotonically decreases
over time (i.e., the likelihood of failure increases as the operational period increases). Substituting
p in Equation D.7 with R(t) from Equation D.2 provides the reliability function of a TMR system
without repair,
Rt (t) = 3 exp(−2λt) − 2 exp(−3λt).

(D.8)

As with the probability of no failure with TMR given in Equation D.7, there comes a point
in time in Equation D.8 where the reliability of a TMR system becomes less than that of a simplex
system (see Equation D.2). When R(t) > 0.5 and R(t) < 1.0, Rt (t) > R(t). When R(t) < 0.5 and
R(t) > 0.0, Rt (t) < R(t).
The MTTF of a system is [16], [41],
Z ∞

MTTF =

R(t) dt.
0
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(D.9)

Thus, the MTTF of a simplex system is,
1
,
λ

(D.10)

5
,
6λ

(D.11)

MTTFSimplex =
and the MTTF of a TMR system without repair is,
MTTFTMR =

which is less than the MTTF of a simplex system (more likely to fail sooner) by a factor of 5/6.
TMR by itself can greatly improve the reliability of a design during short operational periods (prior
to the inflection point between a TMR and a simplex system). At some point in time it becomes
more likely for two copies to have overlapping failures, which defeats TMR. The result is an MTTF
that is worse than having no TMR applied at all. This condition improves when repair is added to
a TMR system.
Conventionally, repair in a TMR system is modeled using a Markov chain such as the chain
shown in Figure D.2 [41]. State S0 represents the fully functional state where all three triplicated
modules are functioning correctly. It is assumed that the design initializes into this state. If any
one of the three copies fail, the system transitions from S0 into the masked functional state, S1 . A
transition rate of 3λ is placed on the transition from S0 to S1 where λ is the failure rate of a single
module. From S1 the system can either enter S2 , the failure state, or it can return to S0 . Entering
S2 from S1 occurs when one of the remaining two functioning modules fails. Hence, a transition
rate of 2λ is placed on the transition from S1 to S2 . Once in S2 , the system cannot leave. S2 is a
terminating state. Entering S0 from S1 occurs when a failed module is repaired. A repair rate, µ, is
assigned to this transition.

µ
S0

3λ

S1

2λ

S2

Figure D.2: Markov Chain of TMR with Repair
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Conventionally, the repair rate is modeled analogous to the failure rate [41]. In this model,
a constant, λ , is used for the failure rate, thus a constant µ is used for the repair rate. Using
constants simplifies the model, but a constant repair rate may not accurately represent the rate of
repair. Many factors contribute to the composite repair rate such as the time it takes to complete
a configuration memory scrub cycle, when a soft error occurs in relation to the repair, the time it
takes to complete a computational task (e.g., finish processing an image and load the next image
to flush corrupt data), clock rate and clock-cycle length of the return path through feedback for resynchronization, etc. Without strong theoretical support, a constant is usually used when modeling
repair in a TMR system.
The reliability of a TMR system with repair is the probability of not being in the failure
state, S2 . Solving the Markov chain for this probability of yields,

Rtr (t) =



1)
(5λ + µ + σ1 ) exp − t(5λ +µ−σ
2
2σ1

−



1)
(5λ + µ − σ1 ) exp − t(5λt +µ+σ
2
2σ1

,

(D.12)

where
q
σ1 = λ 2 + 10λ µ + µ 2 .

(D.13)

Subsequently, the MTTF of a TMR system with repair is,
MTTFTMR with Repair =

5
µ
+ 2.
6λ 6λ

(D.14)

Figure D.3 visually compares plots of the reliability functions of a TMR system with repair, a TMR system without repair, and a simplex system against each other. It is observed that
a TMR system with a repair rate that is significantly higher than the failure rate (in this case 60×
higher) is able to maintain a higher level of reliability for a significantly longer period of time compared to either a simplex or a TMR system without repair. Comparing MTTFs between the three
configurations reveals that the MTTF for the presented TMR system with repair is approximately
11-13× longer (less likely to fail sooner) than that of the simplex or TMR system without repair
respectively.
In theory, the application of TMR with a high repair rate carries a promise of a greatly
improved system reliability compared to a system without any TMR. This can be seen in the
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Figure D.3: The continuous time reliability of a TMR system with repair (µ = 60λ ; see Equation D.12) and
a TMR system without repair (µ = 0; see Equation D.8) compared to a simplex (non-triplicated) system
(see Equation D.2) as a function of time normalized to the failure rate λ .

MTTF limit as the repair rate approaches infinity,
lim MTTFTMR with Repair = ∞.

(D.15)

µ→∞

With perfect isolation between module failures, meaning that it is not possible for two modules
to fail at simultaneously, and perfect repair, meaning that all failed modules are repaired before
a subsequent failure occurs, the composite average failure rate of a design becomes zero and the
MTTF of a design becomes infinite. In such a scenario, perfect reliability is obtained. In practice,
there are several factors that limit the effectiveness of TMR with repair.

D.2

Incomplete Triple Modular Redundancy
The greatest limitation of TMR is that it only protects a design from the negative effects of

soft errors among components that are triplicated and truly isolated. Any soft error that affects a
non-triplicated component, or that simultaneously affects multiple copies within the same partition
will defeat TMR. This notion of single-point failure or common cause failure in TMR on SRAM-

144

based FPGAs is the subject matter of several studies [21], [48], [52]–[55]. TMR is also limited
by the accumulation of soft errors among multiple copies and by the availability of resources to
support its application. The great majority of this section focuses on the functional limitation of
TMR as imposed by single-point failures and common cause failures. Common cause failures and
single point failures result from not having perfect isolation between failures in TMR domains.
Single point failures are either non-replicated components, or components that are shared
by multiple copies. Consider a configuration memory bit in routing that isolates connections from
two different TMR domains. If this single bit is upset, it can cause multiple TMR domains to fail,
defeating TMR. This occurs even though the individual components in each domain are themselves
triplicated [55]. Any component that is not triplicated is also a single point failure. Partial TMR is
the purposeful exclusion of components from TMR.
Common cause failures are simultaneous failures in multiple TMR domains that stem from
a single soft error event. MCUs, or the occurrence of multiple SEUs simultaneously caused by
a single particle strike, are an example of a single soft error event that can cause multiple TMR
domains to fail [53]. MCUs that simultaneously affect multiple TMR domains in the same partition
at the same time defeat TMR and are common cause failures. The difference between single
point failures and common cause failures is subtle, but the point to consider is that these factors
contribute to the incompleteness of a TMR application.
There are two failure rates to consider in a design that is partially triplicated or where
triplication is incomplete (due to the presence of single point failures or the probability of common
cause failures). First is the failure rate of a single TMR domain, λt . Second is the cumulative
incompleteness failure rate, λi of non-triplicated or otherwise limiting factors that make TMR
incomplete. These failure rates govern the transition of the system into the masked functional state
and the failure state, which can be used to model the reliability of an incomplete TMR system with
repair.
The reliability of an incomplete TMR system with repair (applicable to partial TMR) can
be modeled in two ways. First, it can be modeled using a reliability block diagram (RBD) of a
TMR system with repair placed in series with a simplex system. Second, it can be modeled using a
modified Markov chain with transitions added for the direct defeat of TMR. Both approaches yield
the same reliability function.
145

The RBD approach, shown in Figure D.4, places a TMR system with repair in series with
a simplex system. In order for the overall system to function correctly, both the TMR system with
repair and the simplex system must function correctly. If one potion of the system fails, the system
as a whole will fail. The probability of no failure for the RBD, pRBD , is product of the probability
of no failure in the TMR portion of the system, pt , and the probability of no failure in the simplex
or incomplete portion of the system, pi . Thus,
pRBD = pt pi .

(D.16)

Substituting these probabilities with their respective reliability functions, Rt (t) and Ri (t), yields,
RRBD (t) = Rt (t)Ri (t),

(D.17)

where Rt (t) is found in Equation D.12 and Ri (t) is found in Equation D.2.

Cause

TMR System with Repair

Simplex System

Effect

Figure D.4: Reliability block diagram of a TMR system with repair and a simplex system representing CCF
and SPF vulnerabilities toward system failure.

The modified Markov chain approach is similar to the approach used to model complete
TMR with repair with the addition of two transitions from the functional states, S0 and S1 , to the
failure state, S2 . The new transitions are governed by the failure rate due to incompleteness, λi ,
as shown in Figure D.5. The failure rate, λ , in Figure D.2 is replaced in Figure D.5 with λt to
reflect that the transitions that are governed by the failure rate of a single TMR domain within the
triplicated portion of the design.
Solving for the probability of not being in the failure state, S2 , yields the reliability function

R(t) =



i −σ1 )
(5λt + µ + σ1 ) exp − t(5λt +µ+2λ
2
2σ1

−



i +σ1 )
(5λt + µ − σ1 ) exp − t(5λt +µ+2λ
2
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2σ1

(D.18)

µ
3λt

S0

S1

2λt

S2

λi
λi
Figure D.5: Modified Markov Chain of TMR with Repair

where
q
σ1 = λt 2 + 10λt µ + µ 2 ,

(D.19)

and the MTTF expression,
MTTFIncomplete TMR with Repair =

5λt + µ + λi
6λt 2 + 5λt λi + µλi + λi 2

.

(D.20)

These results are the same as would be solved using the reliability block diagram approach.
MTTF improvement is hard limited by the incompleteness failure rate. The MTTF limit as
the repair rate approaches infinity is,
lim MTTFIncomplete TMR with Repair =

µ→∞

1
.
λi

(D.21)

Thus, the model supports the notion that a small exclusion of the failure rate of concern from
TMR yields a significant decrease in obtainable MTTF improvement, from infinite improvement
to 1/λi . This dictates that a large portion of the failure rate of concern needs to be included in
TMR in order to obtain a significant improvement in MTTF. Incompleteness, in any form, severely
limits the MTTF improvement that can be obtained.
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APPENDIX E.

PARTIAL CIRCUIT REPLICATION LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the literature available on partial circuit replication focuses on TMR with brief
references to DWC. For example, partial DWC is included in [18] by happenstance due to resource
limitations in the conducted experiment. Other works propose techniques that augment DWC [88],
[89] without a focus on the partial DWC. As such, the majority of this literature review is likewise
focused on TMR.
Partial circuit replication techniques presented in the literature are distinguished by their
selection approaches and desired outcomes. Five main categories have been identified. They are
feedback-based partial circuit replication, reduced precision redundancy partial circuit replication,
probability-based partial circuit replication, approximate logic based partial circuit replication, and
specific outcome driven partial circuit replication. These categories capture the bulk of the partial
circuit replication concepts conveyed in the literature.

E.1

Feedback-based Partial Circuit Replication
Feedback based partial circuit replication [24]–[26] traditionally focuses on eliminating

persistent errors by targeting TMR toward components within feedback groups and their respective
upstream dependencies (input-to-feedback components). Persistent errors are errors that do not
resolve themselves after configuration scrubbing but instead remain present in the circuit. These
errors tend to be associated with feedback, which is where the value held by a memory element
is somehow dependent on its previously held value. By replicating logic within feedback groups,
replicating associated upstream dependencies, and inserting voters for self-synchronization [17],
the likelihood of persistent errors can be greatly reduced at a much lower cost than full circuit
replication.
In [26], feedback-based partial TMR is applied to two FPGA designs: a synthetic design
consisting of counters, multipliers, and adders; and a digital signal processing application referred
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to as a DSP Kernel. In this paper, feedback-based partial TMR applied to approximately 30%
of the synthetic circuit was able to reduce the likelihood of persistent errors by approximately
99.0% (a 100× improvement). In the DSP Kernal design, similar results were obtained at only 8%
coverage. The findings presented in [26] are the culmination of the other feedback-based partial
TMR references [24], [25].
In [26], a large amount of reduction is obtained at a small cost because the targeted failure
mode (persistent errors) is a small subset of all possible errors. Approximately 20% of all observed
errors in the synthetic design are persistent errors while only 2% of all observed errors in the DSP
Kernal are persistent. It follows that a portion of a design may contribute more to the likelihood of
a specific failure mode than other portions of a design. Thus, by replicating a portion of the design
that contributes more to the likelihood of failure per resource used, a large amount of benefit can be
obtained while replicating a smaller amount of the design. In [26], the proposed selection approach
is shown to decrease the likelihood of any error linearly as additional components are included in
the partial TMR selection; the likelihood of a persistent failure arrives near zero more quickly
compared to the likelihood of any failure.
The feedback-based selection approach in [26] prioritizes components found in topologically dominate feedback groups followed by components whose output signals feed into those
groups. This ranking is accomplished by performing a strongly connected component (SCC) decomposition [71] on a connectivity graph produced from the connections of the components. Each
node in the connectivity graph represents a component and each directional edge represents a connection. An SCC decomposition of the connectivity graph produces a directional acyclic graph
(DAG) where each node in the DAG represents a feedback group. The DAG is sorted topologically to prioritize feedback groups by downstream influence. If enough resources are available to
replicate all feedback groups, then input-to-feedback logic is included in reverse topological order
(from feedback groups to inputs) to reduce the number of TMR to non-TMR signal transitions.
These transitions are undesirable. By replicating outward from already triplicated components,
these transitions are better avoided. When all feedback groups and input-to-feedback logic is replicated, persistent errors should be eliminated (with exception to faults that defeat replication).
The feedback-based selection approach presented in [26] shows great promise in that persistent errors are often associated with specific failure modes that are undesirable. Undesirable
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failure modes include persistent loss of service in a communications application without warning
or indication, a system stalling, hanging, or crashing without avenue for recovery, a computational
node that persistently provides corrupt results, etc. By targeting feedback, the likelihood of persistent errors can be reduced, and undesirable behaviors associated with persistent errors can also
likewise be reduced. Assuming persistent errors are a subset of all possible errors, a large amount
of reduction should be able to be obtained at a reduced cost compared to full TMR.
The greatest difficulty of the feedback based SCC decomposition approach is its scalability
to larger, more complex designs. Complex designs, such as a soft core processor, tend to consist of
a one or two large SCCs surrounded by small satellites of feed-forward logic. The values held by
components within a soft core processor, for example, tend to depend on previously held values that
are subsequently stored in memory and recalled later for reuse. Thus, all of the components within
a soft core processor are likely to be within the same SCC feedback group. Similarly counters
contain feedback. Their values may be used to control transitions in a finite state machine, which
at some point may come back to reset the counter. Thus, the tight web of feedback may extend
over the majority of components within a design, even if large subsets of components are by themselves feed-forward logic. When it comes to more complicated designs, the SCC feedback-based
selection approach may provide groupings that are too large to be replicated all together. To take
advantage of feedback in larger, more complex designs for partial circuit replication, additional
techniques are needed that can identify smaller groups of feedback within an SCC.

E.2

Reduced Precision Redundancy Partial Circuit Replication
The second category of partial circuit replication techniques found in the literature is re-

duced precision redundancy (RPR) [27]–[32]. This form of partial circuit replication focuses on
replicating logic that is associated with the most significant bits of a computational outcome. By
replicating the logic associated with the most significant bits of a computational outcome, the
magnitude of SEU-induced error (outcome vs. expected outcome) can be reduced. This form of
partial circuit replication is helpful in applications were noise in computational operations can be
tolerated, such as digital signal processing applications.
In [27], RPR is applied to a critical filter in a digital signal processing application for digital
communications. In this work, it is observed that only 5-15% of SEUs cause critical performance
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loss based on an application specific performance metric. Using RPR, the MTTF is improved by
20× (a 99.5% reduction) while replicating less than half of the components within the critical
filter. This approach compares the most significant bits in the output of a full computation against
those represented by a truncated version of the same computation (where least significant bits of
the operands are excluded). Detailed analysis was performed to determine the benefit cost ratio for
including or excluding a certain number of least significant bits.
RPR benefits arithmetic operations and depends on full TMR to protect non-arithmetic operations. In [27], RPR combined with TMR (RPR for arithmetic potions of a system and TMR for
non-arithmetic portions of a system), is able to provide a 42× MTTF improvement (in a recursive
demodulator system for a digital communications application) using approximately half as many
additional resources as would be required by full TMR. This corresponds to a 97.6% reduction
in the average failure rate of the circuit while replicating approximately half of the circuit components. RPR assumes all components in a system are replicated and then selectively excludes
components from replication, whereas partial circuit replication, as studied in this dissertation,
assumes all components are excluded from replication and then selectively replicates components.
In [28], it is shown that replicating the logic associated with the top four bits of a 16-bit
ripple carry adder can reduce the magnitude of error by a factor of 16× while replicating only a
forth of the original design components. This result does not reflect the actual reduction in the
likelihood of a failure beyond a certain threshold, but it does illustrate some of the disproportional
benefit that may result from replicating components of a design that are associated with more
significant consequences.
RPR is an on going field of research. In [29], the use of majority voters in place of traditional threshold comparison is evaluated. In [30], RPR is applied to fast Fourier transform (FFT)
computations. In [31], a novel application of RPR to multiply and accumulate (MAC) operations is
presented. In [32], an automated design flow for RPR is developed. While new avenues of comparison and implementation are being explored, the general approach of RPR remains to replicate the
most significant bits and associated resources of arithmetic or computational operations. For highreliability using RPR, system logic (state machines, logical operations, data flow, etc.) are fully
replicated and the least significant bits of arithmetic or computational operations and resources
associated with those bits are excluded from replication.
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E.3

Probability Based Partial Circuit Replication
The third category of partial circuit replication found in the literature is probability-based

partial circuit replication [33], [58]. This partial circuit replication approach examines the propagation of signal probabilities throughout a design to determine the components in a design that
would provide the greatest benefit if replicated. This approach typically assumes that signal probabilities (the likelihood of a signal being a one or a zero at any given time) are available for all
inputs, and that the target circuit consists of purely combinational elements without cycles. Signal
probabilities are assigned to the outputs of gates based on the operation performed and the signal probabilities entering the gate. Components are then selected for replication based on which
components will reduce the likelihood of error on the outside.
In [58], one example demonstrated a 94.4% reduction (a 27× improvement) in error probability with only a 6.8% inclusion of gates in TMR (a benefit cost ratio of 14), but this partial
mitigation approach does not extend well to complex designs. Signal probabilities statistics on inputs to a circuit are often unknown, and most digital designs consist of sequential logic containing
feedback. It is briefly suggested in [58] that probability-based partial circuit replication could be
extended to logic with sequential elements by applying the technique on computational logic in
between sequential elements and triplicating the sequential elements as well. The expected benefit
and implementation challenges of extending this approach to sequential circuits are unclear.

E.4

Approximate Logic Based Partial Circuit Replication
The fourth category of partial circuit replication found in the literature is approximate logic

based partial circuit replication [57], [59], [60]. This approach is only applicable to TMR. Under
this technique, the redundant copies ignore an input to the logic equation being protected. One
redundant copy is an over-approximation of the protected logic as it assumes the ignored value to
be a logical one. The other redundant copy is an under-approximation as it assumes the ignored
value to be a logical zero. Thus, an n-input lookup table can be partially protected from SEUs
using two additional (n − 1)-bit lookup tables. An error in any of the non-ignored signals will
be masked, but an error in the signal ignored by the redundant copies will propagate through the
majority voter.
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It is not clear how effective approximate logic based partial TMR is to SRAM-based FPGAs. In SRAM-based FPGAs, logic equations are mapped to the same physical resource (e.g., a
generic six-input LUT) regardless of input size. Higher order lookup tables are implemented using
additional muxes and routing, but the effectiveness of this technique on SRAM-based FPGAs is
still unclear. In [57], the technique is applied to an SRAM-based FPGA design. In [59], a survey
is provided of the literature surrounding this approach. In [60], a algorithm is developed to help
determine the most beneficial signals to exclude from TMR.

E.5

Specific Outcome Driven Partial Circuit Replication
The final category of partial circuit replication found in the literature is specific outcome

driven partial circuit replication [34], [56]. This category is intentionally broad. Most other techniques will fall into this category as well, but under this category, the specific targeted outcome
is undefined or rather defined by the end user. This category aligns most closely with the partial
circuit replication approaches presented in this dissertation. Partial circuit replication approaches
that fall under this category use whatever means are available to minimize the likelihood of a specific outcome while lowering the cost of implementation. The objective is to maximize the specific
desired benefit while lowering the cost.
In [56], the desired outcome is to minimize errors that originate in the ALU of a soft-core
Risk-V processor. Thus, the ALU is targeted by partial TMR and subsets are replicated based on
different operations. It is found that replicating subsets of the ALU can provide significant benefit
in comparison to the associated cost. It is important to note, however, that simulated faults were
limited to the ALU. As such, it is unclear how beneficial this approach is overall since larger or
more pressing issues may be related to SEU in the entire soft core processor as a whole.
The study presented in [34] is the most similar of all the referenced literature to the partial
circuit replication approaches presented in this dissertation. In [34], several circuit attributes are
exploited to maximize the benefits of partial circuit replication while minimizing associated costs.
A small circuit is tested (consisting of 54 registers, some combinational logic, and a single feedback
loop). Failure is defined as having a certain percentage of clock cycles in which the output of the
circuit is erroneous. Partial circuit replication is applied based on several attribute-based selection
algorithms, and the selection is iteratively tuned based on feedback.
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This dissertation builds upon the contributions found in the literature to advance the stateof-the-art in partial circuit replication approaches. The literature provides insights into different
styles of partial circuit replication. Feedback, RPR, probability, approximate, and specific outcome
based partial circuit replication approaches explore the vast design space. Many promising results
are found. It is upon these findings that this dissertation is built. This dissertation provides holistic analysis, explores new selection approaches, and evaluates these approaches on two complex
FPGA-based networking designs and another FPGA design.
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APPENDIX F.

ESTIMATING FAILURE RATES

In the literature, radiation-induced failure rates in FPGA-based applications are estimated
in three ways: through real-time testing, through artificial fault injection, and through accelerated
radiation testing. These approaches return metrics that reflect the average failure rate. Real-time
testing, such as the testing conducted in the Rosetta experiment [90], involves instancing hundreds
or even thousands of devices to observe the effects of radiation on the devices overtime. This
approach is cost and time prohibitive, but it directly returns the average number of failures per unit
time in a terrestrial environment. The second approach is artificial fault injection [42]. Artificial
fault injection mimics the behavior of radiation effects on SRAM-based FPGAs by purposefully
corrupting configuration memory bits. This estimation approach returns fault injection sensitivity
or the average percentage of randomly upset bits that results in a failure. Fault injection sensitivity
can be converted to an average failure rate by attenuating the average single event upset occurrence
rate in the target device by the percentage of randomly injected faults that result in a failure. The
third estimation approach is accelerated radiation testing [1], [43]. This approach uses accelerated
radiation sources to measure the cross section of failure at different energy levels. Cross section is a
hypothetical area that if crossed by an atomic partial of interest would result in a failure event [36].
The smaller the cross section, the less likely the event is to occur. Given radiation characteristics
of a target environment, a cross section can be converted into an average failure rate.
In this dissertation, artificial fault injection and radiation testing are used to estimate the
average failure rates of designs under test. Failure rate estimates are made before and after the implementation of partial circuit replication. Comparing results before and after the implementation
of partial circuit replication or between different implementations allows the effectiveness of the
implemented techniques to be examined [42], [43]. Failure rate estimates are used to examine and
validate the theoretical foundation and practical application of partial circuit replication.

155

This appendix covers the common elements used to estimate failure rates in this dissertation. Section F.1 covers the general test methodology used for both fault injection and radiation
testing. Section F.2 covers artificial fault injection, both random and targeted approaches. Section F.3 covers accelerated radiation testing. Methodology tailoring specific to individual experiments is discussed alongside the respective experiment in the body of the dissertation.

F.1

General Test Methodology
Figure F.1 gives an overview of the experiment methodology used in this dissertation. Ex-

periments begin with a baseline design. A baseline design is a circuit without any added replication.
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Figure F.1: Experiment Methodology Overview

This design serves as a baseline reference point that partial circuit replication variations can be be
compared against. Partial circuit replication variations of are created through the application of of
different selection approaches. The failure rate of each design variant (baseline and others) is estimated through fault injection or accelerated radiation testing. Comparing the obtained estimates
against that of the baseline design provides the benefit obtained from partial circuit replication.
Using the benefit obtained and the cost required for each partial circuit replication variant provides
a benefit-cost ratio (see Section 4.6). This metric is used to determined the effectiveness of the
partial circuit replication.
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Figure F.2 provides a simplified view of components used in a test setup. The same setup
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Figure F.2: Components in a Typical Test Setup

is used for fault injection and radiation testing. Central to the setup is the device under test (DUT).
This is the SRAM-based FPGA on which the design under test resides and operates. Some additional logic may be instanced on the FPGA with the design under test to support the test. The
stimulus component provides input values to the DUT. This stimulus activates design features and
exercises the functionality of the design. The checker component examines the output values of
the DUT for proper behavior. The test monitor and control components orchestrates the experiment and gathers the data necessary to make an evaluation. Each test setup has a fault source, a
repair method, and dosimetry (if needed). The fault source is artificial fault injection or accelerated
radiation. The recovery and repair methods address restoring the system to a working state when
a failure is detected and provide some mechanism for configuration scrubbing. Dosimetry is the
measurement of radiation dosage that a DUT is exposed to during an accelerated radiation test.
Dosimetry is not included in fault injection testing, but any upsets introduced by fault injection or
radiation are recorded by the test monitor and control components.
Figure F.3 shows a generalization of the test flows used for both fault injection and radiation
testing. A test sample exposes the DUT to faults while the device is operating and records observed
behavior. The test monitor and control component collects these test samples over and over again
to capture the information necessary to perform an evaluation. Whenever a failure is observed the
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test monitor and control component follows procedures to bring the DUT back into a working state.
After the test is initialized into a working state the test flow repeats a cycle of exposure, checking,
and repair until a sufficient amount of data is collected. The repair or reset clears the DUT of all
CRAM upsets and takes any actions necessary to bring the DUT back into a working state.

F.2

Artificial Fault Injection
Fault injection is a common way of emulating SEUs to observe system response [42].

SEUs are mimicked in an SRAM-based FPGA by purposefully writing incorrect values to CRAM.
Incorrect values written to the CRAM are the faults injected. In this dissertation, faults are injected
by writing incorrect values to device configuration memory while a design is operating on the
device.
Fault injection tests included in this dissertation follows the generalized approach for fault
injection as outlined in [42]. Figure F.4 depicts the flow of the fault injection tests. First, the DUT
is brought into a working state. Second, a fault is introduced. Third, the application is allowed
to execute for some time to allow error introduced by the fault to propagate to the outputs of the
DUT. Fourth, diagnostics are run to determine if the DUT returned the expected response. Finally,
the injected fault is scrubbed away though external configuration scrubbing. The DUT is then
recovered and brought back into a working state had any failures occurred. This cycle repeats until
sufficient data has been collected.
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Figure F.4: Fault Injection Flow
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Two forms of artificial fault injection are performed in this dissertation: random and targeted. Random fault injection injects faults into random locations in configuration memory. This
approach mirrors the behavior of SEUs that result from radiation exposure. Randomly injecting
faults evaluates design sensitivity through population sampling producing a statistically significant
estimation of the designs sensitivity toward injected faults [91]. Random fault injection returns
the percentage of faults that result in a failure (number of observed failure events divided by the
number of injected faults). It also identifies failure modes that radiation exposure may cause. Targeted fault injection introduces faults into specific resources in a device. Doing so helps to identify
which resources contribute more to a specific failure mode. This type of analysis lends to better
understanding which component are the more important to replicate.

F.2.1

Random
Random fault injection is used in a large number of SRAM-based FPGA reliability studies

to estimate the sensitivity of a design to radiation-induced failure. Random fault injection typically
assumes that each fault injected at random has an equal likelihood of resulting in design failure.
As such, each injected fault and the resulting response of the system constitutes a Bernoulli trial or
an experiment on a binomial random variable. Given a fault has occur, only two possible outcomes
are recorded: acceptable behavior, or failure. Designs with a higher sensitivity to radiation-induced
failure likely have a high probability of failure given the injection of a random fault.
The sensitivity of the design, or the estimated percentage of configuration bits for each
SRAM-based FPGA design that may result in failure if upset, is estimated using the maximum
likelihood estimator, r̂, of the Binomial distribution:
k
r̂ = ,
n

(F.1)

where k is the number of observed failure events and n is the total number of faults injected. The
outcome of the Bernoulli trail is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. Extended
effort is made to ensure that injected faults are isolated meaning that configuration memory is
scrubbed between injected faults and any residual artifacts are removed before a subsequent fault
is injected.
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Confidence in the maximum likelihood estimation increases as additional trials are conducted. Confidence is measured in terms of a confidence interval. A confidence interval is a range
in which the actual maximum likelihood may reside. Confidence intervals are given with a bound
on their accuracy such as 95% meaning that there is a 95% chance that actual maximum likelihood resides within the provided interval. For a Binomial population sampling scenario (such as
fault injection) a confidence interval is commonly determined using the standard deviation of a
normal approximation based on the central limit theorem. The standard deviation of the maximum
likelihood estimator using a normal approximation is,
s
σ=



k
k
1−
.
n2
n

(F.2)

A 95% confidence interval corresponds to:
95% Confidence Interval = r̂ ± 1.96 × σ .

(F.3)

The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (i.e., maximum likelihood estimate). The smaller the coefficient of variation is, the more confident and significant the
estimation. Thus, the more data collected, the more confident the estimation becomes.
The maximum likelihood estimation can be converted into an average failure rate. This
is accomplished by scaling the average rate of SEU occurrence in the device as a whole by the
maximum likelihood estimation.
Average Failure Rate = Sensitivity × Average SEU Rate

(F.4)

If the pool of randomly injected faults includes all possible fault location in the device, then the
average SEU rate can be scaled directly. If the pool of randomly injected faults represents a subset
of all possible fault locations in the device, then the resulting average failure rate needs to be
further scaled proportional to the subset of fault locations included. An equivalent conversion
is accomplished by multiplying the total number of possible faults by the maximum likelihood
estimate resulting in the approximate number of sensitive bits, which can then be multiplied by the
average SEU rate for a single bit yielding the average failure rate of the design.
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F.2.2

Targeted
Under targeted fault injection, faults are introduced into specific resources or regions of a

design. This fault injection approach leverages critical bit information from vendor tools, data from
an open source project – Project X-Ray [92], and implementation information specific to a built
design. This approach improves the rate of data collection and provide more specific information
as to what regions or resources are more likely to result in a design failure if affected by radiation.
With targeted fault injection, there are two approaches that can be taken: targeted-region
and targeted-resource. Both of these approaches are applied in the experiments of Section 7.1.
Under targeted-region, faults are injected randomly within a targeted subset of fault locations in the
device. Under targeted-resource, faults are injected into specific device resources that correspond
to a logical resource (primitive component or connection) in the design under test. These methods
of fault injection are used to speed up the test and gather more specific information from the test.

Targeted-Region
The experiment in Section 7.1.1 injects targeted-random faults into only the critical bits
of a design. As discussed in Section 2.3, critical bits are configuration bits identified by vendor
tools as potentially utilized by a design. Randomly sampling critical bits for sensitivity provides a
maximum likelihood estimate for failure among upsets in critical bits. Attenuating this estimate,
by the percentage of all possible fault locations that are considered to be critical, yields a maximum
likelihood estimate that is equivalent to an estimate that would be obtained from randomly injecting
faults into any bit location. The targeted-region approach saves time by requiring fewer faults to
be injected to obtain similar results.
An extension of the same experiment injects targeted-random faults into sub-regions of the
same design. This is accomplished by only injecting faults into the critical bits that are associated
with the targeted sub-region. These bits are identified by re-generating a set of critical bits after
removing unwanted regions from the placed and routed design. Regions are removed or maintained
at a hierarchical module level. Only the desired sub-region remains after removing the unwanted
regions.
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Minimal disruption to the original placement and routing of the targeted sub-regions is
caused by the removal of unwanted regions. Some changes are introduced to peripheral routing
where now un-driven routes are tied to ground to create a valid design for generating a set of critical
bits. To filter out the minor changes to peripheral routing, faults are only injected into bits that are
included in both the original set of critical bits and the newly generated set.
Injecting faults randomly into the critical bits of different sub-regions provides a normalized maximum likelihood estimates for each sub-region. This analysis allows for the dissection
of average failure rate into the different sub-regions and aids in determining the sub-region with
the highest average failure rate density. Sub-regions with higher average failure rate densities are
likely to be more beneficial to replicate.

Targeted-Resource
Targeted-resource fault injection injects faults into specific components used by a design.
There is a one-to-one mapping between the resource affected and a component in the design netlist.
This fault injection approach allows the effects of faults to be connected to a specific component in
the design. Such an analysis aids in the identification of the portions of the design that will benefit
the most from circuit replication.
Fault analysis discussed in [75] suggests the purposeful insertion of fault mechanisms into
the description of the design circuity so that faults are allowed to originate from a specific key
point in the circuit. This capability allows for a rapid evaluation of possible failure modes by
exhaustively testing tens-of-thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of LUTs as opposed to sampling
among millions of individual CRAM bits.
In this dissertation, targeted-resource fault injection uses the LUTs of a design as a built-in
fault mechanism. In Section 7.1.2, faults are injected into all of the configuration bits associated
with the logic equation of a specific lookup table. The bits are read out and compared to their expected values prior to fault injection. This confirms the correct mapping between the configuration
bits to the logic equations of the LUTs. Mapping CRAM bits to LUT equations involves identifying the associated bits through Project X-Ray [92] and reordering them to match any perturbations
made during implementation. Inverting all bits associated with the logical LUT effectively inserts
an inverter on the output of the targeted LUT. This allows observation of any adverse outcome and
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corresponds to what might occur if an upset were to affect the circuit at that specific point. Through
this analysis, specific components of the design can be identified as more prone to causing failure if
upset by radiation. This technique is used in this dissertation to identify components of the design
that are more beneficial to replicate.

F.3

Accelerated Radiation Testing
Accelerated neutron radiation testing is the de facto standard for evaluating the impact of

terrestrial radiation induced soft errors in semiconductor devices [1]. The purpose of accelerated
radiation testing is to observe the effects of radiation on a device in a much shorter time scale. Realtime observation can be done as in [90], but real-time radiation testing typically takes much longer
and requires a large number of devices to shorten the data collection period. With accelerated
radiation testing, a single device can be exposed to a large amount of radiation in a short period of
time. This allows data to be collected quickly.
It is recognized that accelerated testing causes upsets to occur more quickly than they would
under normal circumstances in a terrestrial environment. This can overwhelm the test system and
cause unrealistic accumulations of upsets. In some sense, accelerated radiation testing provides
a worst-case bound on expected behavior. There is no indication that the radiation testing data
obtained in this dissertation has been significantly skewed by the rate of radiation exposure.
Neutron radiation testing was chosen for this dissertation because it allows the results to
more closely reflect the effectiveness of the evaluated partial circuit replication techniques in a terrestrial environment. Neutron testing is an important part of evaluating the soft error characteristics
of FPGAs in terrestrial environments [1]. It is important in this dissertation because the evaluated
partial circuit replication techniques may be used in large-scale deployments of commercial FPGA
designs in terrestrial environments [82]. The data collected from accelerated neutron radiation
testing reflects the behavior of the device as it operates in the presence of radiation found in a
terrestrial environment. Of the radiation found in a terrestrial environment that affect integrated
circuits like SRAM-based FPGAs, high-energy neutrons are perhaps the most prevalent form [93].
By exposing a device to a large amount of high-energy neutrons, an estimate can be obtained as to
its behavior in deployment.
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Accelerated neutron radiation tests in this dissertation are conducted at the conducted at
TRIUMF, the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and at the Rutherford Appleton
National Laboratory (RAL) in the United Kingdom. All three of these facilities have a spallation
neutron source with a neutron energy spectra that is very similar to a scaled ground spectrum [1].
These facilities have instruments that are designed to measured the amount of neutron radiation
that an integrated circuit is exposed to from the neutron source. At TRIUMF, the BL1B beam
path is used [66]. At LANSCE the instrument used is the Irradiation of Chips Electronics (ICE
House) experiment. At RAL the instrument used is the ChipIr (instrument for the irradiation of
microelectronics) experiment off the ISIS neutron and muon source. These instruments provide
controlled exposure of integrated circuits to a high-energy accelerated neutron source, and provide
an accurate measurement of the amount of radiation exposure given in terms of fluence or the total
number of high-energy neutrons allowed to pass through each cm2 of the irradiated device [36].
The similar test flow is used for radiation testing as for fault injection testing as described
in Section F.1. During neutron radiation testing, neutron exposure commences with the opening of
the beam shutter and continues throughout the duration of the test. The total fluence of exposure is
recorded and used to calculate the neutron cross section of failure.
Great insights can be gained from neutron radiation testing by calculating the neutron cross
section of failure [36] and converting it to an average failure rate. The cross section is determined
by dividing the total failures observed by the total fluence of exposure. The neutron cross section
is then converted to FIT as the product of the NYC high-energy neutron flux (13 n cm−2 h−1 ),
one-billion hours, and the neutron cross section.
FIT =

13 Neutrons
× 1, 000, 000, 000 Hours × Neutron Cross Section
cm2 Hour

(F.5)

Confidence intervals on neutron cross section estimates are determined through conventional means [43]. If fifty or fewer failures are observed, then the upper and lower bound 95% confidence intervals are determined using observational bounds from a lookup table provided in [43].
If more than fifty failures are observed, confidence intervals are determined using the standard
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deviation of the Normal approximation as follows,
√
Failure Events
2 × Failure Events
95% Confidence Interval =
± 1.96 ×
.
Fluence
Fluence
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(F.6)

APPENDIX G.

TOOL FLOW

Partial circuit replication in this dissertation is applied through the use of custom computer
aided design (CAD) tools. Two tools are used: BYU EDIF tools [26], and a new tool named
SpyDrNet [65]. These tools provide a framework for circuit analysis and transformation. Through
the use of these tools, custom circuit analysis and transformation is conducted that advances the
state-of-the-art in the implementation of partial circuit replication. The use of these tools is part of
a larger tool chain flow for implementing partial circuit replication on a design in an SRAM-based
FPGA.
BYU EDIF tools is the predecessor of SpyDrNet. SpyDrNet was developed to maintain
the core functionality BYU EDIF tools in a new programming language (Python in place of Java),
to leverage the use of well developed libraries like NetworkX for graph analysis, to support new
input and output formats for netlists, and to add new features such as replication across hierarchy (maintaining hierarchical structure while replicating components, ports, and connections). In
short, SpyDrNet was developed over the course of this dissertation to perform netlist analysis and
transformation tasks (needed for the experiments in this dissertation) that could not reasonable be
completed with any pre-existing CAD tools. SpyDrNet provides a rapid prototyping solution for
netlist analysis and transformation that is used heavily in this dissertation.
SpyDrNet is used in the great majority of the experiments included in this dissertation. As
such, this tool will be referred to throughout the remainder of the tool flow discussion. Because
SpyDrNet had not yet been developed, the experiments in Chapter 5 use BYU EDIF tools or variations of the BYU EDIF Tools, written in Java, to perform their netlist analysis and transformation
tasks. To maintain applicability to the experiments in Chapter 5, please consider SpyDrNet to be
synonymous with BYU EDIF Tools when referring to the tool flow for implementing partial circuit
replication.
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Digital hardware circuits consist of discrete components and connections. These components work together through their connections to implement a digital hardware design. Discrete
components and connections in a digital hardware circuit implemented on an SRAM-based FPGA
can have specific attributes (i.e., properties) associated with them. All of this information can be
stored inside a graph-like data structure called a “netlist” which details each component and connection along with their respective attributes. Given a netlist and a set of design constraints, a
functional copy of a design can be implemented.
Netlists are the product of logic synthesis. It is common for a design to begin as a behavioral
description written in a hardware description language (HDL) such as Verilog or VHDL. This
description of behavior is synthesized into a netlist through a process know as logic synthesis.
The produced netlist may be a logical netlist containing gates and resisters, or it might be further
progressed as a technology mapped netlist containing instantiations of primitive components (e.g.,
LUTs, registers, block memories) specific to a device architecture or family.
Figure G.1 depicts the tool flow of a design from HDL to bitstream. SpyDrNet is included
in this flow as a step between logic synthesis and final implementation. The netlist produced by
logic synthesis is provided to SpyDrNet. SpyDrNet performs analysis and transformations on
the netlist and produces a transformed netlist. This netlist is then used by vendor tools in final
implementation to produce a hardware file (i.e., bitstream) for programming the design onto an
SRAM-based FPGA.

HDL
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Netlist

SpyDrNet

Transformed Netlist

Generate Hardware
Files

Figure G.1: Tool Flow

SpyDrNet currently includes a parser and composer that imports and exports netlists written in electronic design interchange format (EDIF). Figure G.2 shows how the SpyDrNet framework can be used to parse, analyze, transform, and compose netlists in many different formats.
Note that Verilog and VHDL in this figure refer to the structural subset of these languages. Parsers
populate an intermediate representation of the netlist in memory using information provided by
the input file. With the netlist in intermediate representation, analysis and transformation of the
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netlist can take place. Once the design is in a state where the user is satisfied (e.g., with all selected components replicated and any support logic added), a composer exports the netlist into a
desired format. Using the SpyDrNet framework, additional parsers and composers can be written
for additional netlist formats. In this dissertation, parsing and composing EDIF proved sufficient
to accomplish the tasks at hand.
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Figure G.2: Processing a Netlist in SpyDrNet

It is important to note that some care needs to be taken to ensure that redundancy modifications are not removed by down stream optimizations in implementation. Reliability modifications
to netlists are often optimized away. One common adjustment to a netlist for reliability purposes, is
a replication of various components. Often when tools see the same functionality with a theoretical
identical result they will attempt to remove the duplicated portion. This defeats the purpose of the
reliability modifications.
SpyDrNet is used in this dissertation for the application of partial TMR and partial DWC.
The current implementation for TMR selects a subset of the circuit to replicate, identifies insertion
points for voters, and then proceeds to replicated and insert voters. Several different approaches
are taken to select components for replication. Then a voter insertion algorithm is used to identify
insertion points for voters. Furnished with this information, custom subroutines transform the
netlist by replicating selected components and corresponding connections and by inserting voters in
the desired locations. SpyDrNet carries out these operations through hierarchical structures, which
allows the preservation of complex design constraints that depend on hierarchy. The application
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of DWC takes an approach similar to TMR, only selected components are duplicated instead of
triplicated and error detectors are inserted instead of voters.
This tool flow is used in conjunction with the designs under test, fault injection, and radiation testing to evaluate the effectiveness of various partial circuit replication approaches. The goal
of these experiments is to better understand the effectiveness of partial circuit replication and to
demonstrate an effective use of partial circuit replication.
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APPENDIX H.

FEEDBACK FOLDING ALGORITHM

The feedback folding algorithm, presented in this appendix, is used in this dissertation to
further breakdown feedback within a strongly connected component (SCC) into nested feedback
groups. One of the challenges of SCC decomposition within a connectivity graph from a large
circuit is that the decomposed graph returned may contain only a handful of large SCCs due to the
presence of feedback throughout the circuit. This algorithm looks for grouping of tight feedback
within SCCs to provide additional information about feedback in the circuit.
Many variations of this algorithm can be had. The form in which the algorithm is presented
in this appendix is the form that was used to help generate tight feedback selections in Chapter 6.
While the structure of the algorithm may differ depending on the application, the intent of the
algorithm remains the same: to provide more information about feedback relationships between
circuit components.
The use of this algorithm begins with a connectivity graph of the circuit. A connectivity
graph represents each component in a circuit as a node and each connection between components
as an edge. This mathematical representation of the circuit allows for the systematic identification
of circuit structures and relationships through graph analysis.
Prior to folding feedback within SCCs in the graph, combinational nodes are removed
from the graph while preserving connections through the removed nodes. Combinational nodes
represent components such as LUTs, adder carry chains, multiplexers, etc. These components
are removed using Algorithm 1. Removing combinational nodes in this manner reduces the size
of the graph, but it also allows for sequential relationship to be viewed more easily. Without
combinational nodes, each connection represents a minimum of one clock cycle delay between
components. Thus, a self-loop in the remaining graph represents a sequential element whose output
can affect its own next state within a single clock cycle.
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Algorithm 1: Remove nodes while preserving connections
Input: C ⊂ G, G
foreach c ∈ C do
foreach p ∈ G.predecessors(c) do
foreach s ∈ G.successors(c) do
G.addedge(p, s);
// Add edges from predecessors to successors
end foreach
end foreach
G.removenode(c);
// Remove nodes from from graph G
end foreach

After removing combinational nodes, Algorithm 2 is used to further decompose SCCs
within the circuit. The feedback folding algorithm looks for tight feedback relationship within
SCCs to bound the search of the algorithm. By looking for tight feedback feedback relationships
within SCCs, it is guaranteed that feedback will be found. Without limited the search in this way,
the algorithm may pointlessly explore portions of the circuit in which no feedback is to be found.
As this algorithm may be executed on very large connectivity graphs, it is important to bound the
search as much as possible to reduce its computational complexity.
Algorithm 2 finds all nodes with self-loops, placing them in their own feedback group. It
finds all feed-forward nodes, which are nodes that are not contained in any feedback group. All
strongly connected components found that are greater than one in size are further broken down
using Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 starts with a collection of nodes that all belong to the same SCC. This algorithm finds subsets of nodes within the SCC that all have the same minimum return distance,
meaning that for each node in a found subset there exists a path with the same minimum number
of edges starting from the node back to itself. The search for a minimum return distance begins a
at very restricted depth that is later extended until a minimum return depth is found. The point of
this restriction is to bound the search so as to prevent spending large amounts of time in portions
of the graph that are void of nodes with a minimum return distance. Limiting the search in this
way reduces the average computational complexity of the search algorithm.
Algorithm 4 is the depth-limited breadth-first search that finds the minimum return distance
of a node back to itself. This algorithm allows for a breadth-first search of the graph, starting from
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Algorithm 2: Feedback folding algorithm top
Input: G
F ← 0;
/
// Feedback hierarchy empty set
SCCs ← strongly connected components(G);
// Tarjan’s SCC algorithm [71]
foreach SCC ∈ SCCs do
if length(SCC) = 1 then
if is selfloop(SCC) then
// If node is its own successor
n ← collapse(SCC,G);
// See Algorithm 5
else
n ← collection to singular(SCC);
// Node is feedforward
end if
else
n ← further fold scc(SCC);
// See Algorithm 3
end if
F.add(n);
// Add node to feedback hierarchy set
end foreach
return F

the node of interest, out as far as the depth-limit will allow. As soon as the node of interest is
re-encountered as part of the search, the minimum number of edges needed in a path to return to
itself is returned. If the node of interest is not found within the search limit, a distance of zero is
returned indicating that a return path has not been found.
Algorithm 5 is used to create a new node that represents a collection of nodes to be removed
from the graph. The predecessors and successors of the collection of nodes are identified, the
nodes themselves are removed, and a new node representing the collection of nodes removed
is connected to the identified predecessors and successors in place of the nodes removed. This
operation decomposes the graph while preserving the set of nodes removed together into a new
representative node. The newly created node is then used in additional analysis as a node in the
graph. For example, the new node may be included in a minimum return distance path.
The result of the feedback folding algorithm is a nested set of sets that contains the tightfeedback groupings of components in the circuit. This collections represents a hierarchical grouping of feedback from feedback relationships with the largest number of clock cycles in feedback
loops to feedback loops with the least number of clock cycles in them. This analysis does not
designate which feedback groups are the most beneficial to replicate, rather is provides more in172

Algorithm 3: Further fold strongly connected components
Input: C ⊂ G, G
while length(C) > 1 do
// Until SCC is completely folded
subG ← G.subgraph(C);
// Make a subgraph of the SCC from graph G
l = 1;
// Limit search depth to reduce computational complexity
candidates ← 0;
/
// Begin with an empty set for candidates
while candidates.isempty() = True do
// Until return distance found
l ← l × 2;
// Double search depth limit
foreach c ∈ C do
d ← find min return distance(s,subG,l);
// See Algorithm 4
if d > 0 and d < l then
// Return distance < l found
l ← d;
candidates ← {c};
// New set with only c as a memeber
else if d = l then
candidates.add(c);
end if
end foreach
end while
if length(C) > length(candidates) then
subsubG ← subG.subgraph(candidates);
subSCCs ← strongly connected components(subsubG);
foreach subSCC ∈ subSCCs do
n ← collapse(subSCC, G);
C.add(n);
end foreach
else
n ← collapse(C, G);
C.add(n);
end if
foreach candidate ∈ candidates do
C.remove(candidate);
end foreach
end while
return collection to singular(C)
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// Tarjan’s [71]
// See Algorithm 5

// See Algorithm 5

Algorithm 4: Depth-limited breadth-first search to find minimum return distance
Input: m ∈ G, G, l ≥ 1
F ← 0;
/
Q ←queue();

// Empty set for found nodes
// Empty queue

Q.enqueue(m, 0);
// Initialize search with node m at distance 0
while Q.isempty() = False do
n, d ← Q.dequeue();
if d < l then
// If search depth-limit not met
foreach s ∈ G.successors(n) do
if s = m then
return d + 1;
// Minimum return distance found
else if s ∈
/ F then
F.add(s);
Q.enqueue(s, d + 1);
end if
end foreach
end if
end while
return 0 ;

// Minimum return distance not found within search limit

formation as to how feedback is structured in the circuit. This information can then be used to
generate selections for partial circuit replication, but the most beneficial means for leveraging this
information is unknown. From the results of Chapter 6, it appears more beneficial to replicate
selections that include some level of tight-feedback.
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Algorithm 5: Collapse a collection of nodes into a single node
Input: C ⊂ G, G
n ← frozenset(C);
P ← 0;
/
S ← 0;
/

// Create a new node
// Empty set for predecessors
// Empty set for successors

foreach c ∈ C do
foreach p ∈ G.predecessors(c) do
if p ∈
/ C then
P.add(p);
end if
end foreach
foreach s ∈ G.successors(c) do
if s ∈
/ C then
S.add(s);
end if
end foreach
end foreach
foreach c ∈ C do
G.remove(c);
end foreach
foreach p ∈ P do
G.addedge(p, n);
end foreach
foreach s ∈ S do
G.addedge(n, s);
end foreach
return n;

// Add all predecessors not in C to P

// Add all successors not in C to S

// Remove all nodes in C from graph G

// Add edges from all predecessors in P to n

// Add edges from n to all successors in S

// Return the new node that represents the collapsed nodes
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APPENDIX I.

FPGA-BASED COMPUTER NETWORKING DESIGNS

SRAM-based FPGAs offer many features that are beneficial to computer networking applications. They provide high-bandwidth serial I/O ports, a large amount of configurable resources,
and the ability to be reprogrammed after device deployment. The ability to be reprogrammed postdeployment allows the latest network protocols, design architectures, and updates to be deployed
in a short period of time. These features promote the use of SRAM-based FPGAs in computer
networking applications.
SRAM-based FPGAs are supported by a large configuration memory that is susceptible
to radiation induced upsets, which may be a concern for application that require high reliability.
The likelihood of radiation causing an upset in a single FPGA in a terrestrial environment is extremely small [9], but the likelihood of an upset is greater among many deployed instances (see
Appendix B). Built-in soft-error mitigation (SEM) features are available in many modern SRAMbased FPGAs to address these concerns [14], [15], but the use of additional SEM techniques may
be necessary to meet application needs.
This appendix discusses the FPGA-based computer networking switches used in this dissertation. Section I.1 discusses the severe failure mode mitigated by partial circuit replication.
Section I.2 provides a high level description of the need for test designs. Section I.3 and Section I.4
discuss material specific to the commercial and open source SRAM-based FPGA networking designs used in this dissertation, respectively.

I.1

Partial Circuit Replication to Address Severe Failure Modes
Partial circuit replication may be used to address severe failure modes that occur infre-

quently compared to less severe failure modes. Such is the case with FPGA-based computer
networking. Computer networking in general has built-in mechanisms that address reliability.
Network protocols such as TCP/IP anticipate disruptions in connectivity and degradation of link
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to allow for packets of data to be lost or received out of order. Network architectures provision for
failover, which automatically redirects network traffic though a redundant system or network connection when a failure is detected. A broad range of failures can be properly handled and mitigated
though the use of these already existing mechanisms that are built into the application, but there
are severe failure modes that occur that are not addressed by these mechanisms. Partial circuit
replication can be used to target and address these severe failure modes.
A class of severe failures that partial circuit replication is suited to address are failures
caused by faults that are undetected by the target system and result in unrecoverable outages of
service. In [74], these failure modes are described as follows, “The effect of the [radiation-induced]
upset is not detected by the circuit and results in a failure (data corruption, stuck network traffic).
In a [computer networking] router, this might be the case of a device causing all incoming traffic
to be silently dropped (“black-hole”).” Since these failure modes are severe, these failure modes
are less tolerable. In [74], it is shown that approximately 14% of all failures experienced by an
Internet core router were designated as unrecoverable severe failures. Thus, there is opportunity to
use partial circuit replication to address a severe failure mode that occurs less frequently than other
failure modes. Persistent undetected loss of network traffic is studied in the commercial FPGA
based computer networking design, and any persistent deviation from expected behavior is studied
in the open source FPGA-based computer networking design.

I.2

Evaluating Partial Circuit Replication Using Designs Under Test
In proving any mitigation scheme, it is important to have designs that can be tested before

and after the mitigation scheme has been applied. The test conducted must be able to estimate the
average failure rate of the design. This makes it possible to observe the effectiveness of the applied
mitigation scheme. Having testable designs allows for empirical data to be collected. This data
can then be used to more confidently support conclusions made about the mitigation approach.
Designs under test must be able to accept input stimulus and provide a response. Ideally,
the input stimulus exercises a significant portion of the design under test. The output response
reflects the operation of the design under test. When the design provides an output response that is
in agreement with expected behavior, the design is considered to be operating correctly.
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To estimate the average failure rate of the design under test, the soft error response of the
design must be observable. As such, the test setup must be able to introduce faults into the design
that are similar to the faults that a design may experience in deployment. The test setup must be
able to observe the effects the faults introduced. This is accomplished by providing meaningful
stimulus to the design while a fault is present and by being able to check for proper behavior. This
type of test setup typically requires the design under test to be implemented on a target FPGA
device with I/O made accessible to the test setup.
Developing a complete test setup is labor intensive. Other fields of research need only
to place and route a design to examine timing, power, or structural characteristics. Studying the
effectiveness of partial circuit replication requires functional designs (stimulus in, response out)
that are accompanied with meaningful stimulus and checks for proper behavior. With that level
of test setup development, the design can be fitted into a test environment for fault injection or
radiation testing. Using the design under test, the stimulus, and behavioral checks, the average
radiation-induced failure rates can be made estimated through fault injection or radiation testing.
Those estimates are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of partial circuit replication; thus, the
labor required to develop a complete test setup is justified.
Two FPGA-based computer networking designs are included in the experiments of this
dissertation: one commercial and one open source. The FPGA-based computer networking designs
are complex. They have multiple clock domains and incorporate several independently developed
sub-modules to provide the desired functionality (including third-party IP). For these designs, it is
desirable to see a small amount of partial circuit replication significantly lessen the likelihood of a
specific undesirable failure mode. Insights gained from the experiments on these designs advance
the effective use of partial circuit replication on complex SRAM-based FPGA designs.
What follows in Section I.3 and Section I.4 is a description of each FPGA-based computer
networking design under test and their respective test setup (stimulus and checker). Each design
has its own test setup. Among each design, the same test setup is used for both fault injection
and radiation testing with slight variations. These designs and their test setups are included in this
appendix so as to consolidate shared material found among the different experiments detailed in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 7.
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I.3

Commercial Networking Switch
The commercial networking switch used in this dissertation is a campus backbone switch.

This type of computer networking switch is typically used to link smaller networks together
throughout an entire building or across a wide range of locations. Figure I.1 provides a high-level
overview of components in the switch. The switch uses SRAM-based FPGAs to process most of
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Figure I.1: Commercial FPGA-based Computer Networking Switch System Layout

the network traffic. Each FPGA connects to a group of network ports through dedicated ASIC
components. Communication between the FPGAs and ASICs is conducted using a high-speed
chip-to-chip packet transfer protocol. Each module in a chassis is equipped with two FPGAs and
their associated network port connections. Installed modules are governed by a system controller
and are interconnected on the system’s backplane. Additional modules can be added to the switch
to expand network capacity.
The FPGA design targeted by this dissertation resides in a Virtex-7 FPGA (XC7VX330T)
on a modular network board in the system. The design within the FPGA in this system is large and
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complex. Table I.1 show the resource utilization of the FPGA design. The design occupies 86% of
the available slices. It consumes more than half of the registers and block memories and more than
one-third of the available look up tables (LUTs). Most of the global clock buffers and I/O pins are
also being used. In this dissertation, the size of the design is important for two reasons. First, it
limits the amount of redundancy that can be added to the design for SEU mitigation. Second, the
larger the design is, the more challenging it can be to debug and protect against soft-error induced
failure behavior.
Table I.1: Resource Utilization of the Original Design

Virtex 7 Device
Slices
Registers
LUTs
Block Memories
Global Clock Buffers
I/O

Used
44,256 (86%)
115,619 (56%)
141,317 (34%)
429 (57%)
30 (93%)
622 (88%)

Total
51,000
204,000
408,000
750
32
700

The physical test setup developed for this design under test provides interesting stimulus
and a method to observe failure events. A diagram of the test infrastructure is shown in Figure I.2.
A single modular network board of the commercial network system is connected to a network
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Figure I.2: Commercial FPGA-based Computer Networking Switch Test Infrastructure

traffic generator. A random stream of data is presented to the network switch by both ports on the
traffic generator. The network switch is configured to redirect all incoming traffic through all of the
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ports in a loopback fashion such that traffic entering the first port will travel through all ports and
return to the traffic generator out of the last port and the same in reverse (from the last to the first
port). This stimulus ensures that data flows through key resources in the FPGA design and makes
it possible to observe network disruptions. The FPGA on the modular extension is connected to a
custom JTAG configuration manager (JCM) [94], which enables observation of upsets in CRAM
and the simulated corruption of CRAM through fault injection. The JCM, traffic generator, and
the network switch console terminal are all connected to a host computer. The host computer
orchestrates the flow of experiments on the system.
The experiment in Section 5.1.1 makes use of four data ports on the modular network board
while all other experiments on the commercial FPGA-based computer networking switch make use
of sixteen ports. Utilizing more ports increases the likelihood of an observed failure and alters the
distribution of the average failure rate throughout the design.
A simple test flow is used for the commercial networking switch (see Figure I.3). This test
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Figure I.3: Test Flow for the Commercial FPGA-based Computer Networking Switch

flow is similar to the test flow described in Section F.1. First, the system is brought into a working
state with traffic flowing correctly through all ports. Then a CRAM bit is purposefully corrupted
if fault injection is being used, or the FPGA is exposed to the accelerated neutron beam if testing
under radiation. The flow of network traffic is periodically monitored. Once a second, the flow of
network traffic is checked. Under fault injection, if the flow is still good, then the fault is repaired,
a new CRAM bit is corrupted, and the test continues. Under radiation testing, if the flow is still
good, the test continues to the next check. If ever the flow of data drops below 90% capacity for
an extended period of time (3 seconds) without recovery, the system is rebooted, and a persistent
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silent network disruption is recorded. Other failure modes detected by the network system are not
considered persistent silent network disruptions and are noticed only to bring the system back into
a working state.

I.4

Open Source Networking Switch
The open source networking switch design under test is a 4-port Gigabit Ethernet switch.

The design was chosen due to its use of multiple clock domains, proprietary IP cores and strict
timing and placement constraints. This design parallels the commercial networking switch in the
challenges it presents to partial circuit replication, but it is a more simple design to study. Much of
what can be learned from the open source networking switch is also applicable to the commercial
networking switch design.
This design is implemented on the NetFPGA-1G-CML development board, which utilizes
a Kintex 7 325T SRAM-based FPGA (XC7K325TFFG676-1). The NetFPGA-1G-CML is a versatile network hardware development platform [95]. The FPGA design is based on the NetFPGA
SUME Learning Switch. The NetFPGA SUME IP cores were ported over to the NetFPGA-1GCML board as part of the development of this design.
Figure I.4 shows the high-level organization of the open source networking switch. The
components are subdivided into three regions: interfaces, processing cores, and the monitoring
system. Interface modules are shown in red, the processing cores are shown in blue, and the
monitoring system is shown in yellow. The interface modules on the left are input interfaces for
data coming into the design and the interface modules on the right are output interfaces for data
exiting the design. An input and out interface are assigned to each of the four available ports on
the device. The monitoring system is implemented using an embedded soft core processor, the
MicroBlaze, that counts the number of packets that travel to and from each of the sub-modules in
the design.
Data flows through the open source networking switch in the following way. First, data
is received from a physical Ethernet port into a media access controller (MAC) over a reduced
gigabit media-independent interface (RGMII). A proprietary third party MAC, the Tri-Mode Ethernet Media Access Controller (TEMAC) from Xilinx, is instanced for each port. Data entering
the MAC from the physical port is forwarded to the input arbiter. The input arbiter buffers an
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Figure I.4: Ethernet Switch Block Diagram

incoming packet of data and forwards the whole packet to the output port lookup module. The
output port lookup module extracts the destination address from the packet of data and determines
the destination port. The packet of data is then forwarded to the appropriate output queue for the
destination port. When the output interface (included in the MAC) is ready, data is removed from
the output queue and sent to the physical port over RGMII. This flow of data requires a significant
amount of buffering and control logic to support the gigabit data rates.
Table I.2 shows the resource utilization of the FPGA design. The design required 27%
of the FPGA’s available block memories and 17% of the available slices. The design consists of
eight different clock domains: a system clock domain, six interface clock domains, and a reference
clock domain. The availability of resources is not a constraining factor for the application for
partial circuit replication for this particular design. There are enough resources available that all
components in the design could be replicated for TMR or DWC. However, the application of partial
circuit replication is constrained by timing requirements, clock domain crossings, and the use of
third-party IP.
A networking test system was created to measure the impact of SEUs on the behavior of
the NetFPGA switch. This system is used to compare the reliability of the system before and
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Table I.2: Resource Utilization of the Baseline Design
Kintex 7 Device
Slices
Registers
LUTs
Block Memories
Global Clock Buffers
I/O

Used
8,456 (17%)
29,615 (7%)
18,345 (9%)
120 (27%)
8 (25%)
53 (13%)

Total
50,950
407,600
203,800
445
32
400

after partial circuit replication is applied to the FPGA design. The testbench consists of three primary components: the JTAG Configuration Manager (JCM), the traffic generator, and the Ethernet
switch. These components are interconnected, as shown in Fig. I.5. The traffic generator is responsible for creating and transmitting Ethernet packets into the NetFPGA Ethernet switch. Random
streams of Ethernet packages are send between ports in alternating patterns using the NetFPGA
switch for connectivity. In this way, the traffic generator provides the necessary stimulus to test
the functionality of the NetFPGA switch. The traffic generator also serves as a traffic checker,
which allows for failure detection. It attempts to match every packet that it receives to one that
had previously been transmitted by the generator. This allows the traffic generator to detect packets that have corrupt headers or data, packets that have been misrouted, and traffic that has been
dropped. The JCM orchestrates the test. It controls the traffic generator over an auxiliary Ethernet
connection and it manages the configuration memory of the FPGA on the NetFPGA development
board (for programming, configuration scrubbing, detecting upsets, and fault injection).
Data is collected for fault injection and radiation testing using a test flow that is similar to
the test flow described in Section F.1 and shown in Figure F.3. First, the test setup is initialized
such that data generated from the traffic generator is properly flowing through open source network
switch. Next, the switch is exposed to radiation for radiation testing or a fault is injected for
fault injection testing. Next, the JCM monitors statistics being collected on the traffic generator
and networking switch and detects any upsets that occur in configuration memory. Any upset
detected in configuration memory is recorded and overwritten through configuration memory. Any
deviation from expected behavior, as monitored through the statistics collected by the JCM, is
recorded. If a deviation is detected, the JCM progressively attempts to restore proper functionality
by first re-evaluating after configuration memory is scrubbed, followed by reprogramming the
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Figure I.5: Network Switch Test System

networking switch FPGA, followed by power cycling the networking switch board. Once the
networking switch is brought back into a working state, the test resumes. Radiation exposure
continues throughout the test, or faults are introduced through each test cycle.
There are two separate definitions of what is considered a failure in the experiments conducted on the open source FPGA-based computer networking switch. In the experiments included
in Chapter 5, a failure is defined as any deviation from expected failure. This includes any occurrence data corruption, misrouting, and packet loss. In the experiments included in Chapter 7,
a failure is defined as any persistent deviation from expected behavior, which results when a deviation is not resolved after a configuration scrubbing cycle completes. Persistent failures are
considered to be a more severe failure mode because of their impact continues until the device
reprograms or is power cycled.
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